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As part of the post-disruption news landscape this thesis investigates the 
construction (Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Couldry and Hepp, 2017) of North Korea 
and South Korea in international news. I argue the digital disruption of the news 
industry has not only transformed the delivery of news but also the practice of 
crafting stories on the Koreas. Taking Picard’s (2014) Twilight or New Dawn of 
Journalism thesis as a starting point, this thesis takes Picard’s post-disruption 
newsroom model and applies it to international news. Under this conception of news 
as an industry, newsrooms have become the site of the curation and distribution of 
news rather than a site of news gathering and production. Picard terms this the 
“service mode of journalism”. The scholarly practice of situating news framing 
research of this nature in a newsroom is rendered outdated when viewed through the 
lens of two digital migrant news organisations: news.com.au and The Guardian. 
Despite the changes in the role and function of the newsroom, journalism as a field 
of scholarship has been slow to respond. Within framing theory and methodology 
scholarship there is a persistence in applying outdated methods of newsroom 
ethnography in keeping with the classic studies in the tradition (Tuchman, 1978; 
Gans, 1979; Gitlan, 1980; Gamson, 1988; Entman, 1991, 1993; Reese, 2005). This 
thesis responds to the transformation of the role of the newsroom by moving beyond 
the newsroom and into the network where the stories on Korea are constructed. This 
thesis also introduces “networked framing” as a methodology as a means of going 
beyond simple salience in news story telling. A taxonomy of the network is mapped 
followed by a simple qualitative framing analysis of the story as an artefact. Finally, 
long form semi-structured interviews with journalists on the ground producing content 
on North Korea and South Korea for the international network were conducted. 
Through these interviews the strains and stresses of reporting on these countries are 
revealed as factors that impact the overall narrative of news on North Korea and 
South Korea as part of the ‘journalist frame’.  
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This study was inspired and is grounded in my experience working as a journalist in 
South Korea. 
 
After six years working as a journalist, in early 2002 I was offered position with the 
Associated Press in South Korea working as part of small team covering the FIFA 
World Cup. I had never been to the country. I knew nothing of the place and its 
people, yet this would become one a formative and deeply emotional experience in 
my life as a journalist. 
 
Two weeks before the end of the World Cup, two 14-year-old girls, Shin Hyo-sun and 
Shim Mi-seon, were run over and killed by an American Army tracked vehicle just 
outside of Seoul. The event sparked anti-American protests that would continue into 
early 2003 and split the country. At the beginning of July, after the final of the World 
Cup, I was due to return to Nepal where I had been reporting on the civil war. I 
ended up living in cheap love motels in Seoul and Uijongbu, just north of Seoul, until 
January 2003 covering the aftermath of the girl’s deaths.  
 
I was unprepared for the outpouring of grief and then anger on the streets of villages, 
towns and cities across South Korea. The death of the girls and the collective sense 
of pain that followed could not have contrasted more with the with the euphoria 
around the World Cup.  
 
In the middle of a 2006 I returned to South Korea – this time as a senior staff writer. I 
spent the next five years at AP’s Seoul bureau where I reported on North Korea and 
South Korea, managed editorial processes, was part of a team who set up the first 
English speaking wire service bureau in North Korea, advised governments and 
NGOs on their North Korea policies, and mentored early career journalists. During 
this period, I had number of short stints as bureau chief.  
 
These were times of change for journalism as an industry and the journalism on the 
Koreas. The collapse of the journalism business model and the rise of social media 
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were changing the face of how we journalists went about our work. There were also 
changes in what we covered on South Korea.  
 
From my earlier experience, the types of stories we traditionally told on South Korea 
centred around civil and industrial disobedience, huge sporting events (1988 
Olympics, 2002 FIFA World Cup), the military relationship with The United States, 
and the occasional skirmish with North Korea. Even so, South Korea was a 
backwater, and foreign journalism on the country was sporadic at best. During my 
time with the Seoul bureau, a new type of story appeared. This type of story focused 
on the impact of economic success and material excess. Stories of South Korean’s 
addiction to plastic surgery, strange and wonderful online culture and behaviour, 
extreme work culture, competitive society, and high suicide rates became more 
common and painted a picture of a dysfunctional society struggling to come to terms 
with a new identity. These kinds of stories were at odds with my views and 
experience in the country. People seemed no more or less happy than home. None 
of my friends had undergone any plastic surgical procedures. I knew no one who 
would go on to commit suicide. 
 
During the same period, demand for journalism on North Korea exploded. In my 
workplace, the pressure to produce content on North Korea by our masters in the 
United State became very pronounced. The type and style of story on North Korea 
changed from that involved South Korea to stand alone article about life and events 
in the country. One of the things that struck early on in my time in Seoul as what an 
inappropriate place it was to report on North Korea from. North Korean websites 
were blocked in South Korea. The South Korean National Security Act (NSA) made it 
illegal to access such websites and also forbade the dissemination and/or promotion 
of information that painted North Korea in any but the harshest light. South Korean 
mainstream news media giants including the nation’s largest media outlet, The 
Chosun Ilbo, were a key source of stories on North Korea foreign journalists 
operating in South Korea despite these media organisations being deeply 
conservative and anti-North Korea. This combined with the fact North Korea and 
South Korea were still at war made reporting anything positive about North Korea 
from the south impossible.  
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Many of my colleagues were aware of these things and did their best find ways to do 
reliable and compelling journalism on North Korea from Seoul. This resulted in North 
Korean defectors becoming the ‘go to’ for many stories on North Korea. As this 
thesis reveals, defectors are not without their issues as sources for information on 
North Korea. Another solution was to report directly from North Korea. I was part of a 
team who negotiated with the North Korean authorities to establish a news bureau in 
Pyongyang. As part of this process, I travelled to North Korea many times. The North 
Korea I experienced firsthand was at odds with the North Korea I knew from the 
media I consumed. The people were welcoming and kind, and never once did I fear 
for my safety. In 2012 Associated Press opened a Pyongyang bureau, and, again, as 
this study shows, this initiative was not without its problems. 
 
After leaving Associated Press I took a job at a university in Seoul teaching 
journalism. This gave me time to reflect on my experience as a foreign journalist in 
Korea. As I reflected on the gap in the way the North Korea and South Korea were 
reported in the foreign press and my first-hand experience living and working in 
these two countries, I became more and more perplexed. This is where the long 
journey toward writing this document began. The question, “Why are these countries 
reported like are?” dominated my thinking for almost a decade. The answer to this 
question involved the journalists reporting on North Korea and South Korea, and this 





Set against a backdrop of the digital disruption and collapse of journalism and a 
history of inaccurate representations of both North Korea and South Korea, this 
thesis seeks to understand the contemporary construction and subsequent framing 
of the Koreas for a Western audience.  First, the post-disruption network that 
supports and feeds the market on the Koreas is mapped. Then, a sample of content 
from news.com.au and The Guardian on the countries is analysed for their frames. 
Finally, journalists covering events and issues from the Koreas are interviewed in 
order to form a complete view on why the coverage of the Koreas is like it is.  
 
This study also seeks to position framing as a theory and methodology within a 
culture of industrial change. This means bringing the journalist back into the frame in 
order to understand how the challenges of reporting on North Korea and South 
Korea impact journalism on the countries. 
 
1.1 Korea – A World Away 
 
For millennia, the Korean people were cut off from the rest of the world as ‘The 
Hermit Kingdom’ (Cumings, 2005). When they did emerge as part of a regional 
order, they did so as a reluctant vassal state subservient to China.  
 
Despite living in the shadow of China, Korea did not fall under the full control of 
another country until 1910 (Tudor, 2012). The period 1910-1945 saw Korea 
absorbed into greater Japan. The extreme brutality of Japanese colonisation has left 
an indelible mark on both Koreas (Oberdorfer & Carlin, 2013) and in many ways 
defines many aspects of contemporary North Korea and South Korea. For example, 
Myers (2015) argues the organisation of the North Korean state and North Korean 
ideology is much more a product of post-Meiji Japan than Marx, Lenin, Stalin or Mao. 
A similar argument made is in regard to South Korea. Eckert (2016) argues South 
Korea’s regimental corporate and government cultures and the blurred lines between 
government and business are a product of Japanese militarism in Korea during the 
colonial period. During this period, Korea was under complete media repression 
(Cumings, 2005). All media was subject to censorship by Tokyo and all media had to 
be published in Japanese.  
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Despite the end of Japan’s colonial ambitions in 1945, under-reporting and a lack of 
interest in Korea on the part of Western news media continued into the late 1940s 
and the onset of the Korean War in 1950. The Korea War claimed the lives of 2.5 
million North Koreans (out of a total population of ten million) (Martin, 2004), as well 
as almost six hundred thousand South Koreans (Cumings, 2010). The intensity of 
the fighting and the rugged terrain made reporting from the field dangerous with most 
journalists covering the conflict based in Osaka, Japan (Brady, 2007; Cumings, 
2010). This made getting reliable information on the conflict difficult and resulted in 
the war going underreported and eventually widely regarded as the “forgotten war” 
(Brady, 2007). Cumings (2010) said the lack of firsthand accounts coming from 
Korea during the war saw the conflict framed as a clash between the geo-political 
east and west. As a result, stories of the suffering of Korean people went untold. 
Cumings (2010) said: 
 
The point to remember is this was a civil war and, as a British diplomat once 
said, “every country has a right to have its War of the Roses.” The true 
tragedy was not the war itself, for a civil conflict purely among Koreans might 
have resolved the extraordinary tensions generated by colonialism, national 
division, and foreign intervention. The tragedy was that the war solved 
nothing: only the status quo ante was restored, only a cease-fire held the 
peace. (p. 35). 
 
The cessation of conflict saw the two Koreas develop in very different ways.  
 
By the early 1960s, South Korea was under the authoritarian rule of former South 
Korean strongman, Park Chung-hee. Park had no appetite for criticism and dissent, 
and during his rule an unknown number of South Koreans vanished (Oberdorfer & 
Carlin, 2013). Park did not allow a free press. All media, local and foreign, had to 
conform to his vision of a disciplined, austere, and highly controlled society (Baik, 
2011). Although Park’s time as South Korean leader came to an end with his 
assassination in 1979, deep suspicion and distrust of a free press in government 
circles endured in South Korea until 1998 when the first non-conservative president, 
Kim Dae-jung, was elected (Snyder, 2018).  
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North Korea had never had any pretensions of a free press. Foreign visitors, 
including journalists, have never had freedom of movement or association in the 
country.  
 
North Korea was thrust onto the international stage with the collapse of the Soviet 
Union (Fifield, 2019b; Oberdorfer & Carlin, 2013). North Korea had survived and 
prospered under the patronage of the Soviet Union. Without the Soviets, North 
Korea was forced to other sources as a means of survival. According to Myers 
(2010, 2016), North Korea was forced to exert pressure on South Korea. The result 
has been the cycle of cross-border provocations on the part of North Korea. All of 
this was amplified by the “Arduous March” – a famine that killed as many as twenty 
per cent of North Koreans in the late 1990s. To survive, the Kim regime was forced 
to cede some of their power to the North Korean military and give up control of food 
and fuel supply (Smith, 2015; Tudor & Pearson, 2015). This enabled small-scale 
commerce to flourish. Kim’s existential crisis and subsequent threats and attacks on 
South Korea, Japan, and the United States in the wake of the Arduous March also 
drew the fascination of the international news media. This fascination continues to 
this day. 
 
1.2 The Western glare 
 
Said (1978) observed that there is an assumption in Western scholarship that as 
time marches on, we get better at understanding the world around us. The general 
idea is that, as we accumulate knowledge in a rigorous and organised way, the more 
reliable that knowledge becomes until we, as a society, arrive at a state of certainty 
over what is under scrutiny. Said was writing about the processes of Orientalism that 
for him were central in creating and maintaining an “otherness” in viewing and 
understanding the orient. Said (1978) said the processes and outcomes of 
Orientalism as a tradition of constructing and maintaining the “other” and otherness 
is both latent and manifest and at its core ethnocentric. For Asad (2003) this 
otherness found expression in the post-9/11 west with George W Bush’s designation 
of the Axis of Evil – including Iraq, Iran and - most interestingly in the context of this 
study – North Korea. In what Asad saw as an act othering, America and much of 
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Europe had shifted from their modern secular foundations to a new formation of the 
secular state that supports ideas of good and evil and by extension enhances 
perceived difference of the other. 
 
Spurr (1993) noted that latent and embedded misunderstandings of the non-Western 
parts of the world become manifest in the ways such places are reported by Western 
journalists. Spurr argued: 
 
Constructing a “coherent representation” out of “incomprehensible realities” is 
one of the greatest challenges for journalists, a challenge that becomes even 
more difficult when the Western journalist confronts such realities in the non-
Western world. (1993, p 3) 
 
In keeping with Said’s Orientalism, Spurr argues further that such representations 
are made in the service of empire building, control, and colonisation. He argues 
representations of faraway lands tend to be formulaic and deny the complexity of the 
people they cover. Thussu (2007) goes further arguing coverage of foreign lands in 
the western news amounts to little more than infotainment created and disseminated 
in the interests of American led Western neo-liberal imperialism. Thussu says: 
 
While wars and conflicts are presented by infotainment conglomerates as 
high-octane spectacles of moral crusades to promote opaque notions of 
freedom and democracy across the world, real agenda may be more 
concerned with control and consolidation of power on a global scale. (2007, p 
121) 
 
Bemoaning a formulaic caricature driven representation of North Korea in the 
Western news media is a favourite topic for many in the North Korean watching 
community. Smith (2015) says North Korea as a caricature is as old as North Korea 
itself, and, “Caricatures of both government and society have been remarkably 
pervasive and persistent during the post-Cold War era in their shaping of ‘common 
knowledge’ about North Korea” (p.20). Smith says caricatures work because they 
contain an element of truth or perceived truth. More troubling, Smith argues, is that 
“Caricature also provides the staple of racism and the ethnic stereotyping and is 
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dangerous in its dehumanising of entire peoples by reducing them to a small number 
of allegedly shared characteristics” (p.20).  Cumings argues the caricature and 
misrepresentation of both Koreas goes back further with roots in the early Soviet 
Union with Koreans widely viewed as a distant, savage, and a devious other 
(Cumings, 2017).  
 
The construction of modern North Korea and South Korea relies on an “open” and 
“closed” dichotomy (Cumings, 2005). South Korea is the open, fun, and sometimes 
kooky global popular culture leader and trendsetter. South Korea is an arbiter of 
“cool” (Nye & Kim., 2013). South Korea’s cultural products are easily recognisable 
around the world with their movies, television dramas, and pop music leading a 
global soft power charge. South Korean brands like Samsung, Hyundai, and LG are 
among the world’s most sought after. In recent times, South Korea’s democracy and 
the power of peaceful protest have been an example to the world of how popular 
democracy should function. North Korea, on the other hand, is autarkic, remote, 
violent, and bizarre (Hastings, 2016). As with many of the popular representations of 
the two countries, at its core this study argues these representations are at best 
inaccurate and at worst willfully ignorant. For example, in A most enterprising 
country: North Korea in the global economy, Hastings (2016) argues the orthodox 
understanding of North Korea as a hermit kingdom hermetically sealed away from 
the rest of global economy propagated by the likes of Cha (2012) is a fiction. Indeed, 
Hastings makes a claim for the opposite, saying contemporary North Korea has 
been shaped as a response to global forces, economic and otherwise (p. 96). Smith 
(2015) and Tudor and Pearson (2015) make similar claims, all arguing North Korea 
at home and abroad is far more integrated and open than the casual journalistic 
observers and Western policy hawks are willing to admit. 
 
1.3 A Disrupted Industry 
 
News and news production are in a constant state of change. The digital disruption 
of journalism is important for this study as the disruption of news content and 
practice, on an industrial scale, defines the ecosystem in which news is gathered, 
produced, and distributed. Gone are many of the news organisations that dominated 
the news industry during the twentieth century. This is as true for news on North 
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Korea and South Korea as news on anything or anywhere else, with the old Western 
news giants that still maintain a presence on the Korean Peninsula only just hanging 
on. It is also true for wire services. Maintaining a presence on the Korean Peninsula 
in times of such dramatic change has required existing news organisations to 
change their practice and associated content. In doing so, the fundamental nature of 
what is journalism work and how to do the work has been transformed significantly.  
 
This study is conceived around the notion of ‘getting outside’ the newsroom in the 
digital age, inspired by Zelizer's (2004) argument that much of what matters about 
journalism today does not take place in the newsroom (Witschge, Anderson, 
Domingo, & Hermida, 2016). A changing ecosystem of journalism should lead to 
corresponding changes in journalism research but, as Pavlik (2013) argues, both the 
news industry and academia have been slow to react to the disruption that has seen 
rivers of advertising revenue slow to a trickle. Still, there is an ever-growing corpus 
on the digital disruption and journalism and the practice of doing journalism in a 
disrupted environment.  
 
Picard (2014) says for more than a century news has been produced within an 
industrial mode of production. Within this mode of news production companies had 
the size and power to bring together the resources and equipment necessary to 
produce and disseminate news. They also drew upon a skilled, specialised, and 
professionalised workforce in aid of printing or broadcasting the news of the day. 
This industrialised or “legacy” mode of news production has been irreparably 
disrupted and changed forever with the digital disruption of news. While 
acknowledging elements of the industrial mode of news still exist and continue to 
fight for survival, Picard (p.506) argues the digital disruption of news has resulted in 
the reconfiguration or “re-institutionalisation” (Greenwood, Oliver, Lawrence, & 
Meyer, 2017; Scott, 2008) of the news industry. Central to this response to the digital 
disruption of news has been the emergence of the service mode of news and the 
craft mode of production.  
 
Picard defines the service mode of journalism as one where “news products 
(traditionally newspapers and broadcasts) are being transformed into services that 
firms stream across a variety of platforms. The companies are becoming more 
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focused on distribution rather than gathering and producing news” (2014, p. 503). 
Picard states further that big news companies are increasingly relying on news and 
commentary through syndication. He argues news organisations in the service mode 
of journalism are about delivery and dissemination of a product rather than traditional 
journalism.  
 
In this study, The Guardian Australia and news.com.au are investigated to gauge 
how they “do” international journalism with a specific focus on North Korea and 
South Korea. Both news organisations are interesting as they have visible 
manifestations of the digital disruption of news. Both are web-based and both rely 
heavily on outsourced content to populate their pages. In the case of news.com.au, 
this reliance is almost complete. news.com.au is News Corporation’s primary digital 
offering, aggregating material from the numerous Rupert Murdoch-owned news 
media across Australia and around the world.  
 
Briefly, the service mode of journalism, according to Picard (2014), defines 
newsrooms and news organisations that are concerned with the distribution of 
content rather than the creation of content. The Guardian Australia is not as 
singularly service-oriented as news.com.au. The Guardian Australia is part of the 
broader Guardian news organisation. The Guardian Australia was launched in May 
2013. Since then the broader organisation has ridden the ups and downs of the 
contemporary journalism ecosystem, with significant challenges being posed to the 
longevity of the organisation. Like news.com.au, The Guardian Australia has 
responded to the challenges of making news pay by offering a free product. Like 
news.com.au, The Guardian relies heavily on outside providers for their copy on the 
Koreas. Unlike news.com.au, The Guardian maintains a full-time presence in the 
region with a correspondent in Tokyo. This posting’s focus is Japan, so the coverage 
of the Koreas is limited (The Guardian Japan correspondent, Justin McCurry, was 
interviewed as part of the later chapters of this study). To this end, The Guardian 
maintains a traditional industrial presence in the space, albeit heavily skewed 
towards the service mode in its coverage of the Koreas.  
 
Picard argues that with the rise of the service mode there has been a concurrent 
growth and development in what he terms a “craft mode” (p. 503) of doing journalism 
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that is “novel to contemporary news production”. As part of a broader de-
institutionalisation of the news industry, small-scale news providers have emerged, 
which Hermida (2016) refers to as entrepreneurial or explanatory journalism. This 
style of journalism “emphasises the uniqueness and the quality of their news” (p. 
504). Picard points out:  
 
Journalists working in this craft mode are focusing on special topics such as 
climate or defense, employing specialized techniques such as investigative 
and data journalism, or serving smaller localities as general news providers. 
Most are providing news directly to consumers, but some provide their 
materials to companies that practice the service mode of news provision 
(2014, p. 504).  
 
As revealed later in this study, with the withdrawal of correspondents employed by 
news organisations, the ranks of freelance journalists have swelled to cover the 
shortfall in the market for news on North Korea and South Korea. At the same time, 
the rates for stories on the countries has collapsed making the business of doing 
freelance journalism on the Koreas marginal at best. International wire services and 
traditional news providers with a presence in Seoul are finding business increasingly 
difficult and in some cases are finding the expense of reporting from Seoul harder to 
justify.  
 
The ongoing collapse of the industrial mode of journalism has not always necessarily 
resulted in the complete withdrawal of the legacy media giants from South Korea. 
There are several mastheads that maintain an active presence in the region, 
including The New York Times and The Washington Post. 
 
This collapse has resulted in tensions in the practice of doing journalism in such an 
environment. Put simply, the practice of doing journalism under a powerhouse 
masthead like The Washington Post in the case of Tokyo Bureau Chief Anna Fifield 
and for The New York Times in the case of one-man Seoul Bureau Choe Sang-hun 
is quite different from a few years ago.  
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Picard’s analysis of the rise of a craft mode of journalism rings true for the business 
of covering both North Korea and South Korea for the international market. In 
covering North Korea and South Korea, several craft mode news providers have 
sprung up. They are uniquely digital in that they are agile, relatively cheap to run and 
finance, and exist only because of the affordances of the internet. Examples include 
NK News, 38 North, Daily NK, and Korea Expose. All employ staff with specific skills 
and knowledge in the area they are covering. Some, like 38 North and Daily NK, are 
funded by the non-profit sector and are largely left alone to provide in-depth and 
thoughtful coverage and analysis on North Korea. NK News is closer to Picard’s 
vision of craft journalism in that they not only specialise on North Korea and have 
demonstrated a willingness to employ cutting edge techniques of digital journalism in 
crafting stories on the country, but they are also self-funded. The NK News business 
model rests on the pillars of subscription, syndication, and intelligence. NK News 
offers several subscription options for readers. On top of this, and relevant for this 
study, NK News has a commercial agreement with The Guardian as part of The 
Guardian’s “North Korea Network” (2014). The Guardian explains their relationship 
with NK News and other providers who fall into the craft mode in the following words: 
 
Our partners offer unique reporting and analysis about the state of the 
country, from both inside and out. We are collaborating with Daily NK, whose 
reporters are North Korean citizens, defectors, South Korean democracy 
activists and international researchers; and NK News, a specialist site focused 
on news, data and opinion. There’s Sino-NK, which publishes articles from 
academics specialising in North Korea’s relations with its border countries; 
North Korea Leadership Watch, which looks at politics and the people at the 
heart of the Kim regime. North Korea Tech is dedicated to reporting on IT and 
internet coverage across the country (yes, it does exist). North Korea: Witness 
to transformation is a blog supported by the Peterson Institute analysing 
economic, political and social change. The Conversation features the writing 
of academic experts and Choson Exchange is an organisation working inside 




Here exists a clear nexus in the craft and service modes of NK News and The 
Guardian respectively. In an age of shrinking newsrooms and reduced numbers of 
newsroom staff, these kinds of relationships are becoming more and more salient if a 
re-imagined news organisation like The Guardian is going to survive, and herein lies 
the appeal of Picard’s ideas as part of this study. Again, and in keeping with Picard, 
this signals a fundamental shift away from the industrial mode where wire services 
covered anything and everything within a news paradigm. Within the news 
ecosystem that defines this study, the meaning of news changes in line with changes 
in the practices of news gathering and dissemination. Those working within the craft 
mode of journalism are more likely to depart from the former industrial “closed” 
methods of news gathering, relying almost exclusively on official sources and 
professional journalists, “to a more open system in which news emerges from the 
public observations, data and flow of information and commentary that were not 
possible before” (Van der Haak, Parks, & Castells, 2012, p. 509 in Picard, 2014).  
 
The construction of North Korea and South Korea is understood and analysed 
through the lens of framing theory. Fundamental to the use of framing theory in this 
study is the acceptance of framing as a result of many different factors across a web 
of culture (Reese, 2009; Van Gorp, 2007). In order to understand the impact of 
industrial change on the practice of doing journalism on North Korea and South 
Korea for an international audience, this study seeks to enrich the “journalist frame” 
(Boesman, Berbers, D’haenens, & Van Gorp, 2017; M.  Brüggemann, 2014).  This 
means interviewing those engaged in this kind of work to understand the challenges 
of their craft. 
 
1.4 Brief Methodology 
 
This thesis rest is built on a foundation of understanding constructions and 
representations of faraway places through the eyes of foreign correspondents. 
These studies draw from anthropology (Hannerz, 2004; Pedelty, 2013) and sociology 
(Hess, 2005; Holohan, 2003). In seeking to understanding foreign correspondent 
culture and society, these studies draw upon the foreign correspondents themselves 
as a means of data. In this study this is done so in the service of shedding light on 
frames and frame creation more than unpacking the culture of those reporting on the 
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Koreas for a Western audience. Despite this, the way these correspondents 
understand their relationship with the place and people they are reporting on, the 
organisations and people they are reporting for, and each other forms the core of 
their framing and, therefore, the culture of their lives as foreign correspondents 
becomes intertwined in the analysis and discussion in this study. 
 
This study utilises a mixed methods approach. In the first part of this study a content 
framing method is used. In the second part of this study, semi-structured interviews 
of 20 journalists based in Korea and Japan covering North and South Korea for 
international news organisations are used. This involves purposeful snowball 
sampling of journalists and qualitative thematic analysis of the interview data to 
break down the issues facing journalists in covering the two Koreas in a digital era. 
 
1.5 Chapter Overview 
 
Chapter two interrogates the literature as it applies to the digital disruption, framing, 
and framing studies of the Koreas. Chapter Two also introduces the theoretical 
frameworks of this study which draws upon framing theory, as Entman (1993) and 
Reese (2007) understood it, to tease out the salience in the news sample on North 
and South Korea. A contribution of this study is in its discussion of what digitally 
disrupted international news means to those working in that field as journalists. The 
metaphor of the “hypothermic response” (Downman & Murray, 2017) is assumed in 
understanding the disrupted industry. In such an environment, increasingly scarce 
capital is concentrated around the heart, or the core business, of a news 
organisation. Other less important parts of the news organisation’s business are 
starved and eventually die. This creates a news vacuum that is filled by outside 
parties who are often casualised workers.  
 
Under such re-institutionalism (Carlson, 2015) there needs to be an adjustment to 
framing theory to recognise and include factors of industrial and institutional change. 
This chapter finds there has been scant attention paid to these changes through the 
lens of framing theory. Through the integration of the “journalist frame” (Boesman et 
al., 2017; Brüggemann, 2014), this approach seeks to respond to calls from Van 
Gorp (2007) and Reese (2009) to understand framing as part of a broader cultural 
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phenomenon. In the case of the framing of the Koreas, this also means responding 
to calls from Zelizer (2004) and Anderson (2011) in reimagining journalism research 
beyond the confines of the newsroom. 
 
As discussed briefly above, Chapter Three lays out the methods used in this study. 
This study utilises a mixed-methods approach. In the first part of the study, framing is 
used. In the second part of the study, semi-structured interviews of 20 journalists 
based in Korea and Japan covering North and South Korea for international news 
organisations are used. This involves purposeful snowball sampling of journalists 
and qualitative thematic analysis of the interview data to break down the issues 
facing journalists in covering the two Koreas in a digital era. 
 
Chapter Four, the first of the findings chapters, maps the network for news on the 
Koreas as it applies to news.com.au and The Guardian. Against the backdrop of 
Picard’s (2014) service mode of industrial journalism, it is argued, the newsroom 
becomes the site of the curation and distribution of content. Content creation is 
something that happens within sometimes vast networks for news content. Through 
this lens, the agents making up the networks for news on the Koreas are mapped 
and categorised. This furthers the argument for looking beyond confines of the 
newsroom in understanding the framing and construction of journalism on the 
Koreas. This chapter finds that news.com.au and The Guardian draw on different 
networks for their news on the Koreas. news.com.au’s network is an “intra” network, 
meaning they draw their content from mainly other publications owned by parent 
company News Corp and traditional wire services. As a relatively small news 
organisation, The Guardian does not have the luxury of being able to draw content 
from an internal network. Rather, The Guardian draws from a vast external, or “inter” 
network that, compared to news.com.au, is both broad and deep in terms of 
coverage of North Korea. For both news organisations, news on South Korea is an 
afterthought. Also, while both newsrooms did little journalism on either North Korea 
or South Korea, there was an overwhelming reliance on the traditional wire services 




Chapter Five, the second of the three findings chapters, analyses and discusses the 
results of a framing analysis of three months of news on North Korea and South 
Korea for news.com.au and The Guardian Australia. Here, stories covering only 
North Korea, only South Korea, and both North Korea and South Korea are analysed 
to expose the frames in these stories. This part of the study shows a preference for 
the bizarre in both story selection and framing within the stories. Despite both news 
organisations drawing on extensive networks for their stories on the Koreas, the type 
and nature were uniformly strange across the sample. This gave rise to the bizarre 
frame and accompanying frame packages.  
 
Chapter Six, the third findings chapter, draws on interviews with journalists reporting 
on the Koreas to understand how they see the representation of North Korea in the 
international news media. The second part of this chapter deals with the issues in 
the practice of covering North Korea and what impact this has on stories on the 
country. These interviews confirmed primacy of the strange in terms of story 
selection and frames in covering North Korea, but also the ubiquity of strange, weird, 
and wonderful stories across the network. The anxiety around “feeding the beast” for 
content on the country leads those producing stories on the country to favour 
expedience over accuracy and depth of reporting. This, in turn, results in an 
“anything goes” approach to story selection and framing with journalists feeling they 
are driven to do more with less. Without access to the country or sources to verify 
stories, any story on North Korea becomes fair game. This has resulted in the 
threshold for stories on the country being extremely low and many of the stories 
being of questionable accuracy.  
 
Journalism on North Korea has also become the site of an ideological struggle over 
the best way to deal with the nation. The use of defectors to frame stories around 
issues of human rights was viewed as a cynical attempt by conservative forces in 
Washington DC and Seoul to pervert and twist narrative on North Korea away from 
rapprochement and engagement to a narrative that enables and supports hawkish 
policies that isolate and exclude North Korea from the global order. Questions of 
ideology also defined much of the argument around Associated Press’s presence 
and engagement in North Korea. Under the leadership of then Seoul bureau chief 
and participant in this study, Jean Lee, AP established a news bureau in Pyongyang. 
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The AP in Pyongyang proved to be a divisive issue in this study and was definitive of 
journalists’ approaches to North Korea and reporting on the country. 
  
Chapter Seven follows a similar trajectory to Chapter Six, this time with an emphasis 
on South Korea. This chapter finds, in terms of news and media, that South Korea 
lives in the shadow of North Korea. Where the threshold for news on North Korea is 
low, the threshold for news on South Korea is high. For the time and resource poor 
journalists covering both countries, South Korea is an afterthought. Unlike much of 
the content on North Korea by virtue of access to South Korea, there is lower 
tolerance on what kinds of stories are considered acceptable.  
 
For the most part, covering South Korea requires actual time and resource intensive 
journalism. Stories on South Korea also need to compete with those on the North in 
the market for journalism on the countries. When stories do cross the threshold, they 
are big. These articles also appear random and lacking in context. The result is big 
stories that appear out of nowhere and disappear just as suddenly, thus creating a 
vision of a country that is extreme and illogical.  
 
For those covering both countries, North Korea always takes precedence leaving 
South Korea in the shadow of North Korea. Like North Korea, in the framing of South 
Korea the bizarre frame prevails. This study finds that covering the bizarre elements 
of South Korean society forms the other type of story to make it into the international 
news media. Stories of a society struggling to come to terms with their material 
success are the norm here. These kinds of stories often include topics like a society 
addicted to plastic surgery, stories on the Korean popular culture industry, stories on 
suicide, and stories on people working themselves to death. This chapter shows 
these stories are cheap and easy to cover. Much like the coverage of North Korea, 
they are often extreme in nature.  
 





1.6 Research Questions 
 
Against the background of the analysis of the problems that inform this study and the 
relevant literature, this study examined the following research questions: 
 
RQ1. What does the network for news on North Korea and South Korea look like?  
RQ2. How are North Korea and South Korea framed in news.com.au and The 
Guardian Australia? 
RQ3.  What are the factors that influence the way in which journalists report on 
North Korea and South Korea? 
 
 
The next chapter positions this study within the theoretical traditions and literature in 
the field. 
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2 Theoretical Frameworks and Literature Review 
 
This study examines the framing of North Korea and South Korea in a digitally 
disrupted industrial environment. While chapters Six and Seven investigate the views 
of journalists servicing the Western market for journalism on the Koreas, it does so 
from the perspective of the factors that influence the narrative and the ultimate 
framing of the Koreas. To this end, literature around the role, practice, and function 
of foreign journalists and correspondents is neglected in the literature review but 
does make an appearance in the findings and discussion chapters. This early part of 
the study is dedicated to situating this research within the expanse of framing 
literature, theory, and methodology.  
 
2.1 Constructing the Message 
 
Walter Lippmann’s seminal Public Opinion (1922) forms the paradigmatic backbone 
of this study. In constructing “the pictures in our heads”, Lippmann argued the mass 
media lead citizens to make sense of the world through simplistic representations of 
complex subjects and issues. Lippmann argued these representations are first and 
foremost constructions which by their very nature are subjective. These inherent 
biases are accepted as truth and serve a specific agenda in what Lippmann terms 
the ‘manufacturing of consent’ decades before Herman and Chomsky (1988) made 
the phrase famous. To this end, the mass media are powerful. The pictures in our 
heads form a simplistic pseudo-environment that can be fictitious but nevertheless 
are accepted as fact. The stories that inform and populate this pseudo-environment 
are largely singular in nature in that they are simplistic to the point they negate and 
deny the existence of counter narratives and this results in distortions and 
stereotypes. Lippmann (1922) wrote: 
 
Generally, it all culminates in the fabrication of a system of all evil, and of 
another which is the system of all good.  Then our love of absolutes shows 
itself.   For we do not like qualifying adverbs.  They clutter up sentences, and 
interfere with irresistible feeling.… Real space, real time, real numbers, real 
connections, real weights are lost.  The perspective and the background and 
the dimensions of action are clipped and frozen in the stereotype. (p. 156) 
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Lippmann defines this as propaganda and argues the propaganda function of the 
mass media is the key weakness of representative democracy. McAllister (2013) 
argues much of the brilliance of Lippman’s work lies in the systematic destruction of 
this democratic faith—an analysis that is as damning today as it was in 1922. 
McAllister (2013) says, “Among other things, Lippmann notes the speed of modern 
life that makes it impossible to make sense of ‘the great booming, buzzing confusion 
of the outer world’ without recourse to a predetermined model or framework that 
allows one to filter the information that we confront. As he put it, ‘we do not first see, 
and then define, we define first and then see’.”  
 
McAllister argues that, at the level of the nation, public opinion is either 
manufactured or a phantom — in either case, it is not the product of a 
knowledgeable citizenry engaged in an expansive act of deliberation. Rather, it is 
propaganda designed to subvert the democratic process in the interests of the elite 
and powerful in society whether they be public or private. This notion resonates in 
the work of Habermas (1989) in writing on “steering media” and its impact on the 
actualisation of a truly deliberative public sphere, and the work of Herman and 
Chomsky (1988) and their propaganda model. 
 
Berger and Luckman (1966) take Lippmann’s construction of knowledge further, 
arguing all knowledge is constructed through processes of social interaction.  Berger 
and Luckman (1966) argue that common sense knowledge is a reality shared by 
people and reinforced by human typifications, significations, and institutions. They go 
further and argue these typifications, significations, and institutions define knowledge 
for those involved in knowledge creation, and, more significantly, future generations 
who have no say on the original construction of knowledge. This thread finds its way 
into the study of journalism through Tuchman’s (1978) seminal study.    
 
Couldry and Hepp (2017) go beyond the thought of Luckman and Berger in exploring 
the mediated construction of reality through the lens of materialist phenomenology. 
In doing so, they address the tension that exists, “… between convenience and 
autonomy, between force and our need for mutual recognition ….” (p. 223). Where 
Berger and Luckman focused primarily on face-to-face communication as a means 
 37 
of the construction of reality, Couldry and Hepp layer mediated communication into 
the construction of reality. Where Berger and Luckman focus on the role of 
institutions in the construction of the message, Couldry and Hepp shift the gaze to 
the ‘interdependencies’ that form what Livingstone (2009, p. 2) terms the deep 
mediatisation of society. Put simply, the advent of the internet and digital technology 
has embedded media in all parts of human lives. Deuze (2012, 2014, 2017) uses an 
interesting metaphor to illustrate this point. He says: 
 
We live in media. Media are to us as water is to fish. The ubiquitous and 
pervasive nature of contemporary media does not mean people’s lives are 
determined by technology, but it certainly should suggest that our 
understanding of society and the role of it must start with an appreciation of 
the profound mediatization of everyday life and the lifeworld (the world we 
experience).  (Deuze, 2014, p. 12). 
 
The appeal of these ideas to this project is obvious and manifest. In an era of the 
disintegration of news media institutions as we knew them (McChesney, 2012), 
accepting the impact this has had on how we know the world as a construction 
becomes essential.  
 
In his early work, Deuze (2001, 2008) provides a clear conception of the network 
within journalism spaces. Later, he moves into the more abstract realm of “Media 
Life” (2012) where he argues the institutions at the heart of media constructions are 
no longer as important, relevant and pivotal to the construction as they once were. 
This study is set in times of institutional change and re-institutionalism. Deuze is right 
in arguing we are in and of media, but this approach does not guide the argument to 
one of industrial and institutional change. Deuze emphasises the agency of the 
audience in and of the construction of media. Heinrich (2008), on the other hand, 
approaches the network from the producer end, but places emphasis on the role of 
social media in building journalistic networks. In doing so, she does not address the 




2.2 The Sociology of News 
 
This study is positioned as part of the sociology of journalism. Barbie Zelizer (2004) 
says sociological enquiry as part of the lexicon of journalism research has emerged 
as germane to journalism research around the world. She says, “Cueing journalists 
as agents of modernity, sociology found its way into journalism research in 
accordance with an emphasis on people, with an eye both to the patterns by which 
they grouped themselves into organizational and institutional settings and to the 
surrounding structures, functions, and effects through which they worked” (p.47). 
Central to a sociological approach to journalism, Zelizer argues, is inquiry into 
journalism with an emphasis on the systematic actions, practices, and interactions by 
which journalists maintain themselves as journalists.  
 
How journalists view themselves and the impact of their work is at the foundation of 
this study. These considerations and the construction of journalistic content as a 
public artefact are worth revisiting especially in the current journalism industrial 
climate of insecurity and change. Central to this way of doing journalism research is 
engagement and interaction with journalists. Early examples in this tradition included 
David Manning White’s acquisition and adaptation of Kurt Lewin’s 1947 study into 
how people go about making decisions. White (1950) applied the notion of 
gatekeeping – a metaphor used to describe the decision-making process of deciding 
what is and is not news - to the newsroom. White’s study focused on a wire editor at 
the The Peoria Star in the United States. During a week in February in 1949 White 
had the wire editor “Mr. Gates” document his decision-making processes in deciding 
what did and did not make news. White conformed to Schramm’s (1955) 
sender/receiver model and it was assumed the decisions made were subjective but 
the decisions were limited to what made news and what did not make news (Reese 
& Ballinger, 2001). White’s study has been criticised widely for being too superficial 
and not taking broader influences, considerations, and pressures into account in 
researching what amounted to a cultural and professional practice within the 
confines of the newsroom. 
 
It was these limitations in both the theoretical and methodological approaches to 
doing journalism research within the professional rounds of journalists that Tuchman 
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(1978) set out to address in Making News: A Study in the Construction of Reality. 
Tuchman (1978) deployed newsroom ethnography in her research to go beyond 
what she viewed as face value studies in journalism and journalism practice (Zelizer, 
2004, p. 65) and offered a way of looking at journalism practice that was situated in 
the circumstances of its use. The recognition that journalists were social actors 
(Tuchman, 1978) who were driven and influenced by factors of what makes news 
beyond only news values (Galtung & Ruge, 1965) drove Tuchman’s study. 
Tuchman’s study arrived roughly at the same time as two other seminal 
ethnographic studies in journalism by Gans (1979) and Fishman (1980) with all three 
heralding a participant observation approach and marked a clear desire to bring a 
sociological perspective to the study of news.  
 
For Tuchman, this perspective was underpinned by the notion that the construction 
of news is a social enterprise, meaning there were factors beyond the narrative that 
drove and enabled the news frame. The news frame, through which news was 
situated and made sense of, was the product of a complex set of pressures and 
competing priorities on which the journalist was placed. Central to Tuchman’s 
critique of the construction of news were the organisational and other constraints that 
journalists faced in the practices of journalism and the ultimate framing and narrative 
construction of news. By casting the net beyond questions of what journalists think is 
and is not news, Tuchman was able to shed light on the broader factors shaping the 
way the world is presented through news. This study conforms to this theoretical 
tradition. In seeking to understand what drives journalists in constructing the Koreas 
as news, it is accepted there are multiple factors at play. 
 
Tuchman’s work not only came to be viewed as an exemplar in ethnographic 
newsroom research but her work also came to define a paradigmatic way of thinking 
about and executing much of the research into journalism in the closing decades of 
the twentieth century and into the twenty-first century. Although her legacy is still 
quite real, and changes in the journalism industry have not diluted the need for a 
critical view of the social construction of news, these changes forced a re-evaluation 
of how research grounded in this tradition is done. To this end, while this study 
embraces the theoretical tenets of Tuchman’s critical constructionist approach, it 
also takes a different methodological path.  
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Newsroom ethnography has been criticised for not keeping pace with changes in the 
news industry with the “newsroom” becoming a metaphor for journalism practice 
(Deuze, 2005; Zelizer, 2004). A view of the newsroom being the site of news 
construction denies the fundamental changes in the practice of doing journalism and 
is much about ethnography for ethnography’s sake than anything else. Zelizer (2004) 
says: 
 
While emphasis on the newsroom as a research setting made sense for 
ethnographers, it has since been generalized far beyond its relevance to news 
making. Few, if any, news organizations operate with the same degree of 
dependence on “classic” newsrooms that they displayed in earlier decades, 
and decisions taken at a far more diverse set of venues – in the field, internet 
or phone exchanges, social gatherings, publishing conventions – should not 
be left out of the picture. In so privileging certain settings over others, what 
counts as evidence has been narrowed. (p. 68)  
 
For purposes of this study, ethnography has been done away with in favour of semi-
structured interviews with journalists covering the Koreas for a Western news 
consumer. This is discussed in further detail in the Chapter Three. 
 
This point is further reinforced by Dickinson, Matthews, and Saltzis (2013) in arguing 
for the necessity of moving beyond the ethnographic approach in an increasingly 
atomised industry. They argue academic attention needs to re-focus away from the 
newsroom and to the changing experience of journalists as they navigate the 
changes in their industry. This study responds to those calls in seeking to make 
sense of the construction of the Koreas for a Western audience. In doing so, this 
study seeks to broaden framing as a theory and methodology as the shadow of a 







2.3 Disrupted Practice 
 
2.3.1 Beyond the Newsroom 
 
As a response to the digital disruption of news, Picard (2014) and Dickinson et al. 
(2013) called for more research into the impact of the disruption in news. Dickinson 
et al. suggest more time needs to be taken with journalists operating in a de-
institutionalised news ecosystem. This study responds to those calls. This means 
making sense of the network for news on North Korea and South Korea as the site of 
content creation.  
 
Like Picard (2014), Castells (2010) describes a journalism that takes advantage of 
digital technologies to do journalism in ways that are increasingly automised from 
newsrooms. Where Castells and Picard differ is in where they see the role of the 
public in the production and co-production of journalism. Where Castells sees an 
expanded and improved role for the public in something harking back to the golden 
age of digital commons optimism embodied by Jenkins (2006), Rosen (2006) and 
(2004), Picard (2014) sees journalism as very much an industrial process dominated 
by organised, albeit sometimes atomised, professionals and associated umbrella 
organisations. Certainly, in this study, co-creation involves little to no investment and 
involvement of those outside a professional sphere of journalists and pundits. To this 
end, Beckett and Ball’s (2012) view of networked journalism where formal and 
informal arrangements between the public come to define the creation and co-
creation of journalism is less important in the bounds of this study than outsourcing 
production of news on the Koreas what might be best termed “remote control 
journalism” (Compton & Benedetti, 2010; Mosco, 2009).  
 
Journalism-by-remote-control can be defined in terms of an increasing reliance by 
legacy mode news organisations turned service mode providers on local contacts, 
wire services, specialist online news providers, and stringers over paid 
correspondents. This comes as a reaction to a migration of money away from news 
organisations but also a persistence on the part of news organisations to keep on 
going and do more with less (McChesney, 2012; McChesney & Pickard, 2011). 
Under these conditions, although foreign correspondents still exist working under the 
big mastheads – in the context of this study and The New York Times and The BBC 
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– these correspondents are far from Cohen’s (1963) “cosmopolitan among 
cosmopolitans, a man in grey flannels who ranks very highly in the hierarchy of 
reporters,” (p.17). As will be revealed later in this study, those who do hold these 
kinds of reporting are hardly living the highlife. The exodus of funding is only 
matched by the loss of sparkle for those feeding the beast for international news.  
 
There is also hubris in taking the view that the reliance on journalist networks to 
cover faraway places like the Koreas is anything new. Some of the earliest 
formalised foreign reporting started with Paul Julius Reuter in trading stock 
information between Paris and London in the 1860s. Reuter’s business flourished 
because he took advantage of the new technology of the time – the telegraph. The 
telegraph proved faster and more reliable than pigeons as a means of transmitting 
information. Reuter became a wholesaler of news and these types of businesses 
became widely referred to as wire services. There is a multitude of studies that 
reference the importance of wire services and the longevity of wire services as a 
means of procuring news on the world for domestic and local audiences including 
Kliesch (1991), Hess (1996), Fenton (2005), Shanor (2003), and E. Erickson and 
Hamilton (2006). They all argue the network has been long part of the mix in doing 
international journalism. Here, ‘the mix’ is key. What we have seen in recent times is 
the change in the mix due to industrial and technological pushes and pulls. Again, 
journalism as a practice and an industry can be defined in a state of flux, now, 
forever and always.   
 
2.3.2 The Reimagined Journalist 
 
It is no longer possible to define journalists and their work based upon where they 
work. This has had profound impacts upon how the journalist is defined and studied 
to the point Anderson (2011) argues for blowing up the newsroom. Anderson’s 
provocation is rooted in a frustration over the nature of journalism research driving 
how journalism and journalists are understood and subsequently studied. The 
frustration is an over focus and reliance on the newsroom in defining journalism. 
Deuze and Witschge (2018) in theorising “beyond journalism” are critical of what 
they view as the institutional bias in journalism studies, a trend that they see carrying 
over into journalism education which all too often is defined by institutional 
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boundaries (Anderson, 2014; Cottle, 2007). Within the academy, much cited seminal 
studies including David Manning-White’s 1950 gatekeeping work, Jeremy Tunstall 
(1974), and Gaye Tuchman (1978), and more recently David Ryfe (2013) and Nikki 
Usher (2014 cited in Deuze and Witschge, 2018) are set in the newsroom and have 
defined a culture of journalistic research. While these studies have been important in 
shedding light on newsroom culture they have also been problematic in shaping a 
definition of journalism that is skewed towards the elite journalism institutions. The 
newsroomcentricity (Deuze & Witschge, 2018), or focus on journalist as a product of 
newsrooms, of this dominant approach to studying journalism Karin Wahl-Jorgensen 
(2009 in Deuze and Witschge, 2018) says has meant that: 
 
…scholars have tended to focus on journalists’ culture as it emerges within 
the limits of the newsroom and other centralized sites of news production, 
usually paying scant attention to places, spaces, practices and people at the 
margins of this spatially delimiting news production universe (p.23). 
 
Deuze and Witschge (2018) argue there has been a further tendency for studies of 
print, and, more recently, digital journalism to dominate the study of the field 
narrowing the understanding and definition of journalism to something rooted in the 
location and on a specific platform. The upshot of this way of looking at journalism is 
large swathes of journalism and the work of journalists in many parts of the world 
have gone unstudied. To widen the gap between the studied and unnoticed within 
journalism studies is a marked tendency towards “elite, prestige, and glamorous 
institutions located in large cities of the capitalist Western world serves to solidify 
such places as the only ones deemed worthy of a voice to articulate what is 
journalism and who counts as a journalist,” (Nerone, 2013 in Deuze & Witschge, 
2018, p. 171). 
 
None of this is to suggest the newsroom should not be studied as part of the wider 
lexicon of journalism. Indeed, even Anderson (2011) who earlier suggested the 
complete destruction of the newsroom concedes, “The newsroom is not extinct. In 
many ways, it is more important than ever, for it remains, even now, a central locus 
in which a variety of actor-networks find themselves tied together to create an 
occupation,” (p.160). The Latourian appeal of what Anderson says here is not lost on 
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this study, for without understanding the networks that the contemporary enterprise 
of journalism is based on, how can we make a claim to understanding journalism as 
a whole? This study goes further and investigates what the impact the ever-changing 
web of networks actually means to the journalistic product. This study also seeks to 
understand the network from the perspective of the journalists producing the content. 
 
In the evermore fractured and impoverished world of institutional journalism, the 
need to decentralise, atomise and go beyond the tradition of the newsroom to tell the 
stories of the day is more imperative than before. However, in telling the story of the 
changing role of the newsroom in understanding the journalist and journalism it 
would be a mistake to fall into the trap of believing the institutions that came before 
were static and unbending. As Carlson and Lewis (2015) correctly point out 
journalism culture has always been in a state of flux inhabiting a constantly shifting 
landscape. Carlson and Lewis say, “Journalism is not a solid, stable thing to point to, 
but a constantly shifting denotation applied differently depending on the context” 
(p.2). Therefore, in attempting to define journalism the emphasis should be on the 
changing nature of journalism as part of a continuum rather than something frozen in 
time and limited by institutional constraints. It is for these reasons Wagemans, 
Witschge, and Deuze (2016) emphasise movement over stability in what journalism 
is becoming over what journalism is or was. Responding to, or, even pre-empting 
changes in institutional or “big” journalism will enable those seeking to understand 
the exact nature of what journalism is and who qualifies as a journalist to move 
beyond an anachronistic view of what the newsroom is, its role as a site of 
journalism and under what conditions people do this kind of work.   
 
What becomes clear in this study is the convergence of the old news organisations, 
new smaller and more nimble news organisations, and individual journalists and 
those posing as journalists is the reality of doing journalism on the Koreas for an 
international audience. The question then becomes, what is the taxonomy of such a 
network? What does this network reporting on the Koreas look like and how do the 
different elements within such a network understand their role as journalists in 
framing the Koreas for an international audience. The following chapters set out to 




2.4 Framing Theory 
 
Doing journalism is a process of public sense-making (Hartley, 1996 in  
Brüggemann, 2014), and journalism is, therefore, about making sense of the world. 
This explains why studies into the production, character, and influence of news 
stories form a critical part of the scholarship of journalism. The journalist, their 
practice, and their output form a seminal part of how the academy studies and 
understands journalism within the wider societal context. This study seeks to shed 
light on how we come to know and understand North Korea and South Korea 
through the work of journalists specialising in the region. To this end, framing theory 
provides a framework to interrogate this topic not only from the perspective of news 
frame recognition and identification but also from the perspective of those producing 
the news and the issues that impact on how they practice their craft.  
 
The popularity of framing as a theory and methodology in journalism research belies 
how controversial it is as an academic tradition and scholarly pursuit. What a frame 
is and what is framing has driven a wedge through framing and those who engage in 
it since Goffman’s (1974) study on how frames produce meanings and organise 
experience to broader structural and ideological processes (Carragee & Roefs, 
2004). The schisms in what constitutes a frame and how a frame is revealed led 
Entman (1993) to describe the theory and practice of framing as a “fractured 
paradigm” (p.51), and as recently as 2011 Borah renewed Entman’s observation. In 
situating this study within the tradition of framing theory, the conflicting and 
contrasting positions over what is and is not framing are discussed in the following 
section. What is clear, and despite differing opinions on framing, is that framing 
offers a powerful way to interrogate the constructions that situate our news within a 
popular consciousness.   
 
2.5 Positioning within a Framing Tradition 
 
The following section is by no means an exhaustive review of all the literature 
pertaining to framing. Rather, this section seeks to position this study within the 
vastness of framing scholarship.  
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Framing is not a monolithic or unified approach nor is there a unified and cohesive 
understanding of framing. Rather, framing studies have emerged from a range of 
disciplines and academic domains (Borah, 2011; D'Angelo, 2002; Shah, Domke, & 
Wackman, 1996). Borah (2011) identifies two major foundations of framing - 
sociological (Entman, 1991; Gamson & Modigliani, 1987; Gitlin, 1980; Goffman, 
1974) and psychological (Iyengar, 1991; Kahneman & Tversky, 2013; Shah et al., 
1996). The sociological approach is concerned with frame creation and frame effects 
(audience reception, understanding and mobilisation of frames). Chong and 
Druckman (2007a) refer to these as “communication frames”. The psychological 
approach is concerned with framing effects and schema, and the construction of the 
message in our minds. This style of framing dominates the literature to the 
consternation of many of those conforming to the sociological approach including 
Brüggemann (2014), Carragee and Roefs (2004), Reese (2007), and Van Gorp 
(2007). 
D’Angelo (2002) breaks framing into three broad paradigmatic approaches – 
constructivist, critical, and cognitive. While the differing approaches overlap, they 
possess unique characteristics. The constructivist approach is rooted in the work of 
Bateson (1955) and Goffman (1974) and within the confines of communication 
scholarship is most commonly associated with framing effects. Cognitive framing is 
also primarily concerned with framing effects but unlike the constructivist approach is 
grounded in psychological work of “equivalence” framing (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1981). This kind of study is concerned with presenting a message in different ways 
and then measuring differences in reactions across a sample audience.  
 
This study is concerned with the critical approach and questions of framing (or lack 
thereof) (R. Vliegenthart, 2012) promulgated by Tuchman (1978). This approach 
focuses on the causes of framing over consequences of framing. Tuchman saw 
journalists having little to no agency in frame selection. She argued it was broader 
organisational pressures that determined how a story was told and this in turn had 
an ideological dimension. A key assumption for those working in Tuchman’s media 
sociology tradition (a “critical” or “constructionist” approach) is that news gathering 
processes favour a political elite. The resulting coverage are frames of the political 
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elite supported by their ideology with the individual journalist having limited impact on 
the frames. Therefore, framing is about power, and the role and the dynamic of 
power, according to Carragee and Roefs (2004), power has been neglected in 
framing research. For them, the broader themes of political power and social power 
have been ignored in favour of descriptive studies of frames and framing effects. It is 
argued these other conceptions of framing “divorce media frames from the context in 
which they are produced, including the influence of frame production. We find this 
separation troubling, given that the initial applications of this concept to news directly 
linked framing to power and ideology in a broad sense (Gitlin, 1980; Tuchman, 
1978),” (Carragee and Roefs, 2004, p. 217).  
 
A cluster of studies published from the mid to late 2000s aimed to mend that 
separation. Most notable were studies done on the American media’s framing of the 
war in Iraq and the War on Terror (Bennett, Lawrence, & Livingston, 2008; Domke, 
2004; Lewis & Reese, 2009). All of these studies were critical of how American 
journalists and news media organisations framed these events. The overwhelming 
conclusion of all three studies was the journalists and the news organisations 
involved were frame sending rather than frame setting. Frame sending or “Indexing” 
(Bennett, 1990) is the transmission of a frame unaltered from the source to the 
journalist and on to the audience. Under these conditions, the journalist and the 
news organisation are nothing more than a conduit. Frame setting, on the other 
hand, involves the journalists and the associated news organisation determining the 
frame as part of the practice of news reporting.  
 
Care has been taken in how framing as a theory is defined as part of this study. In 
arriving at a suitable definition, the antecedents bear some discussion. Within the 
fledgling critical constructionist approach, Gitlin (1980) built upon Tuchman’s work in 
bringing shape and definition to news framing in defining frames as devices that 
facilitate, organise, package enormous amounts of information for their audiences (in 
Borah, 2011). Gitlin (1980) defines frames as “persistent patterns of cognition, 
interpretation, and presentation of selection, emphasis, and exclusion” (p. 7), 
bringing sense and structure to both the journalist and the audience. The key here is 
“… interpretation, and presentation of selection, emphasis and exclusion” which 
speak to the role of the journalist in frame creation as part of journalism practice. 
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This is important within the constructionist tradition as there is an explicit recognition 
of news and journalism as something constructed and, therefore, open to 
interpretation and manipulation.  
 
Gamson and Modigliani (1989) stressed the influence of the ideology of stakeholders 
over the agency of journalists creating a “frame package”. For Gamson and 
Modigliani, there are three broad classes of determinants that constitute a frame 
package. These are cultural resonances which make the content seem natural and 
familiar, sponsor activities and media practices. Here, again, the two identify extra-
newsroom influences as central to news and issue framing. Pan and Kosicki (2001) 
go further and suggest framing and frame production are not always elite-driven. 
Rather, they often involve a complex interplay whereby citizens interpret and make 
sense of public issues using the resources available to them in making frame 
production “a multifaceted process in which influence travels in different directions,” 
(p. 47).  
 
Echoes of this can be heard in later work by Van Gorp (2007, 2009) and Reese 
(2007) in his call for a broader appreciation and understanding of the “web of culture” 
that drives and determines how we construct a view of the world. This study is rooted 
in this understanding of the construction of news and the production of frames as a 
multifaceted enterprise of sometimes competing and contrary influences. The 
second part of this study aims to reveal those influences through journalists on the 
ground covering North Korea and South Korea for an overseas news consumer. To 
that end, the framing analysis in Chapter Five is designed to reveal frames in news 
content on the countries while the interviews that follow look at the broader issues 
involved in the practice of covering the Koreas. This differs from other framing 
studies where interviews exist to reveal and bolster the frames that emerge during a 
textual analysis.  
 
Within the constructionist tradition of framing, the most commonly cited definition 
comes from Entman (1993). With the explicit aim of how “to offer a way to describe 
the power of a communicating text” (p. 51), Entman defines framing as involving 
selection and salience: 
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To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them 
more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular 
problem definition, casual interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment 
recommendation for the item described. (1993, p.52) 
 
Selection and salience is the stuff of journalists and the decisions they make in doing 
the work they do, and, in the context of this study, this makes Entman’s definition 
attractive. As important as what is selected and what is salient is what is not. This 
can reveal a power dynamic in framing and also points to the ideological orientations 
of the journalist and the news organisation.  
 
2.6 The Journalist Frame 
 
There is a distinction to be made between the journalist frame and the news frame. 
Briefly, when it comes to normative framing practices, Schudson (1995) observed 
that “journalists add something to every story they run” and “they have a professional 
obligation to frame the message” (pp. 19-20). The journalist frame broadly refers to 
what the journalist brings to the frame and the broader story. The news frame is 
based around a frame repository, that is, the frames available to the journalist 
culturally and cognitively in a given cultural setting. Identifying a set of cultural 
frames was advocated by Gamson and Modigliani (1987) as part of their effort to 
standardise frames in framing research. Chong and Druckman (Chong & Druckman, 
2007a, 2007b) argued frames occur in a competitive environment, especially as 
journalists start to investigate a problem and they are presented with differing 
interpretations (Brüggemann, 2014). It is these differing influences on the journalists 
that have been at the heart of some journalism research and sociology. As already 
stated, this field of research is concerned with an explanation of journalistic practices 
by seeking to understand the social contexts of journalists’ work (Reese, 2001). Key 
studies in this area have looked at influences relevant to news making, including the 
individual level (Esser, 1998), professional routines (Hanitzsch et al., 2010), and the 
broader social and cultural context (Reese, 2001; Shoemaker & Reese, 2014).  
 
The journalist frame is not to be confused with the newsroom frame (Scheufele & 
Tewksbury, 2006) which represents the dominant issue on a topic. Within the 
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confines of this study and the given changes in the news industry, it is worth 
pondering how much editorial policy matters as part of the journalist frame in an 
increasingly atomised and casualised news workforce. This features in chapter’s Six 
and Seven.  
 
Returning to Entman, he draws directly from the work of Gitlin (1980) and Tuchman 
(1978) in appealing to concepts of “perceived reality” and the creation thereof. 
Therefore, even the most considered, neutral or objective journalism contributes to a 
subjective construction of reality (Fishman, 1997; Tuchman, 1978). Based on this, 
the journalist is present in all content they create, even if it is shortening a quote to 
make it more salient to the audience. Indeed, Brüggemann (2014), like Cook (1998) 
and Gans (1979) before them, argues journalism is the result of “a process of 
collective sense-making within the newsroom and a negotiation of meaning between 
journalists and their sources” (p. 66). 
 
2.7 Issue-Specific Frames 
 
Using Entman to ground framing in this study lies the recognition that issue-specific 
frames are appropriate. This type of frame can be subjective, and as the name 
implies, targeted and often unique to a given news topic or issue, although this does 
not preclude using issue specific and generic. Baden (2010), for example, sees 
generic frames as typical structures of issue specific frames: “They occur within 
many frames, which remain issue-specific as well as culturally and situationally 
dependent, nevertheless,” (p.25). Brüggemann argues that if we follow the broad 
and integrated understanding of framing laid out by Entman, it makes sense to look 
at journalistic practice through the lens of both generic and issue specific frames 
because the generic frame helps classify the story while the issue specific frame 
offers a detailed account of how a frame is composed. This approach is valuable in 
this study, as this study is not investigating a single issue or event but rather looks at 
the framing of two countries across a disrupted news media industry. Dealing only in 
issue specific frames runs the risk of having the analysis appear chaotic or ad hoc.  
 
At the end of his definition, Entman (1993) offers direction on what to look for in 
doing framing analysis: a problem definition, casual interpretation, moral evaluation, 
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and/or treatment recommendation for the item described. Tewksbury and Scheufele 
(2009) say the most effective or powerful frames are the ones that communicate all 
four “framing devices”.  Vliegenthart and Van Zoonen (2011) note while a plethora of 
framing studies claim to conform to Entman’s definition, it had done little to bring 
consistency to framing studies. Rather, “Scholars have used a plethora of different 
frames that do not always match Entman’s definition and might not be considered 
frames” (Vliegenthart, 2012, p. 947). Reese (2007) makes a similar criticism. 
Vliegenthart (2012) attributes this to not only vagueness in the definition but also the 
time-consuming nature of translating Entman’s ideas into empirical research that 
offers little more than issue specific frames that have little or no resonance across 
time and space. This vagueness is also an appeal of framing. Taking an 
interpretative approach to framing in utilising Entman’s definition allows the 
researcher to immerse themselves in the topic or issue at hand, and in conjunction 
with interviews, deeply interrogates not only the frame, but, more importantly, the 
practice of doing journalism (Boesman et al., 2017). That is the appeal of Entman in 
this study.   
 
Entman’s definition has not been the only framing definition to gain traction. Most 
notable here is Reese’s 2001 framing definition which drove his and Lewis’ (2009) 
study into the framing of The War on Terror. Here, Reese and Lewis define news 
frames as, “… organizing principles that are socially shared and persistent over time, 
that work symbolically to structure the social world” (2009, p. 87). As expansive as 
Entman’s definition is, Reese and Lewis’ definition is so wide as to render it almost 
meaningless. By their own admission, the pair were guided by a desire to unify the 
different approaches to framing. In trying to appeal to the whole, they appealed to 
few other than themselves.  
 
In addressing the perceived issues in Entman’s definition, De Vreese (2005) 
advanced a working definition based on Entman but free of the prescriptive framing 
devices. De Vreese says, “a frame is an emphasis in salience of different aspect of a 
topic” (p. 53). The appeal to salience is attractive but one wonders if De Vreese, in 
trying to bring a workable definition to the enterprise of framing, is conceptually 
stretching what framing is and is not too far.  
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2.8 Frame Setters and Frame Senders 
 
2.8.1 Framing Production and Sources  
 
News frames are best understood as embedded in and part of ways of making sense 
of the world or as Van Gorp (2007) terms it ‘the web of culture’. News frames are 
therefore “patterns of interpretation” rooted in culture and replicated by the individual 
through available media (Brüggemann, 2014; Entman, 1993; Gamson, Croteau, 
Hoynes, & Sasson, 1992; Pan & Kosicki, 2001; Reese, 2007; Van Gorp, 2007). 
Therefore, it follows the factors that influence the way frames are constructed or built 
influence the final frame (Scheufele, 1999).  
This thesis argues, at the level of the journalist, that there is a myriad of factors that 
influence frames and framing. In the context of the digital disruption of journalism, 
these influences range far beyond those identified in the early newsroom centered 
studies. 
Sources are a vital component of any story and yet it is argued the role of sources in 
frame creation is all too often ignored and in doing so basic questions of power of 
sources of information also go unasked and unanswered (Boesman et al, 2017; 
Carragee and Roefs, 2004; Reese, 2001; Vliegenthart and Van Zoonen, 2011). A 
fundamental element of this study in both the framing and interview phases is source 
selection and the use and deployment of those sources within the finished news and 
associated frame. This builds upon the excellent work of Boesman et al. (2017) and 
seeks to further add to knowledge of the relationship between sources and the 
journalist frame (Bruggemann, 2014).  
Boesman et al. (2017) note a number of studies that tie sources to the practice of 
journalism and journalistic output. For example, Manning (2008) argues journalists 
are more dependent on official and elite (the rich and powerful) sources due to 
increasing deadline pressure. Lewis, Williams, and Franklin (2008) delved into the 
political economy of news in interrogating the impact of the public relations industry 
and its practitioners on journalists and news on the back of a growing imbalance in 
the public relations professional/journalist ratio. Boesman et al. point to further 
studies that emphasize the influence of the source in the ‘discovery phase’ with the 
 53 
journalists showing more initiative in the gathering and reporting phases (McManus, 
1997; Reich, 2011). The discovery phase can be understood as the earliest stages 
of finding a story and deciding whether to proceed into the later production phases. 
Boesman et al. argue, therefore, there is scope for the source to ‘lead the dance’ 
(Gans, 1979) in the selection phase and journalists take over in the framing phase 
(Boesman et al., 2017; Cook, 1998; Strömbäck & Nord, 2006). 
It follows then, in recognition of the role and potential power of sources to call the 
shots, that the origins of frames should be addressed. Van Gorp (2007) has done so 
in framing “through” and “by” the media. As already discussed, Brüggemann (2014) 
differentiated the two with “frame sending” where the journalist functions as a conduit 
for the source and “frame setting” where the journalist is largely responsible for 
determining the frame of a given topic or story.  
The work of Brüggemann (2014) and Boesman et al. (2017) represent exciting 
advances in framing scholarship. Indeed, as this discussion has demonstrated, the 
need for quality studies employing framing theory is as true now as any time in the 
last 40 years. Where the current crop of framing studies fall short is in recognising 
the impact of major industrial and practical changes in journalism at home and 
around the world. Zelizer’s (2004) call for journalism research to move beyond the 
newsroom in accordance with the increasing pace of change within the industry 
needs to be heeded if framing is to move forward and remain relevant. Within the 
confines of this study, the journalists interviewed have experienced seismic shifts in 
not only the conditions they work under but also the stories they tell and the way 
these stories are told from both content and platform perspectives.  
Key here is understanding the role and limitations of the journalists covering both 
North Korea and South Korea for the foreign news media as ‘interpretative 
communities’ (Zelizer, 1993) and impact this has upon the final news product. The 
pressures and limitations journalists face in creating this kind of content in a cultural 
context peculiar to covering North Korea and South Korea predominantly from Seoul 
within a rapidly changing news industry put the journalist at the centre of this study. 
Therefore, the framing analysis done as part of this study seeks to better inform both 
researcher and reader to chapters Six and Seven which are informed by interviews 
with journalists covering the Korean Peninsula. To this end, this study conforms to 
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the constructionist leanings of Reese (2007) who saw frames far from being isolated 
but giving meaning that “can be embedded across stories, media, and time” (p. 50) 
and Van Gorp (2009) who viewed frame-building as “a process in which journalists 
frame events and issues not only by applying news values but also by being 
sensitive to cultural themes” (p. 87). Within the context of this study, ‘cultural themes’ 
can be understood within the broader confines of the journalist’s experience and the 
environment in which they operate. It is argued here these factors all play a part in 
the way a story is told and this also goes some way to satisfy Reese’s (2007) call to 
understand frames and frame creation within a ‘web of culture’.  
2.9 Framing International News 
 
Framing studies of international news are as diverse as they are numerous. This 
section examines the literature and studies of the framing of international news as 
they apply within the context of this study. 
 
It is important to recognise that there are no studies in this sub-field of framing that 
recognise or seek to contextualise the disruption of journalism as a factor in how 
countries are constructed and framed in international news. Given the transformation 
of how news is done, this study argues that this is an oversight if there is a genuine 
desire to understand how we understand the rest of the world. As already argued, to 
understand news on North Korea and South Korea, the changing face of journalism 
and journalism practice needs to be addressed. This is in keeping with scholarly calls 
to understand framing as a dynamic process that changes over time. Jang and 
Frederick (2017) say considering framing from a dynamic perspective that includes 
the impact of social processes over time will bring greater meaning to framing 
studies (Jang & Frederick, 2017). For Jang and Frederick, this means recognising 
the diminished power and reach of traditional mastheads in international news and a 
pivot towards studying the impact of international wire services. 
 
In keeping with earlier studies (Entman, 1991, 2003, 2004), Brewer (2006) agues 
there is a clear correlation between how the news media frame a foreign country and 
how the local audience views that country. This, in turn, influences foreign policy. It is 
through journalism, it is argued, that a nation makes up its mind (Dalton, Jung, Willis, 
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& Bell, 2016; Lim & Seo, 2009; Zelizer & Allan, 2011). Lim and Seo (2009) argue 
foreign issues are removed from an audience’s life both cognitively and spatially. In 
reviewing the dominant literature on international framing, Saleem (2007, pp. 134-
135 in Dalton et al., 2016, p. 527) says the tyranny of distance and space heightens 
the importance of frames in determining an audience’s attitude towards a country as 
positive or critical. Saleem says media frames tend to offer a ‘moral judgement’ 
reflective of an ideology communicated through specific words, phrases and 
metaphors that set the tone for the coverage. In simple terms, what most people 
know of countries like South Korea, and, to a much greater extent, North Korea, is 
entirely informed by the pictures that news organisations and journalists paint for us. 
This is true for North Korea and South Korea, and journalism as a whole. In this light, 
getting the story right becomes pivotal, yet: 
 
Reporters do not always get the story right; neither do their editors and 
publishers. This is especially the case when they report about distant lands 
and unfamiliar cultures...the readers, who are already conditioned by the 
prevalent stereotypes, accept the misleading stories as true and react 
accordingly. The consequences can be disastrous...this is why foreign affairs 
reporting demands the attention of experienced, highly skilled, and well 
informed reporters. (Mann, 2001, p. 101) 
 
Bourdieu (1998) argues the quest to keep up with what is happening in the world and 
a fear of missing out on a story leads journalists to self-censor and self-edit in a way 
that constructs a discourse that does not reflect reality. Bourdieu termed this the 
“power to mobilize” (p. 21). Despite Bourdieu’s and Mann’s appeal to a better 
understanding of the condition of the journalist in the creation of narratives, the 
journalist is left out of the study of how the framing of international news works. 
 
Despite repeated appeals to the role of the journalist in frame creation and frame 
setting across the literature, in the study of the international framing of news, 
journalist voices are absent. In their study of international news Semetko and 
Valkenburg (2000) identified five frames in an effort to identify differences in the way 
international events are framed in newspaper and television news. While Semetko 
and Valkenburg sought to bridge the divide in between theory and methodology in 
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framing in generating a set of generic frames, they neglected the ‘journalist frame’ 
(Brüggemann, 2014). Across the study of the framing of international news, the 
agency the journalist may or may not have in the stories they produce is ignored. 
Therefore, by extension, the day-to-day cultural, political, social, organisational, 
ideological, financial, technological, and industrial pressures exerted on journalists 
are also ignored and neglected in study of the international framing of news. Seminal 
studies in the area including Lee and Yang’s (1996) comparative study of US and 
Japanese newspapers coverage of the Tiananmen Square massacre and Brewer’s 
(2006) study of US media coverage China and Russia which focuses on the 
audience reception of frames inherent in such media rather than the factors that 
shape frames at the journalist level.   
  
2.10 Framing the Koreas 
 
North Korea is a popular topic for framing scholars. The studies take two distinct 
forms: the first is studies that investigate specific event and the second comprises 
studies that look at the coverage of the country over a period of time.  
 
In much the same vein as international framing studies, the issue-based framing 
studies tend towards issues of conflict (Lee & Maslog, 2005; Maslog, Lee, & Kim, 
2006). In the case of North Korea, an emphasis on nuclear testing, The Six Party 
Talks, and associated issues and events (Choi, 2009, 2010, 2018; Chung, Lessman, 
& Fan, 2008; Chung, Lessman, & Fan, 2014; Dai & Hyun, 2010; Jang, 2013; Kim & 
Jahng, 2016; Kwon, 2013; Seo, 2009). These studies tend to focus on news output 
from legacy media outlets, with a strong preference for The New York Times and 
dominant South Korean newspapers, including The Chosun Ilbo and The 
Hankyoreh. When other nations’ news organisations are included, they are in the 
form of national news wire agencies (Dai & Hyun, 2010). The others’ preference for 
American and South Korean news organisations could be explained by the influence 
each nation’s media exert upon each other in the coverage of North Korea. This 
becomes a topic for the interviews that inform chapters six and seven of this study. 
 
With the exception of one study, these studies do not engage with journalists 
covering news on North Korea. In the tradition of Fahmy and Johnson (2005) in their 
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study of journalists embedded with US forces during the invasion of Iraq, Seo (2009) 
surveys journalists. While this study throws up important findings around how 
political ideology guides the way journalists engage with news on North Korea, there 
are limitations to surveys. Seo admits surveying journalists lacks depth and does not 
allow for serendipity in findings. Also, Seo does not engage in a content-based 
framing analysis, leaving her solely dependent on the findings of her surveys in 
making sense of the framing of North Korea.  
 
The second variety of studies tends towards a broader evaluation of the coverage of 
North Korea based on a casual and moral evaluation of the problem described 
(Entman, 1993; Gitlin, 1980). Within these types of studies there is an emphasis on 
how the news media gets North Korea wrong. For example, Gusterson (2008) 
broadly characterises American news media coverage of North Korea as dominated 
by recurrent themes, stereotypes, and storylines. He argues the coverage of  
North Korea is always “roughly the same”. He says: 
 
North Korea is a backward, isolated country run by a tyrant with comically 
eccentric, excessive tastes. His regime consistently lies and cheats and is 
driven by a childish narcissism, while the United States, which must manage 
the international system, behaves with the steady consistency of a father 
figure. Nuclear weapons do not belong in the hands of the backward, 
unpredictable North Korean regime, and the question is whether, despite its 
duplicity and unreliability, it can be persuaded to give up its weapons, or 
whether the regime must be isolated until it expires. (2008, p. 29) 
 
For Gusterson, the North Korean narrative is fashioned out of shards of reality that 
makes for entertaining reading but is far too simplistic. This in turn results in 
unsophisticated debate and ultimately crude policy in relation to the “North Korean 
problem” (p. 30). Beyond the confines of journalism scholarship, this view is echoed 
(Hastings, 2016; Lankov, 2013, 2015; Myers, 2010, 2016; O'Carroll, 2014a; Smith, 
2015; Tudor & Pearson, 2015). 
 
The closest to this study is “Framing and dominant metaphors in the coverage of 
North Korea in the Australian media” (Dalton et al., 2016). This study focused on 
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articles about North Korea from The Australian, The Sydney Morning Herald, and the 
ABC from the beginning of 2010 to the end of 2012. Dalton et al. (2016) found the 
language used by the Australian mainstream news media on North Korea:  
 
… is often dehumanising and reductive, metaphorically associating North 
Korea and its leadership’s actions with abnormal, irrational human 
behaviours. This orientation, like all frames, also highlights certain ways of 
dealing with North Korea while obscuring our ability to see more creative, 
positive conflict management strategies. (p 543) 
 
Dalton et al. (2016) blame journalists and the organisations they work for 
misrepresenting and mis-framing North Korea and North Koreans as “… a rogue 
state populated by brainwashed citizens devoted to the cult of the Kims” (p 543). 
They argue: 
 
If we persist framing North Korea in this way, we run the risk of dehumanising 
the North Korean people and, in the event of conflict, humanitarian 
imperatives are more easily pushed aside in favour of the option to send in 
the drones with civilian deaths recast as collateral damage.  (p 543) 
 
Despite these dire predictions, Dalton et al. resist the temptation to interview 
journalists at their target news organisations in an effort to understand why the 
frames they identified in their study are like they are. In doing so, they fail to draw 
attention to the idiosyncrasies of reporting on North Korea in a disrupted news 
industry. The impact on the North Korean narrative of the structural issues around 
the changing role of the newsroom (Picard, 2014), the move to a network of 
journalists and news providers in the supply of foreign news, and the power of news 
agencies to set the agenda and guide framing in international news (Giffard & 
Leuven, 2008) are ignored. These issues become central to this study and are 
interrogated through interviews with journalists creating content on North Korea and 
South Korea.  
 
In a theme that persists across this study, South Korea sits in the shadow of North 
Korea. There are many studies analysing the framing of South Korean domestic 
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issues, including the Korean Wave (rise and popularity of South Korean popular 
cultural products around the world) (S. J. Lee, 2011), North Korean defectors in 
South Korea (Moon, 2014; Son, 2016), the South Korean anti-Amercian protests 
(Song, 2007), and the politics of South Korean nationalism (M. Park, 2009). The 
framing of South Korea from an international perspective is not as studied as the 
framing of North Korea. As part of a broader expression of post-colonial thought on 
South Korea, Pak (2016) investigated the comparative differences in the framing of 
the ‘comfort women’ issue in South Korea and Japanese broadsheet media, while 
Jang and Frederick (2017) conducted a similar study into the framing of the 
Dokdo/Takeshima maritime territorial dispute across American, Chinese, Russian, 








3.1 Framing as a Methodology 
 
Framing as a methodology is as controversial and contentious as framing theory. 
Again, there is a fundamental split in the way framing is “done” depending on the 
paradigmatic orientation of researchers and the kinds of questions they ask (Entman, 
1993). It follows that those from a cognitive school of thought tend to use quantitative 
methods in analysing framing effects. Those on the other side of the paradigmatic 
coin, the critical constructionists, tend towards qualitative methods, and that is where 
this study is situated. As with all forms of academic enquiry, there needs to be clear 
ontological and epistemological underpinning before the research can proceed. 
These have been clearly laid out as part of the theoretical framework.  
 
Qualitative methods are dominant in framing studies conforming to a critical 
epistemology. Qualitative methods allow the researcher to ask the question: “What’s 
going on here?” (Silverman, 2013, p. 52). This way of doing research tends to focus 
on the specific cases and is not concerned with findings that are all-encompassing 
and all-inclusive. Qualitative research is not without criticisms that have resulted in 
people doing that kind of work being viewed as “second class citizens” (Silverman, 
2000, p. 5). Common criticisms of qualitative research are that they are soft, flexible, 
subjective, political, and speculative (Halfpenny, 1979, in Silverman, 2000). 
Silverman argues that, depending on where you sit as a researcher in the 
qualitative/quantitative dichotomy, will determine how you understand the criticisms. 
For example, where qualitative researchers are characterised as subjective, the 
binary reasoning here then concludes that quantitative researchers are objective or 
at the very least less subjective. Silverman (2000) writes that, “The same kind of 
argument can arise about ‘flexibility’. For some people, this flexibility encourages 
qualitative researchers to be innovative. For others, flexibility might be criticised as 
meaning a lack of structure. Conversely, being ‘fixed’ gives such a structure to 
research but without the flexibility,” (p. 2). Either way, as Silverman argues, the 
qualitative/quantitative distinction seems ideological. Silverman quotes Hammersley 
(Hammersley, 1992) in making this point: 
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We are not faced, then, with a stark choice between words and numbers, or 
even between precise or imprecise data; but rather with a range from more to 
less precise data. Furthermore, our decisions about what level of precision is 
appropriate in relation to any particular claim should depend on the nature of 
what we are trying to describe, on the likely accuracy of our descriptions, on 
our purposes, and on the resources available to us; not on ideological 
commitment to one methodological paradigm or another. (p 163) 
 
This tension is true of framing as a qualitative methodology, too.  It is a palpable 
anxiety around questions of reliability, replicability, and being taken seriously that 
have fuelled the debate around framing as a fractured paradigm (Entman, 1993), a 
multi-paradigm pursuit (D'Angelo, 2002), or a bridging paradigm (Stephen D. Reese, 
2007). This anxiety has led some framing researchers to initiate means to take the 
subjectivity out of framing analysis (Van Gorp, 2009). Others aim to create a set of 
generic frames in the hope of lending some consistency to framing (William A. 
Gamson & Modigliani, 1989). Despite these efforts, framing as a theory and a 
methodology remains idiosyncratic in its many different manifestations across the 
academy. Borah (2011) argues the attraction of framing originated in the multiplicity 
of definitions, methodologies, and sponsors of framing. The notion that there should 
be some common paradigm encompassing all framing research and concepts is 
“laughably naïve” (Nelson & Willey, 2001, p. 246). The next section explains how 
framing was conducted in this study.  
 
3.1.1 Framing the Koreas 
 
Fowler et al. (2012) caution framing researchers against starting research assuming 
the subject under investigation starts with “clearly defined, static, competing 
sides/alternatives” (p. 172). Borah (2011) says:  
The conceptual fuzziness in framing research can be avoided by following 
strict operationalizations. Of the manifold perspectives in framing research, it 
is pertinent for each individual study to clearly define the conceptualizations 
and operationalizations of that particular study. (p.256) 
Care has been taken to position this study both paradigmatically and within the 
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tangled mess of competing and often contradictory theoretical positioning. As 
framing crosses both theory and methodology, careful research design and 
methodological positioning is important. A failure to do so runs the risk of creating a 
framing analysis that appears ad hoc, lacking focus, and, thus, casts a shadow over 
the analysis.  
The method advocated here involves analysis of articles on North Korea and South 
Korea from The Guardian Australia and news.com.au and interviews with journalists 
who create this kind of content. As both of these organisations sit within Picard’s 
(2014) “service mode” of journalism, the journalists interviewed are not necessarily 
the source of the article as it appeared on either website. Rather, they are 
representatives of the people engaged in this kind of work and focusing on this kind 
of content. Therefore, examination of the frames as they emerge from the articles is 
the starting point in the conversation with the journalists doing this kind of work. 
These discussions were preferenced over more general questions of the pushes and 
pulls they face in covering the Koreas. This approach has more in common with 
some of the early work in the critical tradition of looking at sources, or “primary 
definers” of news (Hall, 1978). Vliegenthart and van Zoonen (2011) argue that 
although studies in this tradition do not use the language of framing research, there 
is the shared purpose of analysing “how news content ‘promotes particular problem 
definitions’ (in the words of Entman),” (p. 108) beyond the agency of the individual 
editor or journalist. Vliegenthart and van Zoonen lament early critical and 
constructionist studies that offer more on how frames come about than much of the 
current research. This is where this study is grounded rather than framing for 
framing’s sake. Like the early offerings in the tradition, this study is concerned with 
both the meso and micro factors impacting on the practice and the framing of the 
Koreas.  
3.1.2 Finding the Frames 
 
In defining framing, this study draws from classic studies including the framing of the 
shooting down of an airliner (Entman, 1991), the framing of the ‘war on terror’ 
(Reese & Lewis, 2009) and more recently, issues of immigration and refugees in 
Europe (Boesman et al., 2017). This study also draws from the methods of data 
collection and analysis of the above studies in identifying and understanding frames. 
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Entman (1991) is central to understanding frames as a means of shaping salience, 
while Reese and Lewis (2009) offer a methodological bridge to Boesman et al. 
(2017) and Brüggemann (2014) who place journalists at the centre of framing within 
journalistic outputs. In keeping with Boesman et al. (2017) and Brüggemann (2014), 
this study first analyses articles to identify the frames and then, in the tradional of 
Hess (2005), draws upon the journalist themselves to make sense of the frames. 
This section is concerned with framing methodologies that applies to framing within 
the articles. 
 
Reese (2007) is right to caution against frames being relegated to mere categories. 
Reese argued there is little to no value in simple categories of news stories and 
issues isolated in time and space. To overcome this, this study employed layers of 
framing. First, the generic frame is identified followed by the issue specific frame 
which reveals the idiosyncratic nature of the frame in question.  
At the meso level are the generic frames which approximate to what Reese 
described as simple categories but Baden and Lecheler (2012) described as typical 
structures of issue-specific frames. In the quest to unearth salience in the coverage 
of the Koreas, the stories were categorized into generic frames based on the 
different issues that emerge across the sample. Generic frames can be used with 
any news coverage – irrespective of the topic or context (Vliegenthart, 2012) - 
offering greater opportunities for comparison both within a study and across studies. 
This resonates with this study as the sample is drawn from different and competing 
news organisations. On one hand is The Guardian Australia, the darling of left-
leaning urban Australia. On the other hand is news.com.au, a virtual clearing house 
for stories and news from across media mogul Rupert Murdoch’s news media 
empire. A favourite pastime of Guardian readers is to castigate their news.com.au 
reading peers for the base nature of their news consumption. Much of the 
news.com.au content comes from Murdoch’s tabloid press giving the website a 
distinctly sensational feel. Any contrast between the two in how they construct the 
Koreas has the potential to reveal basic ideological and content bias issues in how 
the two frame the Koreas.   
Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) identified five generic frames: “conflict”, “human 
interest”, “economic consequences”, “morality” and “responsibility” and these were 
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the basis for the meso level of framing in this study. Briefly, Semetko and Valkenburg 
define each of the frames as follows: 
Conflict frame: This frame emphasises conflict between individuals, groups or 
institutions as a means of capturing audience attention.  
Human interest frame: This frame brings a human face or an emotional angle 
to the presentation of an issue, event or problem. After the conflict frame, this 
is the most commonly used frame. 
Economic consequences frame: This frame reports an event, problem, or 
issue in terms of the consequences it will have economically on an individual, 
group, institution, region, or country.  
Morality frame: This frame reports an event, problem, or issue in the context 
of religious tenets or moral prescriptions. Because of the professional norm of 
objectivity, journalists often make reference to the moral frame indirectly – 
through a quotation of inference – having someone else raise the question. 
Responsibility frame: This frame presents an issue or problem in such a way 
as to attribute responsibility for its cause or solution to either a government or 
to an individual or a group. (pp. 95-96) 
It should be recognised none of these frames is mutually exclusive with 
combinations of frames possible in one story or across a single event, issue, or 
problem. Also, where Semetko and Valkenburg erred on the side of quantitative 
methods, this study uses a qualitative methodology. Therefore, this stage of frame 
identification is still inductive whereas in using quantitative (Iyengar, 1991) methods, 
Semetko and Valkenburg were looking to fit the data to the frames, not the other way 
around. This is why mixing frames, or ‘frame blending’, as it will be referred to here, 
is important. This offers a variation of the generic frame that both offers consistency 
in framing across the sample and also offers the researcher the freedom to move 
within less rigid structures than those originally offered by Semetko and Valkenburg, 
and Iyengar (1991) before them. Jang and Frederick (2017) put it best: 
Unlike the deductive approach to content analysis, the inductive approach 
 65 
doesn’t begin with a preconceived set of categories of frames into which 
stories are coded. Instead, this approach is more organic in nature. It begins 
with a set of loosely identified frames and allows the patterns of rhetorical 
symbols in the texts to signal to the researchers, through the coding process, 
which frames are present and predominate in news coverage. (p. 221) 
The obvious criticism of using generic frames is the detail and nuance of the frame 
and the broader event, issue, or problem can be lost in the pursuit of having the data 
fit the frame (Van Gorp, 2007). Van Gorp (2007) was clear on this when he said 
frames are rooted in culture which manifests itself at the individual, organisational 
and social level (Brüggemann, 2014, p. 67). This is where the next level of framing 
becomes relevant in identifying issue or unique frames. This style of framing is more 
in keeping with the interpretative critical constructionist approach that values small 
sample deep analysis over the generalised but easily replicable approach favoured 
by those analysing much larger data sets using quantitative methods. Again, 
researchers undertaking studies into unique frames are cautioned that the “lack of 
disciplined approach” could lead researchers “to easily find the evidence they are 
looking for” (Hertog & McLeod, 2001, p. 151). As Borah (2011) points out, for 
idiosyncratic frames to have value, they should be connected to larger implications of 
framing theory. This explains why so much attention has been paid to the conceptual 
issues in both framing theory and methodology.  
The next level is the unique or issue frames that help satisfy Van Gorp’s (2007) call 
for frames to be clearly defined but also idiosyncratic. Van Gorp reasons that framing 
as a pursuit is a process bound by culture, and, in a news context, news production 
is a part of the framing process. In the context of this, the style of fa rame, as 
previously outlined, does not necessarily conform to the research conventions of 
verifiability and replicability. Rather, frames are driven by a host of factors that 
combine within specific and unique cultural settings to produce specific and unique 
frames.  
This builds upon the work of Gamson (1987) and Gamson and Modigliani (1989) and 
what they termed “media packages”. Media packages are a cluster of ideas, symbols 
and messages present in an article or artefact to influence and create schema in an 
audience that guides and influences the ways we think about or behave around an 
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issue, topic or idea. According to the two, a media frame contains a central 
organising idea (the frame) the other elements promote. For Entman (1993), this 
idea corresponds to his idea of “salience”. In addition to the frame, Gamson and 
Modigliani made reference to “condensing symbols” that make reference to the 
frame in shorthand. The authors argue journalists routinely use five common framing 
devices in covering news, namely metaphors, exemplars (historical examples from 
which lessons are drawn), catchphrases, depictions, and visual images. These form 
the package of which the central frame is the container.  
This highlights that frames do not necessarily need to be complementary in name 
but the basic conception, understanding, and organisation do. Although a unified 
conception and approach to framing is nothing more than folly, for those conforming 
to a version of a frame production approach, an interpretive media package offers 
the advantage of deep analysis of a small dataset through qualitative methods.  
Unlike the majority of studies in the critical constructionist framing tradition dealing 
with analysis of written texts (newspaper articles), this analysis begins with the 
written and visual text.  This aligns with a classic study (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989) 
in the tradition that identified different “devices” to signal the presence of a frame. 
The two authors argue not all devices are of equal weight and the composition of 
packages can change. They (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989) also argue that all 
elements and devices of an article needs to be taken into account as part of the 
framing package, and this includes visual material. Therefore, given the prominence 
of images in news articles on the internet, this study analyses them too.  
3.1.3 Data Collection 
 
Three months of articles on North Korea and South Korea were collected from The 
Guardian and news.com.au websites. This took place in July, August, and 
September 2015. The articles were coded for date, headline, sub-headline, byline, 
length, and number and type of images. Most importantly, articles were categorised 
by country focus (North Korea, South Korea or both) and the type of story – conflict, 
human interest, business, entertainment, etc. During this period there was a military 
flareup between North Korea and South Korea that came to dominate the sample. 
How this clash is reflected in the frames and the impact this has on the journalists 
 67 
reporting these hostilities is discussed in chapters five, six and seven. To ensure 
diversity of article topics across the sample, the period of conflict was bookended by 
two months of articles on the Koreas. The results of this and the framing analysis 
can be seen in Chapter Five.  
3.1.4 Textual Data Analysis 
 
The approach to the data analysis of the text borrows from the work of Boesman et 
al. (2017). First, following the constructionist approach of Van Gorp (2010), the 
macro frame is inductively constructed through reading the text. This signals the 
overall theme of the sample. 
After that, sub, meso, or micro frames are established through breaking the sample 
down into the issue or event-based themes. These are then analysed around 
Entman’s (1993) problem definitions, causes, consequences, moral judgments, and 
solutions. This was done to limit the overall number of codes. In keeping with 
Boesman et al. (2017), framing packages were created in the third phase (inspired 
by Gamson and Modigliani, 1989). “Each framing package had a logical cohesion of 
framing devices (word choice, metaphors, etc.) and reasoning devices (from problem 
definition to solution). Occasionally, the latter were found explicitly in the news 
articles but most often the key frame implicitly suggested this logical reasoning” (p 
301). The key frame is the macro-frame. To understand how the key frame is 
constructed or why it is like it is, like Boesman et al., interviews were conducted with 
journalists doing this kind of work.  
3.1.5 Visual Framing as a Device 
 
At the second or meso level of framing, all these devices were drawn upon in 
determining the frame. This includes the visual, which, in many studies, is neglected 
(Coleman, 2009). Geise and Baden (2015) argue that given the multi-modal nature 
of the media we consume, ignoring the importance of images on text runs the risk of 
making framing irrelevant and obsolete.  
Many of the early contributions in news framing analysis combined textual and visual 
framing. An iconic example is Entman’s (1991) study into the downing of two 
commercial aircraft -- a Korean Air (KAL) flight in 1983 by the Soviet military and an 
Iran Air flight in 1988 by the American Navy. Entman was able to show how different 
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frames came into play depending on the aggressor. For Entman, the conflation of 
textual and visual framing in revealing frames was both obvious and natural.  With 
the passing of time and the fragmentation of framing as a unified approach in 
researching framing effects and frame production, visual framing has been side-
lined. Coleman (2009) argues this happened because integrating both verbal framing 
and visual framing is fraught. Coleman says there is little appetite for doing both in a 
single study because doing so is difficult given the length of an average journal 
article was too short to do such a study justice. Coleman also asserts there is an 
institutional bias within the wider academy against visual framing whereby it is usual 
for studies focused on the visual to be rejected because they lack a verbal 
component but the opposite is seldom true. Ultimately, Coleman makes a claim for a 
cohesive approach to visual framing that is underpinned by respect for the sub-
discipline.  
Although this study does not make a claim to answer Coleman’s call for a cohesive 
approach to visual framing or a claim to further theory or the methodology of visual 
framing, it would be remiss to ignore the presence and appeal of the images 
embedded in the online stories that form the sample here. Indeed, the stories that 
make up the sample offer a rich tome of pictures of North Korea and their leadership 
that have become synonymous with the absurd, and, therefore, add gravitas to the 
frames that emerge. The same applies to the images attached to stories on South 
Korea.  
To look at the visual as a framing device as part of broader frame packages, 
Rodriguez and Dimitrova’s (2011) “levels of visual framing” methodology is 
employed. Please note, not every image in the sample was analysed. Rather, a 
smaller representative sub-sample was selected corresponding to the different 
events across the sample. 
Rodriguez and Dimitrova’s (2011) identify four levels of visual framing: visuals as 
denotative systems, visuals as stylistic-semiotic systems, visuals as connotative 
systems, and visuals as ideological representations. Visual framing in this study 
takes place after the text has been analysed, so the analysis of visual material 
becomes deductive. Therefore, visuals as a framing device, in this study, fall under 
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analysis in order to determine if they deviate, support or conform to other elements 
or “devices” that comprise the frame.  
At the first level is visual as denotative systems. Here, frames are constrained “by 
what people know”. The questions to be asked at this level are “who or what is being 
depicted here?” The answer to this question is often informed by frames “derived 
from the denotative or representational meanings of that which are depicted or 
established by the titles, captions, inscriptions, or other textual descriptions that 
accompany the visual” (Rodriguez & Dimitrova, 2011, p. 53). 
At the second level resides visuals as stylistic-semiotic systems. This is concerned 
with the composition of the image. This might include where the subject is situated in 
the frame, what kind of shot is used (portrait, for example), the relationship between 
the subjects in the image, and the relationship between the viewer and the subject.  
 
Level three is the visual as a connotative system. As the name suggests, this level 
refers to the ideas or concepts attached to or associated with a particular person, 
place or thing. In the context of this study, this is the most exciting level of analysis 
as this is a content-driven tier where “news visuals are analysed as signs, and their 
relationship with other signs within the sign system are assessed” (Rodriguez & 
Dimitrova, 2011, p. 56). Rodriguez and Dimitrova argue frames evolve and change 
by critically examining the perceived signs for their more complex, often culture-
bound interpretations. Therefore, the meaning of a “sign” or symbol is by nature 
subjective and open to interpretation across culture and time. Van Leeuwen and 
Jewitt (2001) break connotative symbols into two distinct types: the abstract and the 
figurative. The abstract refers to symbols that are objects or shapes that hold some 
form of symbolic value (for example, the cross or the crescent). Figurative symbols 
are “represented persons, places, and things with a symbolic value (i.e. the Dalai 
Lama)” (Rodriguez and Dimitrova, 2011, p. 57) with these different elements being 
easily manipulated by changing composition, lighting, contrast in colour or tone 
among other things to enhance frame identification. In this study, this level of visual 
analysis is appealing given how images of Kim Jong-un, his father, and his 
grandfather before him are appropriated and used in the non-DPRK news media. It 
is argued here the inclusion of these kinds of images in news on both North Korea 
and South Korea provides deeper and wider framing analysis. Finally, Rodriguez and 
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Dimitrova include visual metaphors at this level. They define a visual metaphor as “a 
representation of an abstract concept through a concrete image that bears some 
analogy to the concept” (Lule, 2003, in Rodriguez and Dimitrova, 2011, p. 57). 
 
At the fourth level rest visuals as ideological representations. This level takes on a 
special significance. The binary nature and the interrelatedness of the Koreas to 
each other and other stakeholders is significant in terms of how these ideological 
differences are expressed visually. To analyse a frame at this level is to draw upon 
the stylistic and symbolic features in an image to thrash out the “why?” behind the 
images being analysed in terms of the “basic attitude of a nation, a period, a class, a 
religious or philosophical persuasion” (Panofsky, 1970, p. 55). According to Pieterse 
(1992), those looking to reveal frames at this level are interesting in the obvious 
economic and political interest but are also in revealing frames in “relation of a 
subtler nature in cultural, emotional and psychological spheres, and to the various 
ways in which these relations figure in the phenomenon of subordination” (Pieterse, 
1992, p. 10, in Rodriguez and Dimitrova, 2011, p. 57). In order to do so, Pieterse 
says the following questions should be asked: “What interests are being served by 
these representations? Whose voices are being heard? What ideas dominate?” 
(1992, p.10). Ultimately, this level is about visual framing as an instrument of power 
“in the shaping of public consciousness and historical imagination” (Anden-
Papadopoulos, 2007). There are several studies that have followed this fourth level 
approach, with the most iconic among them being Entman’s 1991 study on the 
downed commercial aircraft.  
 
3.2 A Nexus between Content and Interviews 
 
This methodology consists of a framing analysis of news on North Korea and South 
Korea and interviews with the people creating this kind of content. Unlike many other 
framing studies utilising interviews, this study is not as concerned with role 
perception and role enactment, as the gap between how journalists understand their 
role and the realities of enacting that role and what this means to the construction of 
the “Korea narrative” (Brüggemann, 2014; Mellado & Van Dalen, 2014; O'Sullivan & 
Heinonen, 2008; Tandoc, Hellmueller, & Vos, 2013). Although how journalists see 
themselves and understand their role in reporting the Koreas came up during the 
 71 
interviews, these kinds of concerns were secondary to broader issues in the practice 
of covering these countries and the impact this has on framing. These kinds of 
studies rely on some form of direct or indirect interaction with journalists. This study 
looked at the factors that shape the news we receive on North Korea and South 
Korea, and while role perception and enactment form part of this analysis, they are 
not at the heart of what is happening here. Rather, this study is concerned with a 
deep analysis of the issues facing the practice of reporting on North Korea and 
South Korea, and as such the method of data collection needs to reflect that.  
 
Bringing interviews to bear in news framing studies is nothing new. Reese and Lewis 
(2009) used interviews only in their study into the framing of the US Government’s 
War on Terror in the United States. Yet, using interviews alone in frame finding runs 
the risk of not being able to verify if individual bias, taste, and judgement makes it 
into the news (Brüggemann, 2014).  
 
The practice of combining content analysis and interviews in news framing studies is 
an orthodox approach to this kind of research (D. A. Scheufele, 1999) especially in 
relation to interrogation of the “journalist frame”. The journalist frame, that is, the 
frame individual journalists evoke in the day-to-day journalistic practice, is in focus 
here given Picard’s model of the disrupted news industry where the notion of the 
legacy newsroom seems increasingly remote. Therefore, this study used in-depth 





Where the content framing analysis asks what – “What frames are in play?” – the 
interviews go deeper and delve into why and where – “Why are the frames like they 
are, and where do they come from?” Where this study departs from many others is in 
the purpose of the interviews. An orthodox use of interviews sees the researcher or 
research team using interviews to interrogate the frames as they are usually situated 
within a specific issue. The researcher will often interview journalists multiple times 
as an issue unfolds, to understand the framing process (i.e. Boesman et al., 2017). 
This study is not about a single issue. Rather, it focuses on the framing of countries 
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over three months. During the sample period, different issues and events rose and 
fell, some unique to North Korea, some unique to South Korea, and some common 
to both.  
This study took place in a disrupted industry where the contemporary newsroom is 
geared more toward simple distribution than content creation or the journalism of old 
(Picard, 2014). Therefore, a newsroom ethnography in the tradition of Tuchman 
(1978) or Gitlin (1980) is not helpful. If this study was geared toward gatekeeping this 
might not be the case, but, as it stands, questions of distribution are not the focus 
here. The focus here is content creation, and the frames that emerge from analysis 
of that content offer a starting point for such a conversation. This conversation is not 
limited to questions of frames and framing and has the potential to extend into 
questions surrounding wider issues of why the coverage of North Korea and South 
Korea is like it is. From this perspective, engaging journalists involved in creating 
content in these countries are the focus. This includes those whose copy is 
published on the pages of news.com.au and The Guardian, as well as others 
providing this kind of coverage on the non-Korean market for news on the countries. 
Since the journalists in the sample are scattered across Northeast Asia (although 
most are concentrated in Seoul, South Korea), and most work from home or on the 
road, semi-structured interviews were selected as the most appropriate methodology 
in gathering data to answer the “why” question. This approach is grounded in work of 
Tuchman (1978) in her bringing together of journalism and sociology. Hess (2005) 
further the methodological approaches to interviewing to this study by giving voice to 
journalists reporting on a single country. Where Hess focuses on foreign 
correspondents working in the United States, the emphasis here is on the Koreas. 
Where Hess is interested in how foreign correspondent’s culture shapes their 
coverage of America, this study is concerned with what factors shape foreign 
correspondents framing of the Koreas.  
3.2.1.1 Defining the Interview  
 
Defining the interview and how it functions as part of a broader research agenda can 
be fraught and needs to be carefully defined. This study borrows from the 
anthropological and sociological understanding of the interview advanced by Kvale 
(1996). Kvale defines the research interview as “an interview whose purpose it is to 
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obtain descriptions of the life world of the interviewee with respect to interpreting the 
meaning of the described phenomena” (1996, pp. 5-6). Key to Kvale’s definition is 
“purpose”, and it is this purpose that sets the interview apart from other forms of 
communication. Skinner (2012) goes further in defining the qualitative research 
interview as, “… having a number of aspects to it, and it is connected with several 
philosophies” (p.9). Skinner defines the research interview as fundamentally 
qualitative and descriptive and seeks to reveal the “nuances and particularities of the 
human condition in a humanist tradition. It is expansive rather than reductive, 
preferring the complexity, ambiguity and the irony of a memory explanation…” (p.9). 
It is this expansiveness that appeals in this study. The stories and the experiences of 
the participating journalists based on interviews themed around the frames as they 
were revealed in Chapter Five offer the opportunity for wider insights into the nature 
of covering North Korea and South Korea. Skinner adds, “This type of interview is 
themed and seeks to understand the actor’s understandings of his or her life world, 
his or her interpretations, meanings and narrations” (p.9). As with the framing 
analysis, none of this is to suggest this style of research seeks to make 
generalisations about the field as a whole. Rather, this style of research is 
“ideopathic” (not a misspelling) (King & Horrocks, 2016), in that it seeks to describe 
aspects of the social world over making generalisations on general patterns of 
behaviour. Within naturalistic or qualitative research, Patton (1990) says the natural 
orientation is toward a focused sample that speaks to a certain aspect of the world or 
worlds under scrutiny. This approach is fundamentally inductive, making the 
interviews open-ended. It allows for serendipity in the research process and, thus, 
forces the researcher to be less deterministic in the potential outcome of such 
research. Patton categorises qualitative interviews into three basic types: 1) informal, 
conversational interviews; 2) semi-structured interviews; and 3) standardised, open-
ended interviews. All allow for the interviewer to focus first and foremost on the 
interview and all are thematic rather than adhering to a rigorous set of questions.  
 
Differences arise in the degree to which the interviews follow themes. This is in 
keeping with the flexible nature of qualitative research designs whereby questions 
pertaining to themes and the themes themselves can be modified over time to keep 
pace with changes in research driven by what is now productive based on 
progressive findings as the interviews are conducted (Lofland, 2006). In other words, 
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emphasis on certain themes changes as the research progresses based on what the 
researcher has found in earlier interviews.  
 
This study adopted a “semi-structured” approach to interviewing. This approach falls 
at the more casual end of an interview style spectrum with a survey styled approach 
falling at the other extreme. Burgess (1984) makes this distinction with the spectrum 
of interviews being structured (interviews that conform to a rigid set of questions) to 
unstructured/semi-structured/informal interviews that take on the characteristics of a 
conversation. For Burgess (1984), “Interviews as conversation” is underpinned by a 
sense of egalitarian give-and-take between the interviewer and interviewee. This 
form of interview uses open-ended questions most commonly based on themes and 
takes the form of a conversation. Ultimately, the semi-structured interview is about 
the co-production of knowledge between the interviewer and the subject (Kvale, 
1996, p. vii). This is not to say that both parties are equal or the interview is 
spontaneous and unplanned in the same way a conversation can be. Indeed, there 
is a performative aspect to the interview where both the interviewer and the 
interviewee are conforming to some perception of what the other expects or wants. 
This renders the process open to manipulation from both actors. Atkinson and 
Silverman (1997) argue this is inescapable and should be recognised as part of 
studies using interviews. They go further in arguing that we live in an “interview 
society” where the interview is the “zeitgeist of this age” geared “towards 
confessional self-revelations, then the interview process and product substantiates 
and encourages such practice” (Skinner, 2012, p. 11). Atkinson and Silverman 
(1997) refer to this as the “research confessional” with the attraction of this approach 
affirming what the two authors term the “interiority of the self” (p. 310) – a therapeutic 
act for both the speakers and the listeners – “a research soft porn, if you will, 
entrapping an emotional life and a private experience in public” (Skinner, 2012, p. 
12). Skinner and Silverman and Atkinson raise important questions of the reliability 
of interviews to reveal an authentic self and the authenticity and accuracy of memory 
in reconstructions of experience. They are right to be skeptical about interviews and 
interviewing. This does not mean throwing out the baby with the bath water. Rather, 
it means there is a narcissistic element to this form of gathering data that needs to 
be acknowledged before moving forward. The interviews in this study allowed 
access to deep data that would have otherwise been dormant and overlooked. There 
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was also an emotional release on the part of some of the interviewees in this study.  
This was further enhanced by the sense that journalists do not often get to talk about 
themselves or their practice. One interviewee, for example, described the interview 
as “therapeutic”, “cathartic”, and “an interesting release”. She attributed this to 
always asking and never answering as the nature of her work dictated. 
3.2.2 Preparation of the Interviews 
 
Twenty journalists reporting on both North and South Korea for the foreign press 
were interviewed as part of this study. Only one, Justin McCurry, worked as a staff 
correspondent for The Guardian. news.com.au does not maintain a correspondent in 




Those reporting on North Korea and South Korea for the English language foreign 
news media as their primary journalistic activity comprise a small group 
(approximately 30) (York, 2016). Given the qualitative foundations of this research, 
only a small number (15-20) of participants were expected. As such, there was no 
expectation that those participating in this study reflect the overall practice of 
journalism or even news on foreign countries. Rather, this research reflected the 
views and experiences of those interviewed, and there were no claims to generality 
(Griffiths, Gossop, Powis, & Strang, 1993).  
Early in this research, the approach to finding participants was simple – identify 
relevant journalists through their bylines on their stories published across the 
news.com.au and The Guardian Australia websites and contact them through 
Twitter. There were immediate problems with this approach. The first issue lay in 
identification. Many of the news.com.au bylines were vague (for example, “agency 
writers”) or non-existent. This was not as much of a problem with The Guardian 
content where bylines were always clear and present.  
The second issue was, when there was a way a potential participant could be 
identified and subsequently contacted, there were no responses to requests for 
interviews. Eventually, more by luck than by design, I was able to secure an 
interview with Anna Fifield, the Japan and Koreas Bureau Chief for The Washington 
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Post based in Tokyo. Fifield, together with Choe Sang-hun (The New York Times), 
Jean Lee (formerly of Associated Press), and James Pearson (Reuters), comprise a 
who’s who of journalists reporting on the Koreas for an international audience. The 
Fifield interview was pivotal in recruiting further participants. At the end of the 
interview, she said she did not want the interview to end as it was a “cathartic 
experience” (Fifield, 2016), and something others in her field could benefit from. She 
then recommended several people I should contact for their own insights, including 
Choe Sang-hun, Andrei Lankov and Foster Klug (South Korea bureau chief of 
Associated Press). Fifield said I was free to inform them she referred me to them, as 
she thought the research was “timely and important”. This “snowball sampling” 
carried on throughout the interview phase of the study resulted in rich data on the 
issues associated with reporting North Korea and South Korea.  
Snowball sampling can be defined as, “A technique for finding research subjects. 
One subject gives the researcher the name of another subject, who in turn provides 
the name of a third, and so on,” (Vogt, 1999). It is suggested snowball sampling is 
the best way to access a hidden/hard to reach population (Valdez & Kaplan, 1999). 
Traditionally, this method has been used to tap into the social networks of 
sometimes hard to recognize and marginal groups, including street corner society 
(Whyte, 1955), gangs (Patrick, 1973), drug users (Fitzgerald & Hamilton, 1997), 
HIV/AIDS sufferers (Tabnak & Sun, 2000), sex workers (McNamara, 1994), criminals 
(Fitzgerald, 1996), slum dwellers (Aggarwal, Pandey, & Bhattacharya, 2007), the 
seriously ill (Sudman & Freeman, 1988), and those affected by conflict (N. Cohen & 
Arieli, 2011). 
 
This use of snowball sampling in this study was not so much about making contact 
with a hidden vulnerable population, but more about getting the attention of a hard to 
reach professional elite (Saunders, 2012). As already stated, potential participants 
were identified prior to the recruitment process. The issue was having them respond, 
and after the Fifield interview, many did. Again, those interviewed were keen to 
share their contacts within the mostly Seoul-based network of journalists. This style 
of sampling worked well but meant not every person contacted was willing to take 
part in this study. For example, Foster Klug and Eric Talmadge, the respective chiefs 
of the Seoul and Pyongyang Associated Press (AP) bureau refused interviews with 
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no further explanation. It was later revealed in an interview with former AP Seoul and 
Pyongyang Bureau Chief, Jean Lee, that AP has an employee nondisclosure policy 
for current staff. This includes talking to researchers.  
 
Another was an unnamed United Press International (UPI) correspondent based in 
Seoul. After many years away, UPI had employed a fulltime Seoul-based 
correspondent to cover the Koreas. This was someone I was keen to speak with for 
two reasons above and beyond the usual list of questions. First, in an era of 
shrinking journalist presence across the news media industry, including Korea, it was 
interesting that UPI was expanding into Korea. Second, in their short time in the job, 
as revealed in a number of interviews, the correspondent was producing a huge 
number of stories on North Korea every day. The UPI correspondent had earned a 
reputation for copying factually suspect stories on the North from the South Korean 
news media and publishing them straight to the UPI wire (Fifield, 2016; O’Carroll, 
2016; Pearson, 2016; York, 2016).  
 
Finally, Koo Se-woong, the founder of the beautifully crafted news startup Korea 
Expose would only be interviewed face-to-face in Seoul. The tyranny of distance 
precluded such a meeting. My interest in speaking with Koo was based around the 
impact of his news startup which sells itself as “Critical/Independent/Unbound” (Koo, 
2018b) in framing and reframing Korea and issues facing the country through mainly 
long form written pieces. Across his platform, Koo publishes content that challenges 
prevailing views of Korea. He and his staff regularly publish stories on social issues 
and the toll living in Korea takes on people living in the country. For this, he has been 
noticed outside of the country and has become a leading voice in the foreign media 
on Korea. Another reason for seeking to speak with Koo was that he had no 
journalism experience prior to founding Korea Expose and he had never been 
trained as a journalist, yet he and his organisation enjoyed considerable success and 
exposure. Finally, in an era of seemingly endless change, insecurity and uncertainty 
for the broader news industry, Koo has not only been able to establish his digital 
news offering but has also expanded both his staff and the associated coverage of 
South Korea. This sits well with Picard’s (2014) craft mode of journalism, and it 
would have been valuable to speak with Koo about his success especially in light of 
so many failings in following a similar approach to doing journalism. 
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An issue that was highlighted in the literature on snowball sampling is that of 
research fatigue (Moore, 1996) – the exploitation of a certain group of people, 
usually from a socially marginalised group, for the purposes of research. The 
interviewees in this study were neither marginalised nor overused by academic 
researchers. In fact, none of the interviewees had ever been approached to take part 
in an academic study.  
 
The biggest issue in conducting these interviews was the initial hostility and 
suspicion from the interviewees. Trust was established through a demonstration on 
the part of this interviewer of rigorous preparation and knowledge of the subject, and 
experience as a journalist working internationally.  As Patton (1990) said, “The 
quality of the information obtained during an interview is largely dependent on the 
interviewer”.  
 
This method and study satisfy The University of Queensland’s ethical standards on 
using people in research. All of those interviewed as part of this study also agreed to 
be named in the study.  
 
3.3 Thematic Analysis 
 
Chapters Six and Seven are structured around the interview questions: “How would 
you characterise the international coverage of North Korea and South Korea?” And: 
“What are the factors that shape international coverage of North Korea and South 
Korea?”. Based on these questions, the findings and discussion chapters are divided 
into two distinct sections. The data collection was semi-structured which by its nature 
is iterative, interviewee-led, and serendipitous (Skinner, 2012). This also resulted in 
no two interviews being the same with interviews arranged and conducted around 
broad themes rather than specific questions. It follows that methods of analysis need 
to reflect methods of data collection (Silverman, 2016). Against this backdrop, a six-
step thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006) was employed.  
 
The advantage of this specific approach is that it allows for the fluid creation of 
themes across a wide and varied data set (Alholjailan, 2012; Boyatzis, 1998; Braun 
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& Clarke, 2006). Braun and Clarke (2006) argue there is no hard and fast 
agreements on what makes a theme. Rather, a theme is characterised by its 
significance as themes emerge in the data set. In answering questions on why the 
covering of North Korea and South Korea is like it is, clear but varied themes 
emerged.  
 
In keeping with the semi-structured thematic interviews, the interview data in this 
study were broken down and organised by themes. This part of the study borrowed 
from thematic analysis as prescribed by Braun and Clark (2006) which in turn draws 
from the work of Strauss and Corbin (2014) in grounded theory procedures and 
techniques. Braun and Clark (2006) took inspiration for their article on thematic 
analysis from concern around the ambiguity and the apparent lack of structure, 
shape, and direction that plagued thematic analysis. Although Braun and Clark wrote 
for students, teachers and researchers of psychology, their observations and 
prescriptive approach to doing thematic analysis apply equally to communication and 
journalism research. 
 
Braun and Clark advocate a six-step approach: 
 
Familiarizing yourself with your data, 2. Generating initial codes, 3. Searching 
for themes, 4. Reviewing themes, 5. Defining and naming themes, 6. 
Producing the report: The final opportunity for analysis. Selection of vivid, 
compelling extract examples, final analysis of selected extracts, relating back 
of the analysis to the research question.  (2006, p.87) 
 
This approach worked in this study because it combined the sometimes contrary 
characteristic of being deliberate and rigorous but also iterative and flexible. This 
allowed for application across a wide range of qualitative data while bringing clear 





4 The Network as the Source of International News 
 
This chapter does not seek to bring social meaning to content produced as part of a 
network. Rather, it seeks to reveal the decentralised and atomised sources of news 
on the Koreas as it is disseminated across post-disruption news platforms. This is 
done to establish networks beyond the confines of the site of the creation of 
journalism of the Koreas. Therefore, this begins with a short summary of the relevant 
literature and argument before a presenting the findings and discussion. 
4.1 News Platforms as Service Mode Providers 
 
This Findings and Discussion chapter explores the networks that underpin 
news.com.au and The Guardian’s content on North Korea and South Korea through 
an analysis of bylines. This is done to reveal the “post” and “outside” newsroom 
nature of the production of content on North Korea and South Korea. The bylines 
were categorised by type – who was named and what kind of organisation they 
worked for. This extends beyond Picard’s (2014) basic categories of service, craft 
and legacy.  
What emerges are complex configurations of news providers feeding both The 
Guardian and news.com.au online news platforms for news on the Koreas. 
news.com.au’s network is corporate. It is an “intra” network where the platform 
serves as a place to aggregate and distribute news from the traditional wire services 
and from within the broader parent company’s News Corporation framework. It is the 
depth and breadth of News Corp’s news business that makes this possible. 
news.com.au’s network is made complex with much of the content that falls under 
staff writers’ bylines being sourced from outside of the news.com.au network, thus 
creating an illusion of in-house content creation. In these instances, other news 
organisations are cited as sources within stories bearing a News Corp journalist 
byline. As a result, stories within the news.com.au offering are sometimes entirely 
constructed around comment and content provided from other journalists and news 
organisations. What transpires is the illusion of authoritative journalism done by 
expert journalists, with reality being more of an exercise in content curation by 
content managers. 
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There are places in this chapter where, in analysing the network, interviews and 
content from the network drawn upon. This is done to offer the reader a 
comprehensive account of the respective networks news.com.au and The Guardian 
draw upon in their journalism on North Korea and South Korea. 
The Guardian does not have the luxury of a vast news organisation to draw content 
from. This has resulted in The Guardian going beyond the bounds of their newsroom 
in pursuit of news and content to fill their pages. As a service level/legacy news 
media hybrid, The Guardian has been successful in exploiting the changes and 
innovation brought by the digital disruption of news to cover North Korea under the 
banner of the “North Korea Network”. This is evident in their relationships with craft 
mode providers, specialist online news providers (Picard, 2014), and digital natives 
NK News and Daily NK. The Guardian has come to rely heavily on these 
organisations in covering North Korea and relations between the two Koreas. What 
becomes apparent in this chapter is that the relations between The Guardian and NK 
News are sometimes asymmetrical with the bigger organisation taking advantage of 
the smaller.   
 
Industrial and technological transformations in journalism have changed journalistic 
practices. As Anderson (2011) and Deuze and Witschge (2018) argue, the 
newsroom is no longer the best site for the study of journalists and their professional 
practices. In a networked journalistic ecosystem (Anderson, 2013; Beckett & Ball, 
2012; Beckett & Deuze, 2016; Beckett & Mansell, 2008; Castells, 2010), the places 
where journalism actually happens are diverse. Heinrich (2011) argues these 
changes have had the unintended side effect of accelerating the flow of people, 
processes and ideas through the networked journalism enterprise.  
Bardoel and Deuze (2001) defined the networked journalist as: 
… a professional who serves as a nodal point in a complex environment 
between technology and society, between news and analysis, between 
annotation and selection, between orientation and investigation. (Bardoel & 
Deuze, 2001)  
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Since then, the understanding of the network and the ways in which journalists 
interact with it have evolved and diverged. Within networked journalism the 
newsroom is viewed as a “node” that is fed by the network (Castells, 1996). It is the 
composition of the network that is contested with reference to the role publics and 
the audience play in the network. Jarvis (2006) emphasises the interplay and 
connections between the journalist and the audience in the composition and function 
of the network, as do Haak et al (Haak, Parks, & Castells, 2012). This study 
conforms to the “networked institution” (Anderson, Bell, & Shirky, 2012) 
understanding the composition and function of the network. This view is based on 
the notion that “… journalism can no longer be easily understood within 
organizational containers but extends across traditional boundaries in unpredictable 
ways” (S. D Reese & Shoemaker, 2016, p. 394). This understanding of the network 
prioritises the interaction between different news institutions and organisations in 
meeting their journalism publishing expectations.   
As a form of disrupted mediated construction of reality, the network functions as a 
distinct framework for the production and co-production of media, in this case news. 
Couldry and Hepp (2017) define a network as: 
… a structural metaphor to describe the relations of human actors within a 
certain social entity (group, family, etc.) and in between such entities. (p. 60) 
In a swipe at form over content, Couldry and Hepp (2017) argue the endlessly 
shifting and changing of constellations of actors that comprise a network offer 
nothing more than the opportunity to study the composition of the constellations. 
They argue this ignores other features of the social world as a construction and the 
role of the actor within those worlds. Couldry and Hepp argue further that the 
network tells us little, if anything, about how the social world is constructed. They 
say, “The concept of the ‘network’ always falls short therefore of understanding the 
overall constructions of meaning that orientate human action” (p.61). They are right. 
Simply showing the existence of a relationship in the form of a map or constellation 
only shows the potential or existence of such a relationship. The meaning or 
productive capacity of such a relationship cannot and will not be revealed in maps or 
constellations.  
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From this perspective, the single stand-alone organisation (if it ever existed) as a 
point to situate the study of journalism as an agent of the mediated social 
construction of reality seems frail at best. Baker and Faulkner (2005) argue it is 
necessary to embrace organisations as open systems of independent activities, 
linking shifting coalitions of participants in intra- and inter-organisational networks.  
Deuze and Witschge (2018) argue: 
Considering the individualized precarious and networked context of 
newswork, it becomes imperative to critically interrogate the notion of 
‘organization’ as the operational framework for analysing what it is like to do 
journalism and be a journalist. (p. 173) 
In the case of international news, this diversity of sources becomes more extreme as 
costs of maintaining foreign correspondents force many news organisations to look 
elsewhere for their news on the world. As part of this study, it is argued, this makes a 
difference to the framing of stories. It also changes the way we study journalists and 
the environment in which they operate. If the focus is an aspect or aspects of the 
journalistic narrative, there is little to no point in using newsroom ethnography to 
study journalists if the newsroom is no longer the primary site where journalism is 
practiced.  This rings especially true if the news organisations under investigation fall 
under Picard’s (2014) service mode – newsrooms that transformed from creators of 
journalism to content curators and distributors.  
At issue here is how “networked” are the news organisations in this sample in 
relation to their news and coverage of North Korea and South Korea? To answer this 
question, bylines across all the stories in the sample were categorised. The 
categories were based on who and where the stories came from. For example, 
stories bearing the bylines Associated Press or Reuters were categorised as 
“Traditional Wire Service Stories”. Other categories included “Staff Contributors”, 
these are people who identify as working exclusively for either news.com.au or The 
Guardian. There were also “Freelance Contributors” who feed into the network for 
news on the Koreas on an irregular or one-off basis. Google searches were 
conducted to establish the status of staff and freelance.  
The Guardian sample throws up two interesting categories in the context of the 
disrupted field.  The first is labelled “Craft Mode Contributors” and the second is 
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“Pundits”. This reflects broader differences in the coverage of the two content 
providers with The Guardian offering a greater range and quantity of stories on the 
Koreas. “Craft Mode Contributors” is taken directly from Picard (2014) and his model 
of industrial change. These are stories sourced from specialist online news 
producers with a focus on the Koreas (especially North Korea). The final category 
was “Pundits”. Pundits can be best defined as experts (self-proclaimed and 
otherwise) who have a detailed knowledge and a stake in what they are discussing 
(Nichols, 2017). These people include politicians, journalists, and most commonly, 
academics.   
Finally, although the unit of analysis in this chapter is the byline, there are places 
where material drawn from the content and interviews that inform Chapters Five, Six 
and Seven is used to augment and enhance the analysis.  
4.2 Findings 
 
The following findings and discussion are organised first around news organisation. 




Of the 31 stories published on the Koreas by news.com.au during the sample period, 
15 came from traditional wire services, 14 from staff contributors, and two from other 
news publications. Ten of the stories focused on only South Korea, with a further 15 
only focused on North Korea. Six stories dealt with both countries; dealing 
exclusively with the cross-border conflict that dominated news on the Koreas during 
the northern hemisphere summer of 2015. 
In keeping with Couldry and Hepp’s (2017) criticism of the study of networks, these 
numbers alone do not reveal much about the nature of the stories being published 
across the platform other than that news.com.au relies heavily on wire services for 
news and stories on the Koreas. More surprising are the number of stories being 
published under staff contributor bylines. At first glance, the news.com.au newsroom 
looks to be populated by journalists with a deep interest and knowledge on the 
Koreas, particularly North Korea, but this is not the case.  
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4.2.1.1 Traditional Wire Services 
 
Associated Press (AP) 5 
Australian Associated Press (AAP) 2 




One of the more interesting findings to emerge from this part of the study is the 
reliance both news.com.au and The Guardian place on wire services to provide their 
news on North Korea and South Korea. This is especially true for news on South 
Korea where wire service copy comprised all of the stories in The Guardian and 
most for news.com.au across the sample. Paterson (2006) noted wire services (with 
particular reference to Associated Press) dominate the market for international news 
in quality and this has resulted in wire services often setting agendas on international 
news of the day.  
Fifteen of the 31 stories from the news.com.au sample were drawn from Associated 
Press (n=5), Agence France-Presse (n=6), Australian Associated Press (n=2), 
Reuters (n=1) and, video specialists and new entrant, Ruptly (n=1). The content on 
South Korea focused on corruption and corporate misadventure, and deforestation 
ahead of the Winter Olympics. There was also a story on activists liberating 
hundreds of dogs being farmed for their meat. The North Korea stories were news-
based, and far less opinionated than stories coming from other contributors across 
the news.com.au sample. The same can be said of the wire service stories featuring 
both Koreas.  
News.com.au was faster than The Guardian to pick up wire service stories about the 
conflict brewing across the 38th Parallel in the summer of 2015 with the publication of 
two news articles or news stories on August 10 chronicling accusations North Korea 
had planted landmines on the South Korean side of border that had maimed South 
Korean troops. There were also wire service stories about a tour of North Korea by 
Slovenian band Laibach. There were three stories on Pyongyang International 
Airport and Air Korgyo, the North Korean national carrier.  
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Content aside, the volume of wire service stories suggests news.com.au relies 
heavily on wire services in covering North and South Korea. This is nothing new. 
Wire services have been in the business of providing coverage of faraway lands for 
decades (Seo, 2018). This is not to suggest the wire services have not changed or 
are immune to the changes in the news industry. What this finding shows is wire 
services are at the centre of the network for content on North Korea and South 
Korea.  
4.2.1.2 Staff Contributors 
 
Lauren McMah 1 
James Matthey 1 
Victoria Craw 1 
Kate Schneider 2 
Emma Reynolds 1 
Emily Moulton 1 
Megan Palin 1 
Tyson Otto 1 
News Corp Australia Network 5 
(Table 4.2) 
Fourteen of the 31 news.com.au stories in the sample were published under ‘Staff 
Contributors’ bylines. At first glance, this runs counter to the networked argument 
made here. Further examination shows these stories comprise of chopped and diced 
wire service copy, quotes from other news organisations (especially those that fall 
under the parent company, News Corporation, umbrella), promotional material for 
other News Corporation content, and single-source stories. There are two stories 
that feature a single source. Both stories feature Australian-based academics: Justin 
Hastings, an Associate Professor in International Relations at the University of 
Sydney, and Leonid Petrov, a Visiting Fellow at the School of Culture, History and 
Language at the Australian National Univesity College of Asia and the Pacific. Both 
stories are edited interviews focusing on the threat North Korea poses to regional 
and international peace and security. Justin Hastings is called upon by news.com.au 
journalist Emily Moulton (2015) to offer commentary on the heightened tensions that 
characterised relations between the Koreas during the summer of 2015. The article 
featuring Dr Petrov bears the byline of news.com.au journalist Megan Palin (2015). 
The article focuses on news from the KCNA claiming North Korea is on the verge of 
completing nuclear weaponry and delivery systems that may have the capacity to 
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reach Australia. Petrov offers his view on the topic which can be summed up as 
there may or may not be a threat to Australia at some point in the future. What 
makes these articles interesting, in the context of this study, is that a survey of their 
journalistic output for news.com.au reveals neither Moulton nor Palin has expertise in 
or interest on the Koreas. Rather, in a very familiar trope, they are across everything 
all the time, covering a huge range of topics and journalistic genres in what amounts 
to a quantity over quality approach to producing journalistic content.  
The intra-networked character - populating the pages of news.com.au with content 
sourced from within the News Corp organisation - can be seen in the “News Corp 
Australia Network” byline which, as the name suggests, is content drawn from across 
News Corp. Content under this byline tends towards advertising for other News Corp 
products rather than a genuine attempt at journalism. Examples of this can be found 
on September 9, September 14, and September 15, 2015. The first of the three 
promotes a documentary on the news.com.au website about the abduction of a 
Japanese schoolgirl from a Japanese beach in the 1990s by people who were 
assumed to be North Korean agents. The two remaining stories promote a video 
documentary about the South Korean cosmetic surgery industry under the headline 
“How South Korea’s plastic surgery craze is costing lives” (News Corp Australia, 
2015) and “South Korea’s cosmetic surgery is still booming” (News Corp Australia, 
2015b). These articles are not attributed to any source, meaning no sources are 
named other than the video. The video paints a picture of a nation addicted to plastic 
surgery. There is a familiar trope at play here – a nation and a people who had 
become far too wealthy far too quickly to know how to spend their money. In the 
interviews that inform Chapter Six and Chapter Seven, this type of story is a talking 
point with almost all the participants bemoaning this kind of content, while at the 
same time pointing out that stories like this are part of the reality of “feeding the 
beast” for news on the country.   
The rest of the staff contributor stories bearing journalists’ bylines amounted to 
nothing more than wire service copy and stories from other news organisations that 
had been cut and spliced to create a fresh article. There are several issues with this.  
First, much of the content informing these stories come from South Korean news 
organisations including The Korea Herald, The Korea Times, The Chosun Ilbo, and 
Dong-a Ilbo. This, in itself, is not unusual. Again, this is a theme that emerges in the 
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interviews that form the backbone of this study. What is of interest is the uncritical 
acceptance and use of this kind of material by news.com.au. Second, the use of a 
wide range of content from outside sources, rather than stand-alone stories, creates 
the illusion of original stories, but the reality is altogether different. What emerges 
instead is nothing more than an attempt to “feed the beast” for news on the Koreas 
that is often lacking in primary sources. When primary sources do feature, they 
feature as single sources.  
4.2.1.3 Other News Publications 
 
Two of the stories in the news.com.au sample under analysis were sourced from 
outside sources, The New York Post and The Korea Times. The New York Post 
article was a short feature focused on the topic Mukbang. Mukbang, which literally 
translates to “eating room”, is an online phenomenon where people live stream 
themselves for others to view. Sometimes this content features feats of eating 
supremacy – devouring a king crab or a bowl of noodles dipping in extremely spicy 
sauce – and sometimes the Mukbang live streams feature average people eating the 
Korean staples of kimchi and rice. The article sensationalises a complex 
phenomenon that is more about changes in South Korean family and living situations 
than it is about fetishised strangeness, as it appears in The New York Post.  
Famous for its salacious style, The New York Post, otherwise known as “The Post”, 
became part of the Rupert Murdoch’s stable of news publications in 1976 and still 
stands as a key publication as part of the media empire today (Columbia Journalism 
Review, 1980). Murdoch was accused of lowering the tone of the publication by 
imbuing it with the elements that make The Sun, Murdoch’s bastion of all things 
tabloid, loathed and loved in equal parts. Since 1976 The Post has become 
synonymous with sensationalism, blatant advocacy and conservative bias to the 
point “that as early as 1980 the Columbia Journalism Review said The New York 
Post was no longer merely a journalistic problem. It is a social problem – a force for 
evil” (1980). 
The Post is renowned for what might be the greatest headline of all time “Headless 
body in topless bar” (Musetto, 1983) and this encapsulates the paper’s editorial 
policy happily conforming to the maxim, “if it bleeds it leads”.  In keeping with the 
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overall tone of The New York Post, the Mukbang article has a jeering quality that has 
more to do with poking fun at South Koreans than it does to news. The article could 
well fall under the umbrella of “Network Writers”, and it is interesting it received a 
New York Post byline.  
The other “other news publication” came from The Korea Times, a conservative 
English language newspaper based in Seoul. The story was a short 107-word article 
about the jailing of a K-Pop star after he was convicted of possessing illicit drugs. 
One of the two main English language print news publications, The Korea Times has 
enjoyed a conservative reputation while at the same time indulging in the salacious 
(Power, 2014).  
Set alongside news.com.au, The Guardian’s coverage is both vast and diverse. The 
following section maps The Guardian’s coverage of the Koreas. 
4.2.2 The Guardian 
 
A key fiding separating news.com.au and The Guardian is size. news.com.au has 
come about as first and foremost an intra-organisational response to the digital 
disruption of news. As the previous section argued, in reporting the Koreas 
news.com.au is able to draw upon the resources of the wider News Corp media 
empire in aggregating and sharing content. To this end, it is argued here that 
news.com.au draws upon intra-organisational network as well as inter-organisational 
network in the form of wire services. The way the intra-organisational network 
component works is opaque and in the context of this study there is a reluctance to 
speculate on the machinations of this infrastructure beyond acknowledging its 
existence. Also, the nature of the articles emanating from within the organisation 
tends to be widely speculative, sensational, woefully sourced and poorly informed 
(Koo, 2017a). It is possible this stems from a lack of relevant expertise in the 
newsroom. Also, this could be a product of the incessant need to be putting out 
content. It could well be a combination of the two. This will be further developed in 
chapters Five, Six and Seven.  
The Guardian is a digital migrant – a news organisation that has largely abandoned 
its formative platform – print – in order to rebrand, remain relevant and, ultimately, 
survive in a disrupted industrial landscape. Where news.com.au can look inward for 
 90 
content to publish across their platform, The Guardian does not have the benefit of 
existing on the same scale. Like other migrants – for example, The New York Times 
and Le Monde Diplomatique – the rigours of doing more journalism with fewer 
resources have seen these digital migrants look to “the proliferation of many smaller 
companies and networks able to provide specialized and niche services to the 
generally more rigid and bureaucratically structured regional, national, and 
multinational media businesses,” (Deuze, 2007, pp.87-88 in Deuze and Witschge, 
2018, pp. 173-174).  
The Guardian produces very little of the content they offer on the Koreas across their 
platform. Of the stories that come from their newsrooms, none of the content 
emerges from the Korean Peninsula. Interviews (McCurry, 2016) that inform Chapter 
Six and Chapter Seven reveal The Guardian does not maintain a fulltime presence in 
either North Korea or South Korea. There is a small amount that comes from The 
Guardian newsroom in Tokyo, with the rest of in-house content coming from 
Guardian staff writers in London, Manchester, and Sydney.  Despite producing a 
relatively small amount of content on the Koreas, The Guardian is a prolific 
distributor of news on the Koreas. A large portion of their content falls under the 
banner of “The North Korea Network” – a loose constellation of news organisations 
and sources with some form of expertise in North Korea (The Guardian, 2014). The 
rest of the content comes from wire services and freelance contributors, making The 
Guardian’s coverage of North Korea ‘networked’ in the most contemporary sense of 
the word.  
4.2.3 The North Korea Network 
 
The Guardian has embraced the network framework in covering North Korea for their 
readers. Under the banner of “The North Korea Network”, The Guardian writes on 
their website that they looked beyond what they produce in their newsrooms: “To 
help separate the facts from the fabrications, The Guardian has teamed up with a 
selection of North Korea experts to establish a network dedicated to covering this 
secretive place” (The Guardian, 2014).  
It is interesting no such network exists for South Korea. The interviews that inform 
Chapter Six and Chapter Seven reveal much on why a middle power like South 
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Korea is dwarfed in the quantity of news coverage by a more maverick state like 
North Korea.   
Central to the North Korea Network is the network of organisations and experts they 
draw upon in reporting on North Korea. A passage from the The Guardian explaining 
the composition of the North Korea Network can be found on page 24 of this thesis. 
This passage from The Guardian is revealing in the emphasis The Guardian places 
on the craft mode providers, the specialized digital-only news organisations that 
have appeared as a reaction to the decline of specialisation and specialist journalists 
in legacy newsrooms around the world (Picard, 2014; Deuze, 2007): 
We’ll also feature articles from the Guardian’s own correspondents, 
commission exclusive pieces from regional experts and provide plenty of 
opportunities for readers to get involved to help us expand coverage of this 
remarkable nation. By shining a light on one of the world’s least understood 
regions, the Guardian’s new North Korea network will provide new insights 
into the lives of the 25 million people who call North Korea home. (2014) 
Both the passage and the sample show The Guardian places a high premium on 
content from craft mode providers covering North Korea, including the Seoul-based 
NK News and Daily NK who both feature in the sample. As will be revealed, and in 
keeping with Picard’s (2014) view of the craft mode, this content tends toward the 
analytical, adding a somewhat authoritative voice to The Guardian offering. These 
organisations also bring indigenous Korean voices to the coverage of the peninsula - 
something that is absent from news.com.au. Across the sample, all of the bylines 
from Daily NK and seven of the ten NK News bylines were Korean with the 
remainder, Chad O’Carroll and Olive Hotham bylines, belonging to journalists based 
in Seoul. This undoubtedly helps The Guardian to bring a better informed and 
deeper level of coverage and analysis to their work on the Koreas.  
The small online news specialists are also instrumental in giving voice to North 
Korean defectors, and this forms a key part of the NK News offering. The use of 
defectors in the coverage of North Korea is controversial and has a political 
component. This is examined later in this thesis.   
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As successful as networked journalism has been for The Guardian, a tension exists, 
and the relationship The Guardian and the craft mode producers share is not always 
a happy one with the larger more dominant partner standing accused of exploiting 
the smaller (O’Carroll, 2017). Of interest here, too, was the admission from the 
editor/owner of a craft mode producer NK News that being a news provider was part 
of a broader suite of information and intelligence being created, compiled and on-
sold to a range of consumers, including academics, policy makers, and journalists. 
Spreading the commercial risk and spreading the market for consumers is the way to 
make enough money to survive for this new breed of specialist online news 
providers. Still, news is at the heart of NK News’ business model (O’Carroll, 2016) 
and is their most traded commodity. The Guardian’s tendency to gorge on NK News 
content is problematic given NK News supplies many news organisations, including 
CNN, BBC, Al Jazeera, The Washington Post, Fox News, USA Today, and South 
Korean news organisations such as Yonhap News Agency, KBS, The Chosun Media 
Group and The Korea Herald (NK News, 2018). This also makes the network even 
more difficult to disentangle with actors from the news industry feeding off one 
another’s content. O’Carroll was reluctant to talk about the details of the various 
relationships his organisation enjoyed across the news media-scape except to say 
he was committed to providing the highest quality news on North Korea whether it be 
as a wholesaler to other news organisations, or directly to readers as a retailer under 
a subscriber business model. O’Carroll also said he was committed to gradually 
migrating away from news and more into the cloistered and very lucrative world of 
business, diplomatic, academic, and government intelligence (O’Carroll, 2016). 
It is worth noting the diversified business model of craft mode is nothing new. Early 
news wholesalers were, and continue to be, involved in the sale and distribution of a 
broad range of information products not exclusive to news. 
Alongside the North Korea Network, and sometimes as part of it, sit freelance 
contributors. This category features a wide range of content from an equally diverse 




4.2.3.1 Freelance Contributors 
 
Alice Wielinga (pics from Pyongyang) 1 
Anias Bordier 1 
Chris Johnston 1 
Daniel Miller 1 
Mindy Tan  1 
Nicola Busca 1 
Oliver Wainwright 2 
Morgan Potts 1 
Kamila Kingstone 1 
Charlie Jones 1 
(Table 4.3) 
 
The Guardian relies on freelance contributors for much of their content. Again, this 
type of content is mainly confined to issues relating to North Korea or North Koreans 
in the UK rather than coverage of South Korea.  
There is a mystique in covering and reporting on North Korea (Lankov, 2013, 2015). 
There is a romance to covering a hermetically sealed state away from the rest of the 
world. In much the same way Jack London stories captured the imagination of my 
parents’ generation, stories from behind the kimchi curtain enthral and entertain 
today’s adventurers (O'Carroll, 2014b). This has led to the opening of a market for 
stories from those brave enough to board the North Korean national airline, Air 
Koyro, flight from Beijing to Pyongyang International Airport. It follows then that there 
has been a proliferation of photo-based stories revealing daily life in North Korea. As 
with the example from the news.com.au, these types of stories are typically 
presented as intrepid with the journalist risking life and limb, or at the very least time 
in the gulag, in the pursuit of the capturing snaps of Pyongyang Railway Station or 
one of the city’s denizens crossing the road. Two such stories feature as part of the 
section. The first (Tan, 2015), from self-described documentary photographer, Mindy 
Tan, is a series of three photographs Tan took on the streets of Pyongyang. The first 





The photo is accompanied with a caption saying: 
I’m a documentary photographer from Singapore and just spent 10 days in 
North Korea, where they recently banned Instagram. Street photography isn’t 
understood there, and taking a photo can incur wrath, as the look from this 
man on the bus shows. (Tan, 2015) 





Even for someone from Singapore – where 80% of the population live in 
mass public housing – the North Korean version looks like apartments on 
steroids. The homes are 75 to 90 sq/m per unit, state-owned and allocated to 
families. (Tan, 2015) 
This photo could have easily come from the suburbs of Seoul, Shanghai, or even 
Sydney. The third features a slightly blurry image of a mother and her child against 




The caption says: 
As foreigners are few and far between, most North Koreans are very 
reserved. Getting this shot, at Puhung station, which is styled on the famous 
Moscow metro, felt like winning the lottery. (Tan, 2015) 
These photos show how low the threshold for stories and content on North Korea 
can be. What Tan produced was unexceptional in every way. Yet, these kinds of 
stories have become a mainstay in the coverage of North Korea. The other “pics of 
Pyongyang” article came from Alice Wielinga (2015). This article is arresting in that 
there is artistic agency at play. Rather than serve up the same turgid Instagram 
images of North Koreans standing around or crossing the road, Wielinga takes those 
images and overlays them with art from North Korean propaganda posters. In doing 
so, she makes an important comment on the juxtaposition between the cold hard 
reality of life in the DPRK and the idealised version presented in the country’s 
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propaganda. Again, this kind of content is hardly news, but as the next chapter 
shows, it does have an impact on how the DPRK is framed.  
 
(Image 4.4) (Wielinga, 2015) 
The third freelance article came from Daniel Miller (2015). Miller is a music and 
entertainment writer who toured North Korea with Laibach, the first western band to 
tour the nation. As a band, Laibach, a Slovenian post-punk industrial band, is famous 
for their uniquely dark covers of classics including The Rolling Stones “Sympathy for 
the Devil” and Europe’s “The Final Countdown”. In the summer of 2015, Laibach 
played a single show to Pyongyang’s elite and Daniel Miller was there to document 
it. What Miller witnessed was the odd spectacle of Laibach playing Sound of Music 
covers to an audience of either bored or bemused North Koreans. Images from the 
event show the audience in differing states of consciousness.   
Not all the stories shared the banality of the Instagram-based Tan article. Architect 
Oliver Wainwright (2015), like Daniel Miller, in writing about Pyongyang architecture 
was seeking to shed light on a topic that is genuinely quirky. Wainwright delivers an 
article that is an engaging, informative and wonderfully detailed account of the 
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history and development of Pyongyang architecture. In doing so, Wainwright sheds 
light on North Korea’s troubled and turbulent history and how that history is reflected 
in the architecture of the country’s capital. Wainwright went on to publish a book on 
the subject. 
 
(Image 4.5) (Wainwright, 2015b) 
In a thinly veiled piece of advertising for tour company Uri Tours (Uri or Woori is 
Korean for “us” or “our”), Nicola Busca (2015) wrote about the potential for good surf 
on North Korea’s east coast and an upcoming “surf reconnaissance” tour of the 
country. Busca writes: 
Aside from surfing lessons, a bonfire and dinner on the beach, the $2,750 trip 
will offer participants a ride on Pyongyang’s metro, a visit to the demilitarised 
zone and – as required on any tour of the country – bowing before the statues 
of former leaders Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il. Flights to and from Shanghai, 
where the group will meet, are not included; the flight to Pyongyang is with Air 
Koryo (recently named worst airline in the world, for the fourth year running), 
and accommodation is in three- and four-star hotels in Pyongyang, Sijung and 
Hamhŭng. Local guides will escort the surfers for the entire trip. (2015) 
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As interesting as the story might be, it lends little to nothing by way of news or 
broadening the reader’s view and knowledge of the country. Rather, the article feeds 
the notion of a country to be explored and conquered – albeit in the service of finding 
decent waves on Korea’s east coast (Busca, 2015). Again, this supports Smith’s 
(2015) argument of North Korea represented as a caricature. 
Of the remaining freelance stories, only one focused on South Korea. This was the 
story of twin adoptees being reunited in South Korea after being separated and 
adopted out to families in the United States and France respectively (Bordier, 2015). 
None of the freelance stories was news. Rather, they mostly fell into the category of 
holiday stories and stories about the weird. An example of this was a story by Kamila 
Kingstone (2015) about a “friends of North Korea” group in London who get together 
once or twice a month and write letters of appreciation to the North Korean leader 
and get drunk together listening to North Korean classical music.    
 
4.2.3.2 Wire Services 
 
Associated Press (AP) 12 
Agence France-Presse (AFP) 20 
Reuters 12 
(Table 4.4) 
A notable absentee from the North Korea Network’s list of contributors were the wire 
services. Yet, wire service stories make up a lion’s share (41.8 per cent) of The 
Guardian’s coverage on both North Korea and South Korea. The Guardian draws 
heavily on Associated Press, Reuters, and Agence France-Presse in covering both 
North Korea and South Korea. With the exception of some of the stories from 
Guardian Tokyo correspondent, Justin McCurry, and the adoptee twin reunion by 
Anais Bordier, all of the content relating exclusively to South Korea came from AFP, 
AP, and Reuters. All three maintain a fulltime presence in Seoul. These stories tend 
towards news in style and structure and tend to lack the flair and colour of much of 
the content on North Korea. The wire service stories in this sample are often 
breaking or early news, laying a foundation for the opinion, comment, and punditry to 
follow. This is especially true for stories on North Korea although when it comes to 
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North Korea even the wire services take what can be best described as a loose 
approach in both story selection and content.  
The wire service stories on North Korea were numerous and covered a far wider 
range of topics and themes than the stories on South Korea. They also tended far 
more towards the salacious and strange than the content on South Korea. This 
included stories lampooning Pyongyang’s new airport, single source stories from 
conservative American think tanks on the threat North Korea poses to a stable world 
order, stories sourced by copy from the KCNA news wire about North Korea’s denial 
of involvement in the production of weapons of mass destruction, a story about 
touring Slovenian band “Laibach”, and a story about the opening of cycle paths in 
Pyongyang. The wire services also provided the foundation for other more focused 
or subjective articles in The Guardian offering through news articles and breaking 
news. 
For stories that dealt with both Koreas, the wire services were again pivotal in The 
Guardian. The story that dominated this kind of news across the sample was the 
outbreak of open hostilities between the two countries in August 2015, and a story 
on South Korea’s adverse reaction to “Pyongyang time”. Briefly, the Kim 
administration had decided to bring their clocks back 30 minutes to restore the time 
prior to Japanese colonisation 105 years earlier. This story was interesting in that it 
made mention of South Korea laying blame on the North for the maiming of two 
South Korean troops after one of the pair stood on a landmine on the South Korean 
side of the border. A round of threats and counter-threats ensued, leading to a few 
tense weeks on both sides of the 38th parallel. AP, AFP, and Reuters’ coverage of 
the conflict became the mainstay of the coverage of the conflict with other content 
from other forms of news producers being added, bringing more opinion and analysis 
to the unfolding events. Again, the wire services provided much of the bedrock for 
reporting the conflict, but, as the next chapter reveals, in framing this event, the wire 
services were not without their biases. 
What emerges is that wire service content and copy still dominate the network for 
news on both North Korea and South Korea despite not being listed as part of The 
Guardian’s “North Korea Network”. North Korea Network editorial director and 
Guardian journalist Maeve Shearlaw (personal communication, 2017) said despite 
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providing the bulk of the content on both North Korea and South Korea, omitting 
including wire services part of the network for news on the countries was intentional. 
She said most big news organisations had access to wire service copy and, 
therefore, this did not serve to separate what The Guardian was offering from other 
news organisations. The point of difference comes in what else is added by news 
organisations in supplementing wire service stories, and this is a key point of 
departure in the news.com.au and The Guardian’s respective coverage of the 
Koreas.   
Finally, it is worth noting there were two stories in the sample that fell under the 
byline of “Eric Talmadge AP”. These are interesting in that they originate from 
Pyongyang – a notoriously difficult city to report on/from. By way of context, 
Associated Press has maintained a bureau in Pyongyang since 2012, and was the 
first English language news organisation to do so (Daniszewski, 2012). The AP 
presence in Pyongyang has been a source of controversy. Again, by way of context, 
the thrust of those who find discomfort in AP reporting from Pyongyang tend to focus 
on the editorial independence from the information and propaganda organs of the 
North Korean state. To be sure, these are valid concerns. AP Pyongyang bureau 
chief Eric Talmadge, and the only fulltime AP staffer manning the bureau, can spend 
no more than ten days in the country per month. The rest of the time, the bureau is 
staffed by North Korean government agents, giving government agents in 
Pyongyang direct access to the AP wire. What makes the two Talmadge stories that 
appear in the sample interesting is that they have no clear bias. The first, “North 
Korea ramps up anti-American rhetoric on Korean war anniversary” (Talmadge, 
2015), offers a view of the north that is neither complementary nor inflammatory. 
What Talmadge offers is a story from Pyongyang based on journalistic observation 
that appears to be accurate, fair, and free of the speculative strangeness that 
characterises much of the outside coverage of the country.  
The second story written by Talmadge was published a month after the first in the 
last week of August 2015. The North Korean authorities had opened a new 
international airport on the fringes of Pyongyang a month before that was met with 
derision by Western news media for the airport failing to have an Internet connection. 
“North Korea’s shiny new airport falls short of expectations: After Air Koyro is 
declared the world’s worst airline, a visit to Pyongyang International suggests tourist 
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facilities offer little improvement” (Talmadge, 2015b) is an observational article based 
on Talmadge’s visit to the airport. Talmadge offers what appears to be an honest 
appraisal of what he experienced. On the topic of smoking rooms at the airport, 
Talmadge writes, “In something almost never seen in the North, where just about 
every adult male who can afford it, including leader Kim Jong-un, is a smoker, the 
room has a big sign warning that the habit is hazardous to one’s health” (2015b). 
Talmadge offers a view that makes him neither a shill for Kim Jong-un nor an anti-
North Korea warmonger. This runs counter to much of the criticism levelled against 
Talmadge for his “boots on the ground” approach to reporting North Korea.     
 
4.2.3.3 Craft Mode Providers  
 
Daily NK (Choi Song Min) 4 
Daily NK (Lee Song Yong) 1 
Daily NK (Kim Seong-hwan) 2 
Daily NK (Kang Mi-jin) 1 
NKNews (Choi Ha-young) 3 
NKNews (JH Ahn) 1 
NKNews (Chad O’Carroll) 1 
NKNews (Oliver Hotham) 2 
NKNews (Je-son Lee) 2 
NKNews (Kim Yoo-sung) 1 
The Diplomat (Mu Chunshan) 1 
(Table 4.5) 
Despite the emergence and growth of craft mode providers covering issues facing 
South Korean society neglected by the mainstream local and foreign news media, 
The Guardian does not take advantage of the likes of Korea Expose like it does the 
craft mode providers covering North Korea.  
Perhaps the most exciting development in reporting on North Korea has come with 
the rise of what Picard refers to as the “craft mode providers”. Picard’s concepts 
underpin this part of the study. For The Guardian, these providers form a critical part 
of their coverage on North Korea (Shearlaw, 2016). Crucially, unlike the wire 
services, staff writers/contributors and freelance contributors, and pundits, the craft 
mode providers offer a wealth of indigenous Korean voices in covering the north. 
Both NK News and Daily NK rely heavily on a Korean workforce and Korean voices 
to provide content on North Korea as well as non-Korean experts, journalists and 
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pundits. As is clear in Chapter Four and Chapter Six, both NK News and the Daily 
NK are the benchmarks in reporting North Korea. This is in keeping with Picard’s 
characterisation of craft mode providers who tend towards providing deep informed 
news and analysis on their chosen theme or topic.  With the decline of topic specific 
experts in the newsroom, online craft producers have been able to take advantage of 
knowledge deficit that has appeared and stepped in offering a tailored and focused 
product that meets market demands (Picard, 2014). The advantages here are 
obvious; a small number of “expert” journalists are able to deeply focus and analyse 
their given topic or area of expertise. The downside is this style of native online news 
producer is driven by market conditions, meaning, if the demand for their product 
changes, they are exposed to those changes. This has resulted in diversification of 
the product, and the associated market, away from a solely news-based product. For 
example, NK News through their product NK Pro provides intelligence to experts and 
professionals in the field of interest in North Korea (O'Carroll, 2016). NK Pro is 
subscription-based and is only available to those with some kind of big institutional 
affiliation, whether it be a news organisation, government or government agency, 
corporate entity, academic or research institution, or a think tank or lobby 
organisation. In diversifying in this way, NK News is following the lead of industry 
giants like Reuters where news is part of what they do but not central to the longevity 
of the organisation (Pearson, 2016). 
News organisations that can afford it, like The Guardian, benefit from having access 
to a range of stories that help build diversity in their coverage of North Korea. More 
importantly, in building relationships with craft providers like NK News and Daily NK, 
The Guardian does not need to be generating the kind of content the “NKs” do, 
eliminating the need for The Guardian to be employing North Korea specialist 
journalists. Thus, the remaining news organisations are able to focus their resources 
on a kind of “renaissance journalist” (Downman and Murray, 2018) increasingly 
typical of legacy news organisations and digital migrants. Downman and Murray 
(2018) define the renaissance journalist as, “… personable, empathetic, 
collaborative, creative, engaging and networked. They not only understand 
journalism but they understand the business behind news production” (p.35). 
Downman and Murray’s (2018) theorising of the renaissance journalist builds on the 
work Nygren (2014). Nygren investigated changes in journalist’s roles and practice in 
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newsrooms. They found journalists working in contemporary newsrooms were “multi-
reporters” (p. 93) - journalists who were no longer platform specific in their output. 
Downman and Murray (2018) argue the multi-tasking multi-reporter makes them 
universal in the vein of courtiers in Renaissance Italy. However, the collapse of 
specialist newsroom and editorial roles into a single entity comes at a cost. The 
renaissance journalist is a lot of things but they are not specialists and that is why 
The Guardian goes elsewhere for specialist content.  
While there is a symbiotic supply and demand paradigm as the basis of these 
relationships, the relationships between the big and small news providers are not 
without their tensions. Chad O’Carroll (2017), the founder and managing director of 
NK News, said The Guardian had stretched their relationship by pillaging NK News. 
There are also issues of staff retention and turnover, as well as pay and conditions 
for those working for the craft providers. 
At the time of data collection, Ha-young Choi was a journalist working with NK News. 
Her coverage of the summer conflict focused on the back and forth between North 
Korea and South Korea over loudspeakers the South mounted along stretches of the 
border broadcasting South Korean K-Pop into the north. This infuriated the North 
Korean leadership to the point they threatened and then attempted to shell the 
loudspeaker installations. What set Choi’s stories apart from the pack was her ability 
to connect with and understand Korean sources. In her work for NK News, Choi was 
able to transcend some of the limitations facing non-Korean speakers in coverage of 
the two countries. Choi was also able to listen to and understand the broadcasts 
from the south to the north. As Chapter Five demonstrates, there was an assumption 
among many in the international news fraternity that the broadcasts consisted of 
mainly propaganda calling the Kim family into question and K-Pop.  The reality was 
K-Pop formed a small part of the broadcasts with most of the other content on the 
tenets of Buddhism and weather (Choi, 2015).  
Choi was also the only journalist writing on the topic who raised concerns about the 
reliability of the inception of the conflict at the time – South Korean soldiers standing 
on and detonating a landmine on the southern side of the border. For the rest of the 
news world, it was accepted the landmines at the centre of the event were planted 
by the North Korean military who had somehow managed to cross the DMZ, one of 
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the most heavily mined, monitored, and guarded stretch of land in the world (Smith, 
2015).  
What is at issue is the journalist’s capacity and agency to raise the prospect of a 
narrative that deviates beyond the accepted story that the DPRK was solely 
responsible for the cross-DMZ events of the summer of 2015, and Choi has the 
ability to do so. 
Choi is a digital native and not an acolyte of the big South Korean news 
organisations and their agendas. As discussed later in Chapter Six and Chapter 
Seven, there is a clear and demonstrable difference in how those on the inside of big 
news media and those on the outside report both North Korea and South Korea. 
Returning to Picard, Choi is the epitome for the craft-mode journalist (Picard, 2014). 
She is nimble, knowledgeable – she holds a Master’s degree in Korean history - she 
speaks the language, is of the culture, and she cares about who and what she is 
reporting on. She has access to sources Western journalists would struggle to find. 
On August 21, at the height of the tensions across the DMZ, The Guardian published 
an article she wrote through NK News that argued change in North Korea was more 
likely to come from within than through imposition. The article, entitled Will North 
Korea’s ‘in-betweeners’ be the generation to disrupt the regime? (Choi, 2015), 
revolved around comment from defector-turned South Korean academic in the study 
of North Korean society, Kim Sung-kyun. Kim made the argument for dovish 
engagement with Pyongyang in stark contrast with the prevailing Seoul and 
Washington-driven hawkish stance that dominated at the time. In reporting this, Choi 
engaged sources beyond the reach of those who cannot speak Korean. 
Not all of the coverage coming out of the NK News is provocative or covers the 
events of the day. Across the course of the sample, four articles were published on 
The Guardian’s pages under the “Ask a North Korean” moniker. These articles 
feature on the NK News pages in differing degrees of similarity to what appeared on 
The Guardian website. They deal with what it is like to marry in the DPRK, issues of 
pet ownership, mental health, and the dedication to learning foreign languages in 
North Korea. They are informed by defectors in South Korea and take a 
conversational tone. Perhaps the most interesting and revealing “Ask a North 
Korean” piece fell under the byline of Kim Yoo-sung (2015). This story offered 
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insights into what life in the North Korean military is like. It painted a picture of 
starvation and deprivation of the basics needed for survival. The original NK News 
version and the subsequent Guardian version were different in one key aspect – The 
Guardian version made no reference to when this story was set. This created the 
illusion that Kim’s account of life as a conscript in the Korean People’s Army was 
current. The NK News version reveals otherwise. Kim had left North Korea as a 
refugee in 2005 after the “Arduous March”, the famine of the late 1990s and early 
2000s. Lower range estimates put the total number of deaths due to famine during 
this period at 2.5 million, or about ten per cent of the North Korean population 
(Lankov, 2015). During this period the state food rationing apparatus fell apart 
leaving those reliant on the state, including the military, to fend for themselves. This 
was the period Kim served with the Korean People’s Army. Fifteen years later when 
Kim’s piece graced the pages of The Guardian, it can be assumed conditions for 
North Korean soldiers have changed. When asked about this difference in narrative 
between NK News and The Guardian where the same stories were concerned, NK 
News founder and editor, Chad O’Carroll (personal communication, 2016), said he 
was not happy about the differences but “not surprised”.  
The remaining stories fall under the bylines of Chad O’Carroll and Oliver Hotham. 
Hotham’s stories are on the Laibach tour and the role of the leader’s portraits in the 
lives of ordinary North Koreans. O’Carroll’s article deals with the then mooted plans 
for the BBC to be broadcasting directly into North Korea taking aim at groups within 
the BBC and the British parliament advocating for isolationist policies over the kind of 
media engagement on the table.  
As a craft mode organisation as Picard (2014) intended, NK News feeds the network 
for news on North Korea in a diverse and nuanced fashion uncharacteristic of the 
mainstream coverage of the country. This is not to say the coverage or NK News as 
an organisation is not without issues. A deeper analysis of these issues can be found 
in Chapter 6.  
The other craft mode provider to feature is Daily NK. Daily NK differs from NK News 
in that they rely upon sources from within North Korea to tell the story of North Korea 
and North Koreans. Also, unlike NK News, Daily NK has a clear political agenda to 
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effect regime change in North Korea on the back of what they see as prolonged and 
systemic human rights abuses. Daily NK writes: 
We have borne witness to the recent and rapid development of marketization 
that is changing the North Korean way of life. The citizens of North Korea are 
beginning to see glimpses of the outside world via increasing channels of 
foreign media infiltrating the country. The winds of change are coming. 
Daily NK directly supports a robust network of dedicated citizen journalists 
inside the country, who risk their lives on a daily basis to share news from the 
ground. In turn, we broadcast these reports back to the people of North Korea 
and the entire world. In doing so, we hope to advance the cause of freedom 
and give the oppressed people of North Korea the voice they deserve. May 
the information we share play its part in supporting the eventual reunification 
of the Korean peninsula under a just government. (Lee, 2018) 
Much of the coverage from Daily NK focuses on the realities of day-to-day life in 
North Korea. Through the use of defectors and sources within North Korea, Daily NK 
is able to tap into a rich vein of stories of the sometimes strange experience of living 
in North Korea. Across the course of the sample, The Guardian published eight 
stories from Daily NK that dealt with topics, including how North Koreans turned to 
squid soup to ward off MERS (Middle Eastern Respiratory Syndrome) (Choi, 2015a) 
and also increased their daily intake of squid soup because the drought that gripped 
the country in the summer of 2015 meant meeting a recommended caloric intake 
from other sources was difficult (Choi, 2015b). These stories serve the dual purpose 
of representing North Korean people as backward and desperate. Lee (personal 
communication, 2017) argues much of what is deemed North Korean in the western 
news media is in fact pan-Korean – phenomena common to both North Korea and 
South Korea. Certainly, a tendency towards the consumption of certain foods as part 
of fortifying oneself against disease is not uniquely North Korean, yet in his article, 
Choi (2015a) presents this as so.  
Choi offers a further two articles on the trials of life in North Korea: the first is focused 
on a government decree ordering North Korean workers to start work at 5am to beat 
the summer heat (Choi, 2015c) and the second is about raids being conducted 
across the secretive state by police in order to flush out North Koreans listening to 
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foreign music (Choi, 2015d). Both stories feature unnamed single sources within 
North Korea and speak to a Kafkaesque state that places conformity over individual 
rights. This theme is in keeping with the Daily NK’s broader vision of revealing the 
realities of life in the DPRK as a means for regime change (K. B. Lee, 2019).      
In further recognition of the organisation’s human rights agenda, Daily NK staff 
writer, Kim Seong-hwan, had an article on the pages of The Guardian focusing on 
North Koreans being forced to watch public executions as a deterrent to public 
criticism or condemnation of the regime (2015). The article was based on a report 
from the South Korean Government-funded agency, The Korean Institute for 
National Unification, claiming nearly 1400 North Koreans were publicly executed 
between 2000 and 2013. The article said: 
The figures, which cannot be independently verified, were said to be based on 
in-depth interviews with North Korean defectors and confirmed by witnesses 
in the country. The number of executions carried out away from the public eye 
is also impossible to ascertain. (Kim, 2015) 
The fact this article is based on a single unverifiable source aside, there are issues 
with the use of defector testimony, and this is looked at as a part of Chapter Six of 
this thesis. Other contributions from the Daily NK include stories on North Koreans’ 
desire for the BBC to broadcast into their country (a story based on unnamed 
sources) and a story on North Koreans’ love of learning languages. Both feed into a 
broader narrative of a people living in an open air prison hungry to know more about 
the outside world. This is also consistent with the broader narrative arc of the Daily 
NK and their expressed desire to open North Korea up to the rest of the world.  
4.2.3.4 Staff Writers/Contributors 
 
Justin McCurry (foreign correspondent) 4 
Maeve Shearlaw 5 
Nancy Bank-Smith 1 
George Arnett 1 
Sarah Gilbert 1 
Luke Harding 1 
Kevin McKenna 1 
Julian Borger 1 
(Table 4.6) 
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Staff writers/contributors at The Guardian are not dissimilar to their counterparts at 
news.com.au in that they are not usually present on the Korean Peninsula. The 
Guardian maintains a correspondent in Tokyo, Justin McCurry, who reports on 
Japan and the Koreas although his work tends to be framed around what is 
happening in Japan from a Japanese perspective. McCurry was interviewed in this 
study as part of Chapter Six and Chapter Seven and said for him trips to Seoul were 
an infrequent luxury making his coverage of North and South Korea dependent on 
what was published by news organisations on the peninsula and content emerging 
through the wire services and international press (2017). More telling was the 
admission his trips to Seoul needed to be productive and this has had the 
consequence of him being driven to cover what he described as the “low hanging 
fruit” – including stories on plastic surgery and South Korea’s popular culture 
industry. In covering North Korea, McCurry, like everyone else doing this work, is 
forced to improvise in covering the country. Given the lack of access to the country 
and the difficulty in finding authoritative and reliable firsthand accounts on the 
country, McCurry’s stories on North Korea tend to rely on what other journalists and 
wire services have to say and speculate on events concerning the nation.  
The other significant contribution on North Korea across The Guardian offering came 
from Maeve Shearlaw. Shearlaw manages and runs The Guardian’s North Korea 
Network but is also an active contributor on the topic with a total of five stories 
bearing her byline across the sample. Shearlaw’s stories span a range of topics, 
content and forms. Again, Shearlaw’s coverage is hamstrung by access to North 
Korea. In the absence of being able to report from the country, Shearlaw’s content 
tends to focus on the North Korean community in the UK, and her content tends 
toward the “post-disruption”. For example, Shearlaw hosts Twitter interactions 
through The Guardian platform with prominent figures in the conversation around 
North Korea where The Guardian’s audience can pose questions and receive 
answers. As part of the sample, Shearlaw hosted one such interaction with 
prominent celebrity North Korean defector, Lee Hyeonseo, and this coincided with 
the release of Lee’s book chronicling her escape from the DPRK. Another was a 
British student who had taken a gap year in Pyongyang. Another story featured an 
analysis of how North Korean state media covered the conflict with South Korea 
during the summer of 2015 drawing on content from The Rodong Shimun and the 
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KCNA. Shearlaw (2017), by her own admission, is driven to tell stories involving 
North Korea and North Koreans that go beyond what she describes as the “same 
hackneyed stories everyone else is pumping out”.  
The rest of staff writers’ stories are a who’s who of The Guardian’s executive 
editorial team, including Julian Borger, The Guardian’s world affairs editor, George 
Arnett, pioneering Guardian data journalist, award-winning investigative journalist 
and former Guardian Russia correspondent, Luke Harding, Guardian features picture 
editor, Sarah Gilbert, veteran radio and television critic, Nancy Banks-Smith, and 
Kevin McKenna, former executive editor of the Daily Mail in Scotland and prolific 
contributor to The Guardian. Without exception, these stories were opinion or 
editorial based on what the journalists thought of the unfolding conflict between the 
north and the south or what journalists thought could or should be done to defuse 
North Korea as a regional and global threat. Here, The Guardian’s staff writers tend 
to behave more like pundits than journalists.  
4.2.3.5 Pundits 
 
John Sweeney (Journalist) 1 
Andray Abrahamiar (Academic) 1 
Adam Cathcart (Academic) 1 
Aiden Foster-Carter (Academic) 1 
Stephen Haggard (Academic)  2 
(Table 4.7) 
Pundits, including academics, politicians, lobbyists and other journalists take a 
prominent place in The Guardian coverage of North Korea and stories that involve 
both Koreas. This differs from news.com.au where pundits are embedded in stories 
as sources. Pundits are absent in The Guardian coverage on stories dealing 
exclusively with South Korea. Punditry can be seen across the sample in the 
coverage of the cross-border conflict that took place after three South Korean 
soldiers were maimed by a landmine on their side of the border. More space has 
been dedicated to explaining and analysing this event in the next section, but this 
was the event that sparked the 2015 Korean summer of conflict.  
The Guardian is able to attract big names in the world of punditry on North Korea. 
Adam Cathcart, Aiden Foster-Carter, and Stephen Haggard are instantly 
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recognisable names for Korea watchers. All three are academics and the three 
engage with the international news media on a regular basis. All three were called 
upon to comment on the future of north/south relations during, and immediately after, 
the summer conflict with Cathcart revealing he felt uneasy about the conflict, Foster-
Carter saying the propagation of conflict on the part of the north was nothing more 
than business-as-usual, and Haggard offering two opinion articles on who the 
winners and losers were in the conflict.  
BBC investigative journalist John Sweeney weighed in on the future of North Korea 
and strategies for regime change in an article “Information is the most powerful tool 
against the North Korean regime” (2015) which, as the headline suggests, is an 
article about extending the reach of the BBC into North Korea through a dedicated 
Korean language radio service. At the time, the BBC was looking into the prospect of 
broadcasting into North Korea from South Korea. Sweeney’s opinion article made a 
compelling argument for what two years later would become a reality.  
The final pundit was Andray Abrahamian. Abrahamian is probably the most well-
versed on North Korea after having spent significant time in the country as well as 
earning a PhD from a South Korean university. He speaks Korean which puts him at 
a significant advantage to the other pundits mentioned here. His article, on the North 
Korean authorities changing the time zone to pre-colonial messages, is balanced 
and offers a depth of analysis that helped make sense of why this was something 
someone would ever want to do. Abrahamian’s analysis contrasted with other 
coverage on the topic that presented North Korea as a petulant state hell-bent on 
disruption. What Abrahamian shows is that the wounds sustained during the period 
of Japanese colonisation and empire are still raw. 
For those familiar with the debates in international relations, diplomacy, policy, and 
strategic and security studies, figuring out where a pundit might sit on an ideological 
spectrum is intuitive. For those who do not have such a scholarly background or the 
casual observer, such distinctions will not be so obvious making the pundit’s 
message dangerous as it is by definition ideologically loaded (Chubb, 2019).  
Finally, in offering in-depth analysis on North Korea, at least, The Guardian is remiss 
in not extending the opportunity of voice to pundits who are women, anything other 
than white, and those who are not affiliated to big American, British or Australian 
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universities or media organisations. This has the effect of narrowing who or what 
could be viewed as an expert on the topic to a very exclusive elite. This is a favourite 
concern of many covering the Koreas for the international news media, and, again, 
this theme emerges in the interviews with Jean Lee, Anna Fifield, Choi Ha-young, 




Both news.com.au and The Guardian rely on complex but very different networks in 
covering the Koreas. Where news.com.au is able to look toward the broader 
corporate structure in which they are a part in covering these countries, The 
Guardian needs to look beyond their organisation’s framework. In doing so, The 
Guardian has made better use of the content on offer in telling the stories of the 
Koreas. 
The heavy reliance of both organisations on wire services for coverage of South 
Korea is interesting. As this thesis reveals, and in keeping with earlier studies on the 
changing nature of news work (Anderson et al., 2012; Beckett & Deuze, 2016; 
Deuze, 2006), in an increasingly fragmented, piecemeal and casualised work 
environment, news workers feeding the network for news on the Koreas are more 
likely to gravitate toward covering the kinds of stories they know will be coveted by 
the news organisations still willing to buy content. This privileges stories on North 
Korea over stories on South Korea, leaving a gap in coverage that is filled by the 
traditional wire services. This results in wire services driving the international news 
agenda for South Korea, and to some extent North Korea too. For both countries, it 
is the wire services that provide the hard news as they have always done, and it is 
the wire services that provide the foundation for broader coverage of the Koreas. 
This is true for South Korea, North Korea, and news including both Koreas. For news 
involving North Korea, the network is then extended to encompass other types of 
providers. Charting the role of pre and post digital disruption wire services, as Seo 
(2018) has started to do, would heighten the importance of these findings. 
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Therefore, in this case, it is the wire services that serve in creating the foundation for 
news on the Koreas, and then the network is expanded to other categories and news 
and content providers to add colour to the coverage. For The Guardian, the odd one 
out here are the craft mode providers who provide both news and more feature and 
opinion-oriented articles. It should be noted that, although news organisations like 
NK News and Daily NK form an important pillar in The Guardian’s coverage of North 
Korea, they do not come close to the traditional wire services in terms of depth and 
breadth of their coverage on the country. It is also worth noting that The Guardian 
does not draw upon craft mode providers in the coverage of South Korea, and 
news.com.au does not use them in covering either North Korea or South Korea. 
What becomes clear in the interviews that inform chapters Six and Seven, is NK 
News and Daily NK are favourite sources of information on North Korea for 
journalists covering the country. This raises interesting questions about what 
influences journalists to cover North Korea the way they do. 
As part of the network, staff writers and correspondents sometimes become 
indistinguishable from pundits, thus raising questions about the role and relevance of 
newsroom-based journalists in covering faraway places. The role of freelance 
contributors as part of the network was hardly journalistic. Rather, what were seen 
were newsrooms plundering Instagram accounts for content and images of North 
Korea. 
The next chapter unravels the content supplied across the network from a framing 
perspective in order to further make sense of the mediated construction of the 












This chapter investigates how North Korea and South Korea are framed across two 
news organisations in a networked journalism environment. The findings and 
discussion are presented chronologically and broken down into event/micro-based 
frames.  
 
The analysis in this chapter is based on three months (July, August, and September 
2015) of coverage of North Korea and South Korea in The Guardian and 
news.com.au. Due to time and space limitations, the discussion in this chapter will 
be concentrated around the events that dominated August while the discussion 
around July and September will be more general in nature. 
 
The coverage of August features as this was the month North Korea and South 
Korea came into direct conflict across the border demarcating the two countries, the 
38th Parallel.  This allows for a direct comparison of the framing of the Koreas in text 
and pictures.  
 
5.2 Macro and Micro Frame Packages 
 
 
Within framing scholarship, there is a dearth of studies that deal with the framing of 
countries. Rather, what is present are studies that investigate specific issues or 
topics. Classic studies include the framing of the shooting down of an airliner 
(Entman, 1991), the framing of the ‘war on terror’ (Reese & Lewis, 2009) and more 
recently, issues of immigration and refugees in Europe (Boesman et al., 2017). 
When it comes to the framing methods, a two-step approach in line with Boesman et 
al. (2017) and Brüggemann (2014) is useful in analysing frames as they are 
presented in the dataset.  
 
As argued in Chapter Two, this study draws on the advances in framing theory and 
methodology of Boesman et al. (2017) and Brüggemann (2014). Both studies situate 
framing as central to the relationship between the journalist and the source. Both still 
situate framing as a phenomenon that is defined as happening in the newsroom. In 
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doing so, the networked nature and changed industrial modes of journalistic 
production are ignored. As argued, this is where this study departs. In doing so, it still 
conforms to Boesman et al. (2017) in treating stories as complete artefacts. Despite 
the diversity of the network for news on the Koreas, an interesting finding was the 
largely homogenous nature of the macro-frame.  
 
In keeping with Boesman et al. (2017) and Brüggemann (2014), and in the spirit of 
pioneering studies that advocated different frame levels, categories and packages 
(Gamson & Modigliani, 1987, 1989), a macro frame is established as a means of 
summarising the sample. In the context of this sample, the macro frame is labeled 
the “bizarre” frame. This macro frame is intended to characterise the overall framing 
of the Koreas and is based on the analysis and subsequent conclusions in this 
thesis. This is manifest in story selection but also in what is emphasised or salient 
(Entman, 1993). Across the sample under analysis, aspects of the most banal and 
mundane stories are enhanced to bring a bizarre edge to a story. At the 
methodological level, the bizarre frame was established through a systemic single 
cross reading and evaluation of the sample.  Across the course of the sample, the 
micro, or “sub” packages and frames will reveal that the broader idiosyncrasies of 
the bizarre macro frame will be revealed in conjunction with the micro frame 
packages.   
 
Finally, when scholars like Coleman (2009) argue images and words in stories need 
to be analysed independently of each other, they are right. Where this study differs 
from others in the field looking at the Koreas is it draws on all the elements of a story 
as it is presented to the audience. This means analysing both the image and the text 
as presented as part of a story. Analysis of the images is embedded throughout the 
broader analysis in this chapter.  
 
5.3 The Realities of the Coverage of North Korea 
 
On June 1, 2015, a month prior to the beginning of the sample under analysis in this 
chapter, Australian documentary film maker and author Broinowski (2015) published 
an article in The Guardian. The article was thinly veiled advertising for her beautifully 
researched and written book on Kim Jong-il’s obsession with film and film making. 
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Broinowski’s Guardian article, True or false: the 'kooky' North Korea stories they 
couldn't make up – but did, like this thesis, argues our construction and knowledge of 
North Korea is flawed and a negligent international news media is to blame (2015). 
Broinowski writes: 
 
If any country proves sensationalism beats truth in the social media economy, 
it’s North Korea. Sealed off from the outside world since 1953, the country’s 
24.9 million people exist in an internet-free vacuum, which western bloggers, 
intelligence agencies and the 24-hour news cycle have been quick to fill. 
(2015) 
 
Broinowski is right when she argues that when it comes to North Korea, journalistic 
norms of fact-checking, veracity of sources and truth, fairness and balance do not 
apply. With a traditional journalistic “boots on the ground” approach to the country 
impossible, facts and factual reporting fall by the wayside in favour of the bizarre and 
salacious. Indeed, Broinowski’s claim that the vacuum created by a lack of access to 
credible sources is filled by all manner of sources, including sensationalist defectors, 
satirists, politically motivated experts and North Korean propaganda emanating from 
the KCNA aligns with findings from Chapter Four. This approach to covering North 
Korea grows even more complex when mixed with contemporary practices of doing 
journalism on North Korea. Broinowski writes:  
 
The malleability of digital media, and the speed with which consumers can 
embed and reframe North Korean content before passing it on, means even 
truthful accounts of Kim Jong-un’s ruthless moves to shore up his inherited 
power are frequently embellished.  
 
When Kim executed his uncle, Jang Song-thaek, in late 2013 for 
insubordination, mainstream news feeds reported Jang and five aides had 
been stripped naked and fed to 120 starving dogs. The story went viral, before 
it was traced back to a Chinese satirist’s blog on Tencent Weibo. (2015) 
 
Broinowski, Chad O’Carroll, editor of specialist North Korea news service NK News, 
and Jean Lee, former Associated Press Bureau Chief in South Korea and then North 
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Korea, all share the same refrain in arguing this construction of the country is not 
only negligent but also dangerous for the people of North Korea whose humanity is 
erased in the race to tell strange stories on the country. We know this is an issue, 
and yet, stories that would never be published (O'Carroll, 2014a; Quinn, 2012) if they 
were on another country continue to flourish across the Western news media. 
Certainly, when it comes to North Korea, the maxim ‘never let the truth get in the way 
of a good story’ reigns.  
 
What follows is a chronological analysis of the news on North Korea and South 
Korea across a three-month period. Event/micro frames will be analysed and 
presented across the month of August while July and September are included to 
provide context and continuity across the analysis.  
 
5.4 July 2015 
 
The coverage of the Koreas during July could be loosely characterised as banal. 
Without a big event to hang a narrative on, coverage of both countries lurched from 




The news.com.au offering across July was scant. There was a total of six stories on 
the Koreas – three each on North Korea and South Korea. The first is the story of a 
North Korean defector who claimed to have secret information on the North Korean 
chemical weapons program (McMah, 2015). The defector had taken refuge in 
Finland, and he was later to become the object of scepticism on the part of some of 
the participants who inform the final chapters of this thesis after he disappeared from 
the news cycle and was never heard of again. The genesis of this defector story was 
the conservative South Korean news organisations. The reasons why reliance of 
South Korean news organisations for stories on North Korea is a problem are 
discussed in Chapter Six and Chapter Seven. The second story exclusively on North 
Korea was provided by AP (Associated Press, 2015) and was on unconfirmed 
reports Kim Jong-un had been busying himself purging the upper ranks of North 
Korean society. The final story was an AAP (2015a) article on the need for the US 
and North Korea to find common ground if peace was ever to be achieved.  
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The stories on South Korea were fairly pedestrian. The first story deals with 
allegations that Samsung executives had blocked a deal with the hedge fund’s 
managers because Samsung did not want to deal with Jews (Celarier, AP, & New 
York Post, 2015). The second was the story of a South Korean professional golfer 
who had to put his career on hold while he completed his mandatory military service 
(Matthey, 2015). The last was the story of a K-Pop star who had been jailed after 
hitting and killing a person with his car while drunk ("K-Pop star to face jail time after 
hit and run," 2015).  
 
At first glance, none of these stories is particularly profound. Of course, the stories 
on North Korea in isolation were shocking but this is the behaviour we have come to 
associate with the nation. We have become desensitised to the way Kim and his 
regime ride roughshod over human rights and regional and international desires for 
peace on the Korean Peninsula (Cha, 2012). However, what does it mean when the 
stories we read, view and hear on North Korea are unverifiable and potentially false? 
The first two stories fall within this category. Journalist, John Power, later showed the 
defector story (Power, 2016) to be a possible fabrication questioning the existence of 
the defector at the centre of the story. The second was also proved false (Power, 
2016). Photographic evidence cast doubt over whether purges took place or not. 
None of this is about being a shill for Kim Jong-un or his regime. It is about asking 
questions of the sometimes purposeful construction of a strange nation. These are 
questions and issues that arise over and over again in this thesis.  
 
5.4.2 The Guardian 
 
In July, The Guardian published 28 stories on North Korea and six on South Korea. 
No stories were published featuring both Koreas. The stories on North Korea were 
on a constellation of topics and from a wide variety of source organisations, including 
wire services, ‘instagramers’, pundits, craft mode providers, and staff writers. The 




July started with a story on squid and infectious diseases. In the vein of much of the 
industrywide coverage of North Korea, The Guardian started the month with a story 
on North Korea featuring a single anonymous source to explain how North Koreans 
had been turning to a natural remedy to safeguard against MERS (Middle Eastern 
Respiratory Syndrome) (Song Min Choi, 2015b). The story, supplied by Daily NK, 
reported North Koreans had been turning to squid as a miracle cure for the deadly 
disease despite there being no reported cases of the illness in North Korea. This 
story encapsulates much of the coverage of North Korea. We are presented with a 
story that may or may not be true, that is impossible to verify, and does not conform 
to most newsroom policies of the number of sources and the identification of those 
sources. This story also presents North Korea and North Koreans in a less than 
flattering light. The people of the DPRK are framed as impoverished, superstitious, 
and suspicious of science and their government in the pursuit of eating squid soup 
as a means of fortifying themselves against an airborne pathogen. Yet, folk remedies 
are popular around the world. South of the border, in South Korea, there is a thriving 
industry for traditional and folk remedies. Former Seoul and Pyongyang Associated 
Press bureau chief, Jean Lee, said it is normal for cultural characteristics and beliefs 
common to all Koreans to be ascribed only to North Koreans (J. Lee, 2017), if those 
beliefs were “kooky”, “strange” or “served to present North Koreans as weird”. Lee 
was talking about a fundamental dishonesty that pervades the international coverage 
of North Korea, and, as this thesis presents, South Korea, too.  
 
Two weeks later, on January 15, cephalopods again became the focus of The 
Guardian’s coverage of North Korea (S. M. Choi, 2015). This was a story sourced 
from Daily NK on farmers and peasants abandoning drought-ravished farms to 
migrate to the coast in hopes of striking it rich in the annual squid migration up 
Korea’s East Coast. This story again features, presumably, the same unnamed 
source making the story open to the same criticism as before. Interestingly, the story 
focuses on the economic impact of seasonal migration in North Korea in terms of a 
sharp rise in the cost of rents in coastal towns and the bumper profits to be made for 
those who strike it lucky. This story runs counter to dominant narratives on North 
Korea that paint the country as a strictly authoritarian open-air prison. This 
characterisation persists despite there being a growing body of research arguing the 
market and the jangmadang (market) generation is prevalent and changing the 
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structure of North Korean society (Hastings, 2016; Lankov, 2013; Smith, 2015; Tudor 
& Pearson, 2015). This story mentions the existence of a market and freedom of 
movement in passing but fails to move beyond the weird. The emphasis of this story 
ends up becoming “North Koreans really like squid” and this comes at the expense 
of journalism that could reveal something about changes to the structure of North 
Korean society.  
 
Sandwiched between the squid stories in the first two weeks of July were stories on 
Pyongyang’s new airport featuring pictures of Kim Jong-un pointing at things (North 
Korea Network, 2015), Mindy Tan’s Instagram images of Pyongyang (Tan, 2015), 
and the aforementioned story on the mash up art on North Korea (Wellinger, 2015). 
All of these stories are image-based and all focus on the bizarre elements of North 
Korea. Other stories included the introduction of cycle lanes in Pyongyang (Reuters, 
2015a), a story on the drought North Korea was experiencing at the time (Agence 
France-Presse, 2015l), and a story on drought breaking rain (Reuters, 2015b). There 
were also more evocative stories, including a story written by BBC journalist John 
Sweeney on the necessity for BBC to broadcast directly into North Korea (Sweeny, 
2015) if regime change was to be effected. There was a story about the North 
Korean government inviting all of the US Congress to visit a pesticide factory after 
the DPRK was accused by the US of manufacturing weaponised anthrax (Agence 
France-Presse, 2015a). The story was accompanied by an ecstatic Kim supported 




(Image 5.1) (Agence France-Presse, 2015a) 
 
The meaning and use of such imagery is discussed in coming paragraphs.  
 
The second half of July continued in much the same way as the first half of the 
month. In the absence of a specific event or conflict to cling to, the coverage 
bounced from oddity to banality to oddity. These stories included a story on whether 
North Koreans keep pets (J. S. Lee, 2015b), a story based on a single unnamed 
source about the North Korean government forcing people to get up early to beat the 
summer heat (S. M. Choi, 2015a), and a planned surf trip to North Korea (AP in 
Pyongyang, 2015). While these stories may have some novelty, stories of pets, 
waking up early and surfing in North Korea do little to reveal anything of importance 
on North Korea and its people beyond the banal. 
 
There were also more serious stories on the threat North Korea might pose to the 
world order based on a report from a conservative think tank (AP in Washington, 
2015) while another story carried the headline, “North Korea ramps up anti-American 
rhetoric on Korean war anniversary” (Talmadge, 2015c). These two stories represent 
the binary in the coverage of North Korea. On one side is a think tank that takes an 
aggressive, hawkish approach to how they believe North Korea should be dealt with, 
while on the other is a dovish view that favours engagement with North Korea. The 
hawkish approach propagates the view that North Korea is a risk to world peace and 
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world order, and, therefore, the only appropriate way of dealing with the country is by 
taking the offensive. This can include sanctions all the way up to full-scale 
deployment of military force. The other side, the “doves”, favours engagement as a 
means of dealing with North Korea. Eric Talmadge, the AP bureau chief in 
Pyongyang and the author of the story, reported what was said by Kim Jong-un and 
North Korean military elite on the eve of celebrations in remembrance of the 
armistice in the Korean War. The story is alive with bellicose statements from the 
North Korean leaders, but Talmadge is quiet on what should be done about the 
north. This “hawks/doves” distinction becomes central to the framing of North Korea, 
and this is a theme that is returned to later in this thesis. 
 
Of the six stories that dealt exclusively with South Korea, two were about the MERS 
epidemic. South Korea was in the grips of MERS panic for much of May and June. 
Finally, in July, it was announced the South Korean population was free from the risk 
of infection. The stories were identical and published on consecutive days (Agence 
France-Presse, 2015h). The story was framed around the impact of the outbreak of 
MERS on the South Korean economy and the desire on the part of South Koreans to 
return to normal as quickly as possible. Other stories included the failure of a 
Samsung mobile phone to capture market share (Associated Press in Seoul, 2015), 
the delicate issue of South Koreans being adopted overseas (Bordier, 2015), and the 
story of a South Korean naval officer arrested for spying in China (Agence France-
Presse, 2015i). Finally, The Guardian’s anaemic coverage of South Korea included a 
story about the 1980 Miss Universe beauty pageant hosted in Seoul. The story was 
as bizarre as it was pointless, and it failed to comment on the South Korea of the 
time. Rather, the reader is presented with a procession of not funny jokes about how 
short Koreans are (Bank-Smith, 2015). Bank-Smith writes: 
 
There were 69 of them, all dancing in national dress with what vivacity they 
could command for wearing dresses “designed by Gloria Vanderbilt for 
Jonathan Logan” (and I bet he looked sweet in them, too), or being escorted 
by cadets of the Korean military Academy (all with tall feathers in their caps, 
as featherless they are rather on the stumpy side). (2015) 
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5.5 August 2015 
 
August marked a valuable month in terms of this framing project. Unlike the largely 
disparate content of July, news organisations reported on events that occurred in the 
Koreas. Early in the month, there was the mishmash of stories similar to what 
dominated in July. For The Guardian, there were “Ask a North Korean” stories 
sourced from the NK News archives looking at what happens on a North Korea 
wedding day (Y. S. Kim, 2015a) and how North Koreans treat mental illness (J. S. 
Lee, 2015a). There was a story about Lee Hee-ho, former first lady and wife to South 
Korea’s first progressive president, Kim Dae-jung (Agence France-Presse, 2015b). 
 
5.5.1 Pyongyang Time and Post-Colonial Amnesia  
 
The legacy of the Japanese colonial period in both North Korea and South Korea 
burns bright. The ignominy of the annexation in 1910 and subsequent rule until 1945 
by the Japanese Imperial forces is a period that still fuels anti-Japanese sentiment 
for many Koreans (Cumings, 2005). Issues with Japan stemming from the colonial 
period are one of the few factors both North Korea and South Korea agree on. It is 
not uncommon for non-Koreans to be accosted by Koreans on the streets of Seoul’s 
tourist hotspots about their views on Dokdo. Dokdo (Takeshima in Japan) is a small 
group of islands in the East Sea (Sea of Japan) claimed by both Koreas and Japan, 
although South Korea’s claim has been louder and more sustained than North 
Korea’s. Breen (2017) writes, “… this Dokdo issue is far more important for South 
Koreans than the suffering of tens of thousands of people in the North Korean gulag” 
(p. 95). Breen argues issues like Dokdo offer a vehicle whereby South Koreans can 
express frustrations over being a small country that has sustained millennia of 
attacks from Japan. Reluctance on the part of the Japanese Government to address 
territorial disputes with South Korea to South Koreans’ satisfaction is problematic for 
relations between the two countries. Feelings of victimhood for Koreans are further 
exacerbated by the shared perception among many Koreans that Japan is intent on 
brushing other issues of colonisation under the rug, including forced labour before 
and during World War Two. Smith (2015) writes:  
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The most naked abuses occurred during the Pacific war of 1941-5 when 
Japan conscripted the Korean population into support for the war effort. The 
colonial police force rounded up hundreds of thousands of Korean men who 
were sent abroad to work in factories and mines or conscripted as soldiers to 
serve in the Japanese army. By 1944, some 4-million Koreans – out of a 
population of 25-million – were working in Japan or Manchuria in support of 
the war effort, many in mines or munitions factories. Most notably, hundreds 
of thousands of Korean woman – today known as ‘comfort woman’, a term 
which hides the brutality of the experiences of these women, were sent to 
work as enforced prostitutes for the Japanese military. (p. 73) 
 
Making matters worse for Koreans has been repeated attempts on the part of 
Japanese authorities to rewrite school history books erasing any mention of the 
brutality of Imperial Japan. These feelings of anger have been compounded by a 
shift to the right in Japanese politics under nationalist Prime Minister Abe (Snyder, 
2018). Abe has advocated for changes in the Japanese constitution allowing Japan 
to develop an offensive military capacity while there has been an increase in far-right 
anti-Korean public demonstrations in Osaka and Tokyo.  
 
Against this backdrop of national historical angst, North Korean authorities decided 
to change their time zone 30 minutes back in line with pre-1910/Japanese 
occupation. Under Japanese occupation, Korea was brought into the Japanese time 
zone in 1912. The restoration of the Korean time zone was set to coincide with the 
70th anniversary of Korea’s liberation from Japanese rule on August 15, 2015. 
News.com.au featured a single story (AP, 2015a) on the topic on August 8, 2015. 
The story framed North Korea in singular terms – Kim Jong-un is North Korea and 
North Korea is Kim Jong-un. As evident in other stories, North Korea was framed as 
a petulant man-child state hell-bent on bucking international norms in an effort to 
disrupt. Aside from a passing comment on some of the excesses of Japanese rule 
deep in the story, there was scant regard for the reasons the authorities in 
Pyongyang might take such a step, other than it being part of a power play on the 
part of the young North Korean leader. AP wrote, “The North’s move appears to be 
aimed at bolstering the leadership of young leader Kim Jong-un with anti-Japan, 
nationalistic sentiments, said Yang Moo-jin, a professor at the University of North 
 125 
Korean Studies in Seoul. Kim took power upon the death of his dictator father, Kim 
Jong-il, in late 2011,” (AP, 2015). Whether this is true or not is not disputed. What is 
missing from the story was any mention of concerns in both Seoul and Pyongyang 
over a growing anti-Korean nationalist sentiment emanating from Tokyo. Also absent 
was any mention of the deeply symbolic nature of the time change for Koreans of 
both sides of the 38th Parallel as is present in the work of Snyder (Snyder, 2018).  
 
What was present was this choice quote from the KCNA, “The wicked Japanese 
imperialists committed such unpardonable crimes as depriving Korea of even its 
standard time while mercilessly trampling down its land with 5000-year-long history 
and culture and pursuing the unheard-of policy of obliterating the Korean nation,” the 
KCNA dispatch said. It becomes clear in Chapter Six the KCNA has a long history of 
bellicose and hyperbolic language in their international press releases making them 
easy to lampoon. As with this story, in erring on the side of the bizarre, news.com.au 
missed the opportunity to offer an understanding on why North Korea would take 
such action.  
 
The notion of a singular North Korea/Kim Jong-un is reinforced in the images 
accompanying the story. All three images featured Kim Jong-un and one official 




(Image 5.2) (AP, 2015a) 
 
Here, the convergence of the man and the state is bolstered by images that bear 
little or no relevance to the story. All three images in this story show Kim flanked by 
his military officials in degrees of sycophancy.  
 
The Guardian broke the news on ‘Pyongyang Time’ (Harding, 2015) a day before 
news.com.au did in a story that was nearly identical to the news.com.au report. 
Harding’s story used the same KCNA quote in the same jeering fashion.  
 
Harding leads with: 
 
It is a problem for small states everywhere overshadowed by mighty 
neighbours. How to stick out? And perhaps assert national pride at the same 
time? 
 
On Friday North Korea came up with its own typically idiosyncratic answer, 
announcing that from next week it will use its own unique time zone. 
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Pyongyang said that it will pull back its current standard time by 30 minutes, 
making it GMT +8.30, rather than GMT +9. (Harding, 2015) 
 
Again, this article fails to frame the story in terms of the cultural and symbolic 
significance of such a move. Rather, Harding and The Guardian look upon North 
Korea as a child state eager for attention. This is complemented by the following 
image of Kim with the accompanying caption, “North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in 
Kangwon Province. The new time zone will launch on the anniversary of Korea’s 
liberation from Japanese rule at the end of the second world war” (Harding, 2015). 
This is the only mention of Kim in the story, yet this image of him and his entourage 
featured. As already noted, no story on North Korea seems complete without a 
smiling image of Kim. 
 
 
(Image 5.3) (KNS/AFP/Getty Images, 2015) 
 
This is true of the next story, “What’s the time? It’s Pyongyang time!” ("What's the 
time? It's Pyongyang time!," 2015). Yet again, this story featured the aforementioned 
KCNA quote as part of an explanation as to why North Korea was altering their time 
zone. Again, beyond this quote, no attempt was made to place the time change in an 
historical context, nor was there any effort made to explain the changes as part of a 
post-colonial framework. Rather, the quote served to highlight the curious language 
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the KNCA uses in communicating with the rest of the world – it adds a sense of 
heightened strangeness further reinforcing a bizarre idiosyncratic view of the regime 
in Pyongyang. In fairness, the story was not written as news. It was presented as a 
piece of comedy in a question-and-answer format. True to form, the accompanying 
photo was Kim Jong-un at a fish processing plant with the accompanying caption, 
“As can be seen in this picture of a recent visit to a fish-processing plant, North 
Korean leader Kim Jong-un has always had a habit of turning up 30 minutes earlier 
than everyone else.” 
 
 
(Image 5.4) ("What's the time? It's Pyongyang time!," 2015) 
 
This joke is almost as weak as the analysis in this story.  
 
On August 10, The Guardian published a story on the South Korean response to 
‘Pyongyang Time’ (Agence France-Presse, 2015j). The story entitled “South Korean 
president lashes out at 'Pyongyang Time'”, details what amounts to nothing more 
than a tepid response by South Korean president, Park Geun-hye. Park is quoted as 
saying the decision to wind back the clock on the part of the north was “regrettable” 
and, “The North’s action to break from the shared standard time ... runs counter to 
efforts to foster inter-Korea cooperation and to achieve reunification.” None of this 
qualifies as “lashing out”. If The Guardian needed a genuine conflict to report on, 
they needed not wait for too long as the next section shows. This is one of the few 
 129 
stories carried by The Guardian not to feature an image of Kim Jong-un. Nor does it 
carry a likeness of Park Geun-hye. Instead, we get a picture of what is presumably a 
young North Korean woman standing beneath a clock.   
 
Here, in the shadow of the ‘Bizarre’ meta-frame dwells the ‘pariah’ sub-frame. With 
reference to North Korea, this sub/micro frame is driven by a lack of context. Within 
the coverage of this event, the symbolic and real meanings attached to throwing off 
vestiges of colonial rule were lost. Rather, salience lay in the construction of a 
disruptive, sometimes stroppy or boisterous, infantile state set on disruption for the 
sake of disruption. In isolation, a lone state bucking regional and international trends 
in time and time zones seems the definition of illogic. Set against a history of 
antagonism with Japan, reverting back to a pre-colonial time zone on the 70th 
Anniversary of liberation from Japan does not seem as unreasonable and disruptive, 
as The Guardian and news.com.au would have the reader believe. The salience of 
the pariah frame is only heightened when the scorn of the South Korean president, 
Park Geun-hye, is added to the framing package. This is made more confounding by 
there being little in Park’s words especially when ideologically and politically she is 
no friend of North Korea.     
 
Finally, on August 15, The Guardian published a final story on the issue. In a 
deviation from the frame presented above, the article, written by NGO worker-turned-
academic, Andray Abrahamian (2015), argued the change in time zones would 
inconvenience him as someone working in North Korea because of the need for him 
to change the time on his watch on trips to China and South Korea. More 
importantly, Abrahamian recognised the post-colonial symbolism inherent in the 
action. In a twist, Abrahamian argued the move was not aimed at Japan. Rather, he 
argued, it was targeted at South Korea and meant as comment on the south being 
under the thumbs of successive imperial masters of Japan and America. 
Abrahamian concluded his article by saying the only thing surprising about 
Pyongyang time was they waited so long to institute it. Abrahamian writes: 
 
Changing time zones is one more way for Pyongyang to say to its own 
citizens and some constituencies down south that South Korea is symbolically 
and practically in step with the imperialists, while North Korea has always tried 
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to carve its own path. In a way, it’s surprising that they waited until now to do 
it. (2015) 
 
The Guardian’s use of images across this story requires some explanation. 
According to both Lankov (2013) and Myers (2010, 2015), North Korea is a military 
first state. This means the military is the dominant institution and as such needs to 
be portrayed as active as a means of staying relevant. When Kim is portrayed 
alongside his military elite in North Korean media, the message for North Koreans is 
one of stability. What is portrayed are the two key institutions, the Kim dynasty and 
the military, as one. When such images are lifted from the KCNA or national North 
Korean newspaper The Rodong Shimun by foreign journalists, the images are 
stripped of context, making them appear bizarre and sometimes threatening. 
 
5.5.2 The Construction of a Conflict Frame 
 
Early Tuesday morning on August 4, 2015, two South Korean army sergeants were 
on regular patrols on their side of the DMZ. One of the two soldiers stood on and 
detonated a landmine shattering the legs of both soldiers.  
 
This tragic event sparked a series of events that dominated international news on the 
Koreas until the end of the month. The resulting standoff was bizarre as it was 
threatening to the international order – at least in the eyes of the Western press. 
 
What is clear in the coverage of this event is that in times of conflict or perceived 
conflict is a sense of catastrophe in the events between North Korea and South 
Korea. The sense that what is taking place on the Korean Peninsula is the beginning 
of the end is strong in these stories to the point the hyperbolic construction of 
impending doom generated in the international media of the two countries squaring 
off becomes fast-paced entertainment. The coverage becomes more and more 
frenzied as the North and the South are seen vying for position, and then, almost in 
the blink of an eye, it is over. The issue is resolved and, rather than fading from 
public view, it is gone like it was never there. The banality of the bizarre that 
characterises so much of the coverage of the Koreas resumes.  
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This story reached its peak on the Korean Peninsula in August 2015, with a bizarre 
standoff across the 38th parallel.  
 
The coverage of the conflict was built on a foundation of wire service stories and 
then overlaid or covered with other more colourful sources of stories on the Koreas. 
Given the atomised nature of the coverage, there is a reluctance to treat the 
coverage as a singular piece of work. Rather, the different stories are in many ways 
self-contained islands where there is little to no expectation the reader has any prior 
knowledge of the event at hand. Therefore, there is hubris in suggesting these 
pieces dovetail into one another. Despite this, analysis of the event shows penchant 




A key component of the ‘conflict frame’ is its escalating one-sided nature. At the 
heart of the package lies a zero-sum game where there are only winners and losers. 
In this state there is little or no room for anything other than the axiom. The winner-
loser, good-evil binary is readily seen in news.com.au’s coverage of the cross-border 
conflict.  
 
news.com.au’s coverage of the Koreas’ summer conflict broke on August 10 with two 
stories from AFP on Seoul’s ‘vow’ to make North Korea pay a harsh price for planting 
landmines (Agence France-Presse, 2015g) and North Korea being accused of 
planting the landmines that maimed two South Korean soldiers (Agence France-
Presse, 2015c). Both stories take the view that North Korea was responsible for the 
maiming of the two South Korean Staff Sergeants. These assertions were based on 
the results of analysis undertaken by the South Korean military that the landmines 
were not ‘legacy weaponry’ – i.e., weaponry used during the Korean War – and had 
been recently planted. The first story was a news article of questionable balance that 
introduced the prospect of war on the Korean Peninsula after what was viewed as an 
act of wanton aggression on the part of North Korea. The article features three 
images: an image of Kim Jong-un flanked by a phalanx of assistants; an image of 
two South Korean soldiers on patrol on the southern side of the DMZ; and a stately 




(Image 5.5) (AFP/KCNA, 2015) 
(Image 5.6) (Jones, 2015) 
 
The second article (Agence France-Presse, 2015c) was published eight hours after 
the first. The tension around the prospect of impending war between the Koreas is 
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heightened in this article. The article leads with, “This could be the straw that breaks 
the camel’s back in a long-running military battle between North and South Korea.” 
This sentence evoked a sense of permanent war – or battle – between the two. This 
was a gross distortion of the actual state of affairs better described as ‘fractious’.  
The article proceeds to chronicle other attacks on South Korea by North Korea and 
concluded with North Korea’s refusal to meet South Korea at the negotiation table 
because of South Korea’s refusal to cancel their annual military drills with the U.S.  
 
The third story (Moulten, 2015), also from the AFP, dovetailed from the second, 
further building on the north’s dissatisfaction with the impending “Ulchi Freedom” 
military drills between South Korea and the United States. The story drew heavily 
from press releases by the North Korean Government. The story noted, “Such large-
scale joint military exercises … are little short of a declaration of war,” and warned of 
the potential for a military clash that could trigger an “all-out” war.” In isolation, such 
a threat is chilling. What is neglected is a mention that this kind of rhetoric is the 
mainstay of cross-border communication with both sides being guilty of this kind of 
sabre-rattling. There are references in the story to North Korean motivated cross-
border skirmishes and assurances from South Korean spokespeople the exercises 
were purely defensive in nature. The story concluded with a summary of North 
Korea’s nuclear potential and a comment on the “recent mine attack” from the North. 
The conflation of a nuclear armed nation with the demonstrated capacity and 
readiness to maim others painted a picture of an inhuman adversary. It should be 
noted the north never claimed responsibility for the landmines which, at an anecdotal 
level, was out of character. From a framing perspective, the “inhuman evil” that can 
be seen in this story is a key aspect of the frame package where the North is hell 
bent on destruction and disorder and the South is either a harmless spectator or a 
victim of historical circumstance.  
 
The next instalment comes a week later in the wake of an exchange of artillery fire 
across the DMZ. On August 21, a 1005-word feature article was published under the 
byline “Network writers and wires” (2015). The article chronicled the events of the 
two days prior that saw a steep escalation of hostilities to a war footing either side of 
the DMZ. According to the article, the North and the South had traded artillery fire 
although there had been no injuries to either side. Also, according to the article, the 
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South Korean military had incensed the North by engaging in ‘psychological warfare’ 
– resuming loudspeaker broadcasts into North Korea after an 11-year hiatus. The 
article also made reference to North Korea’s opposition to the joint South Korea-
United States military drills as an action that upset the North Koreans. There was 
persistence in blaming North Korea for the spike in tensions. There was no sense of 
anything other than a zero-sum game where the North was the provocateur and the 
South was simply responding to the persistent pokes and nudges from the North in 
the same way an older sibling might put a younger more troublesome sibling in their 
place. The article concluded with a sentence justifying the continued presence of 
28,500 U.S. troops in South Korea as a means of deterring “potential aggression” 
from North Korea. The article featured a picture of Kim Jong-un standing cross-
armed in a peach grove wearing a summery white shirt and smiling for the camera.  
 
(Image 5.7) (AAP, 2015b) 
 
In bold contrast, the story followed with three images of South Korean troops in full 
combat uniform presumably awaiting orders. Despite references to Park Geun-hye 
appearing on South Korean television wearing camouflage fatigues, no image was 
published.   
 
Four days later, on August 26, news.com.au published a story drawn from an 
interview with academic, Justin Hastings (Moulton, 2015). Early in the article 
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appeared the words, “Pyongyang refused to take responsibility prompting Seoul to 
go on the offensive.” Here, in a familiar refrain, a hapless South responded to a 
bellicose and aggressive neighbour with, “K-Pop across the border.” Accompanied 
by an image of K-Pop group, 2NE1, the story drew exclusively from Hastings.  
 
(Image 5.8) (Koichi Kamoshida/Getty Images, 2015) 
 
Hastings went into detail about how war was never really on the cards because the 
two know each other far too well. Rather, following realpolitik reasoning, the episode 
was part of an oft used strategy on the part of the North Koreans to extract 
concessions from South Korea and its allies through manufacturing a crisis and then 
offering a conditional solution. Whether Hastings’ analysis was accurate or not falls 
beyond the scope of this discussion. However, what is clear is that the gulf between 
what is salient in framing South Korea and what is salient in framing North Korea is 
quite different. The reports portray the South as a fetishized mix of the innovative, 
trendy, sexy and cute while the North was represented as conniving and dangerous 
and driving the world to the edge of war in pursuit of an easy score, as well as lazy 
and irrational. This view was reinforced across the coverage of the conflict, 
heightening the sense of a binary Korea – one good and one bad but both bizarre. 
This is a pattern repeated in a slightly more nuanced fashion across The Guardian 





Here, again, a synergy is evident between the words and pictures on the screen. 
Images of Kim Jong-un repeatedly feature in these stories. Kim is portrayed as a 
bizarre character surrounded by fawning cronies, sycophantically hanging on his 
every word. What is portrayed in these photographs could be loosely defined as a 
Machiavellian (Machiavelli, 1961) nightmare where self-interested advisors hang on 
the words of a madman for their own gain. To make matters worse, Kim has an 
arsenal at his disposal that is capable of destroying the world. All the while, as the 
sycophants await pearls of wisdom and jostle among themselves for Kim’s attention, 
Kim smiles as the world awaits his next move. At the same time, the South Korean 
leader, Park Geun-hye, is depicted in a very different light. Absent are the advisors in 
their Cold War era military dress. Instead, Park stares resolutely from behind her 
lectern into middle space, every bit the virgin queen having given up everything in 
service of country and people. Park’s father, former President Park Chung-hee, had 
been cut down through assassination in 1979. Park Geun-hye’s mother was shot 
and killed some years before her father’s assassination by a North Korean agent 
who had fired a bullet intended for Park Chung-hee. Park, herself, had never 
married. What the photo did not reveal was a leader on the precipice of 
impeachment and imprisonment. Further background to Park’s downfall comes in 
Chapter Seven.   
 
5.5.2.2 The Guardian 
 
The Guardian published their first story on the South Korean troops sustaining 
injuries from the exploding landmine shortly after the event on August 4. The article 
(Agence France-Presse, 2015k), supplied by AFP, followed the inverted pyramid 
style of news writing. It offered scant detail beyond the facts of the event – two 
soldiers sustained severe leg injuries after a landmine exploded while the two were 
patrolling the South Korean side of the DMZ. North Korea received a mention for 
being on the other side of the border. Beyond that, there was little indication of the 
strangeness that lurked around the corner and was never far away when reporting 




(Image 5.9) (Agence France-Presse, 2015k) 
 
Here we can see troops on either side of the DMZ in the village of Panmunjom. 
Panmunjom is famous for being the site of the meeting house for North Korea and 
South Korea that straddles the border. The village has become a Mecca for tourists 
on both sides of the DMZ. As the picture shows, Panmunjom gives tourists the 
opportunity to witness the rather surreal pantomime of North Korea and soldiers from 
the United Nations High Command (South Korea and United States) eyeballing one 
another across a narrow piece of curbing separating the two countries and the 
opposing forces. What this has to do with the story at hand at that point in time is 
unclear given the maiming did not take place in Panmunjom nor was North Korea 
implicated at this stage. In the context of this study, introducing the binary of the 
opposing forces through an image is not surprising given the construction of 
strangeness around North Korea even if no link between the two foes had been 
established at this point.  
 
The next story on the brewing conflict was published on August 15 and was entitled 
“North Korea threatens to destroy South’s propaganda speakers” (Agence France-
Presse, 2015d). The story features threats made by the North to the South and the 
United States through the KCNA ahead of joint large-scale military drills between 
South Korea and the United States in South Korea simulating an invasion of North 
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Korea.  The story features the kind of fiery and bellicose quotes that make the KCNA 
a favourite for journalists looking to insert colour into their stories on North Korea. 
They included “turning Seoul into a sea of fire” and describing themselves as an 
“invisible power equipped with both the latest offensive and defensive means … 
including nuclear deterrence”. Aside from the military exercises, the article claims the 
impetus for the threats was derived from the South’s flying propaganda leaflets 
across the border attached to helium balloons, the South’s resumption of the use of 
loudspeakers broadcasting into the North along the border, and the “absurd” claim 
on the part of the South that the North was responsible for the injuries sustained by 
the two South Korean soldiers in the landmine explosion. What is revealing here on 
the part of the AFP and The Guardian is that the story refers to explosion as a 
“landmine attack”. Despite strongly worded claims from North Korea to the contrary, 
there is no sense in the story other than North Korea being to blame.  
 
Wednesday, August 19 featured the story, “K-Pop against Kim: the radio broadcasts 
that have incensed North Korea” (H. Y. Choi, 2015a). In many ways this headline 
sums the characterisation and caricatures of both countries. South Korea is the 
epitome of cool (Nye, 2004). South Korea has some of the world’s biggest and most 
recognisable companies, including Samsung, Hyundai and LG. South Korean food is 
fast becoming one of the most popular cuisines. South Korea’s cultural products 
from the syncopated sounds of K-Pop to the melodramatic television shows are 
instantly recognisable (Jung, 2015; Nye & Kim., 2013). Yet, there is something 
insipid about how the South is constructed. The South is a nation tied to their work. 
The soft power, while popular, is inhabited by a vacuous nouveau riche unsure of 
what to make of their new-found wealth. At the other end of the spectrum lies North 
Korea. It is depicted as the kooky yet devious and dangerous authoritarian state 
ruled by child-king Kim Jong-un and a legion of fawning sycophants (K. Y. Chung, 
2019). This is a place where the leader and the state and people are conflated – the 
overweight and decidedly unfashionable Kim Jong-un is North Korea and North 
Korea is Kim Jong-un.  
 
Still, “K-Pop against Kim” (H. Y. Choi, 2015a) is a different kind of story. NK News 
journalist Ha-young Choi wrote an article that is rich in analytical detail but free from 
the hyperbolic colour so commonly seen in stories on North Korea. Instead, Choi 
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focuses on the radio war that has been waging across the DMZ since 1953. She 
looks at what populates “one of the busiest radio-waves in the world” back and forth 
across the DMZ and comments on a symbiotic propaganda war. The article is 
plagued by some of the usual problems associated with journalism on North Korea – 
in this case unnamed and anonymous sources – but it is also free of much of the 
hysteria that dominated the following week. As a side note, The Guardian published 
the same story two days later. These findings are consistent with recent research 
published by Seo (2018) suggesting organisations like NK News bring a much higher 
degree of detail and analysis to their stories on North Korea than wire services do. 
 
Across August 20-26, The Guardian published 15 stories on the Koreas. None of the 
stories focused exclusively on South Korea and only two of the 15 were on topics 
other than the cross-border tensions. These were a story on Laibach’s, the 
Slovenian band, tour of North Korea, and another article by Ha-young Choi (2015b), 
this time looking at inter-generational change and potential appetite in North Korea 
for home-grown regime change. These articles appeared on August 21 and, again, 
Choi’s work served to offer broader perspectives on North Korea than the 
mainstream of journalism on North Korea offered. It is worth remembering that, in 
2015, the prevailing mood in South Korea, Japan, and the Western world in regard to 
North Korea was hawkish. Within governmental and diplomatic circles, isolating 
North Korea as a means of exerting influence was in vogue. This made Choi’s article 
on the potential for change from within rather unusual in the corpus of the time 
although journalists James Pearson and Daniel Tudor’s book -- North Korea 
Confidential (2015) -- echoed many of the same sentiments.  
 
The remaining 13 stories dealt exclusively with North/South relations. Six of the 
stories were sourced through wire services and were the backbone of the coverage 
of the conflict. They tracked the conflict to resolution. Without fail, these stories 
presented an all-too-familiar binary of South Korea as a victim of North Korean 
aggression. The North Korean military moving to a war footing dominated the stories 
prior to the beginning of talks between the Koreas on August 22. South Korea was 
framed as the hapless nation that has the tremendous misfortune of having the 
world’s biggest trouble maker as their neighbour. This narrative was not necessarily 
grounded in reality. South Korea poked the proverbial bear with an insistence that 
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the North had maimed two of its soldiers in a far-fetched attack. Despite continued 
and persistent claims they had nothing to do with the landmine attack, North Korea 
was declared guilty by the Western media. This opened the door to justified counter-
aggression from the South, including sustained broadcasts across the border. Even 
after talks commenced, there was persistence in North Korea being painted as the 
aggressor (Agence France-Presse, 2015e). For example, AFP wrote: 
 
South Korea said the initial request for talks had come from the North, despite 
its aggressive rhetoric and military posturing of recent days. 
 
On the orders of Kim Jong-un, the North Korean People’s Army (KPA) has 
been in a “fully armed, wartime state” since Friday, while the foreign ministry 
in Pyongyang warned Saturday that the situation had “reached the brink of 
war” and was “hardly controllable”. (Agence France-Presse, 2015e) 
 
There is no mention here of the South Korean president, Park Geun-hye, making 
similar threats and proclamations. In fact, the rhetoric emanating from the Blue 
House (the South Korean presidential palace) is excluded from the coverage. On 
August 25 a resolution was found and the curious balance that passes for normal on 
the Korean Peninsula resumed.  
 
Across the conflict, The Guardian supplemented their wire service coverage of 
events with the thought and views of some of the leading pundits on inter-Korean 
relations. On August 22, The Guardian published an article by Adam Cathcart 
(Cathcart, 2015), a lecturer at the University of Leeds. Cathcart’s article came at the 
height of the tensions and his intention was to bring more context to the noise 
coming from Pyongyang. Cathcart argued that messages coming from Pyongyang 
were grounded in keeping the North Korean masses in a state of war readiness and 
anxiety and, thus, drawing their attention away from prospects of regime change. 
Cathcart made a good point but, here again, the assumption was North Korea was to 
blame and there was a noticeable lack of analysis on South Korea’s role in the 
conflict. This formed a key aspect of the conflict frame. The view of North Korea as 
the sole aggressor and South Korea as an unwilling and blameless participant is 
salient in this frame package.  
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Three days later, fellow University of Leeds academic, Aidan Foster-Carter, 
published an article under his byline (Foster-Carter, 2015). Foster-Carter’s article 
had a jaded and cynical tone. He was critical of South Korea’s response to 
provocations by North Korea. Foster-Carter’s cynicism did not extend to the reason 
for the conflict and the conflict’s inception. Foster-Carter wrote: 
 
If that is how matters stand, it’s very depressing – and shortsighted of the 
South. Why fixate on and make a crisis out of this latest nasty yet minor 
incident? Or if retaliation was needed, why choose loudspeakers – a known 
red rag to the North, and an easy target for pot-shots? Surely anyone could 
have foreseen that this would exacerbate rather than defuse tension. 
 
This is not to condone the mine, nor blame the victim. Park Geun-hye has 
stoically endured endless provocations from Pyongyang, including some foully 
sexist personal insults. (Foster-Carter, 2015) 
 
Who is the victim? This is a question that has never been answered to any 
satisfaction. This is not to suggest the North Korean leadership is anything other 
than odious, but being odious does not make one responsible for everything. Foster-
Carter goes on to conflate North Korea with Kim Jong-un and vice versa. He 
described Kim as a callow, mercurial juvenile gleefully taking the world to the edge of 
Armageddon. Here, we see Kim again painted as the dangerous freak – the epitome 
of bizarre. 
 
The final pundit to weigh in was Stephen Haggard of the University of California at 
San Diego (Haggard, 2015). Haggard’s article was a forensic breakdown of the 
accord reached between the North and the South. Haggard took a binary “Winners 
and Losers” approach in his article. He presented the familiar trope of South Korea 
as the unlucky and unwilling party to the North’s aggression. 
 
There is a sense in these stories that when it comes to South Korea broadcasting 
into North Korea what we see is a clash of modernity and feudalism. The overriding 
message is one of North Korea fighting not only South Korea but also the forces of 
progress and all things good. In attempting to shell South Korean loudspeakers, 
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North Korea was actually trying to quell progress and stay sealed in a Cold War 
bubble replete with comical dictator, generals in antiquated military dress, and 
nuclear weaponry.  
 
5.5.3 The Façade Frame  
 
The sudden cessation of conflict across the DMZ left a void in the coverage of the 
Koreas that was filled by largely vacuous and banal content. An example of this was 
the coverage of the opening of a new international airport in North Korea. This 
became the basis for the “façade frame”. 
 
The facade micro-frame can be characterised by stories around the modernisation of 
North Korea’s infrastructure and industry where the changes enacted serve as 
nothing more than a façade to mask the regime’s arcane ineptitude. These kinds of 
stories are regular fodder for both news.com.au and The Guardian. There is a 
jeering quality to these stories and the sense North Korea is hiding something behind 
a veil of fresh paint and concrete.  
 
After the conclusion of the North/South hostilities for the summer, The Guardian 
published two stories looking at infrastructure and service provision in North Korea. 
The first features a byline by Eric Talmadge, Associated Press’s bureau chief in 
Pyongyang (2015d). This story stands out because it bucks some of the trends 
opponents to an AP presence in Pyongyang find disagreeable in AP Pyongyang’s 
coverage of North Korea. At the same time, it contributes to the construction of a 
kooky North Korea. Put briefly, those opposed to AP maintaining a bureau in 
Pyongyang often point to editorial independence as an issue. They argue that, in 
agreeing to the terms and conditions imposed upon them by the North Korean 
government, AP in Pyongyang was nothing more than a conduit for North Korean 
authorities to spread propaganda globally via the AP wire.  
 
Talmadges’s story focused on the opening of the new Pyongyang International 
Airport. Talmadge wrote, “Pyongyang’s shiny new airport building has all the features 
international travellers have come to expect ... But some of the amenities lose their 
luster upon closer examination. Case in point: the internet room appears to be 
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missing the internet” (2015). This encapsulates the façade frame. Here, we can see 
an attempt on the part of the North Koreans at emulating what a normal functioning 
society might look like but what they achieve is nothing more than a shallow 
facsimile that fails to withstand even the most cursory examination.   
 
If salience can be partly understood in terms of what is not discussed within a given 
text, the omissions in this article are glaring. There was no mention of the capacity of 
the airport in terms of people or aircraft. There was no mention of construction costs, 
nor was there mention of the history or future of such facilities in North Korea. What 
was the reason for constructing a new airport? This, too, was not addressed and not 
answered. What was addressed was an assumed lack of internet access at the 
airport. Talmadge writes: 
 
On two recent trips through the airport, the room’s three terminals were either 
occupied by airport employees, making it impossible for others to use them, or 
were completely empty – with their keyboards removed. 
 
Maybe it was a temporary glitch. It’s hard to say, since airport officials have 
refused to comment. (Talmadge, 2015d) 
 
It is worth noting here that Talmadge did not include any sources in his article. As he 
said, it was based on two trips to the airport, so Talmadge had no idea why the 
computers were off limits during his visits and, indeed, no idea whether the internet 
worked or not. This story was not about an airport, nor was it about the internet or 
internet access. Talmadge concluded thus: 
 
The internet room at the airport, which opened a few months ago, is part of 
efforts to give visitors the sense that North Korea is just like any other modern 
travel destination. 
 
Another nod to international norms can be seen right behind the internet 
room, the smoking area. 
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In something almost never seen in the North, where just about every adult 
male who can afford it, including leader Kim Jong-un, is a smoker, the room 
has a big sign warning that the habit is hazardous to one’s health. (Talmadge, 
2015d) 
 
This article was the epitome of bizarre. In the same way the internet room at 
Pyongyang International Airport, “ … is part of efforts to give visitors the sense that 
North Korea is just like any other modern travel destination,” Talmadge’s article was 
about reinforcing a view of North Korea as fundamentally different and out of step 
with the rest of the world. news.com.au published the same article the following day 
under a slightly modified headline (2015b). Both articles featured a picture of an 
empty internet room with three terminals all missing keyboards. The Guardian article 
included a link to a photo gallery of pictures of Kim Jong-un inspecting the newly 
finished airport. There was the usual picture of Kim pointing at things while 
surrounded by middle-aged men in military uniform busily writing down his every 
word.  
 
In his article, Talmadge also made reference to North Korea’s national airline, Air 
Koryo, being named the worst airline in the world for the fourth year running. On 
August 27, The Guardian published a tongue-in-cheek ‘Pass notes’ article 
lampooning the airline. Written in a question-and-answer format ("The world’s worst 
airline: fasten your seatbelts (if you can) for a flight on Air Koryo," 2015), the article 
offered stereotypes that helped form the backbone of the façade frame, including 
comments on the age and conditions of the airline’s aircraft with particular reference 
to the origin of the fleet. Air Koryo’s aircraft are Russian-made Antonovs, Ilyushins, 
and Tupolevs.  It is worth noting Air Koryo’s aircraft are not unusually old and even if 
they wanted to buy the more highly rated Airbuses or Boeings, they would be barred 
from doing so under the sanctions imposed on them. The article raised concerns 
about the airline’s safety. The tone of the article, while jovial, fitted well within the 
confines of the façade frame – the illusion of normality is wafer thin. Early in 
September 2015, news.com.au published an article on the same topic that took a 
different tone.  
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In an article that runs counter to much of the news.com.au offering on North Korea, 
news.com.au published an AP article under Eric Talmadge’s byline that was devoid 
of much of the hyperbole that characterised the façade frame. In contrast to the Pass 
Notes article, Talmadge offers a well-researched and well-sourced article that not 
only revealed much about Air Koryo but also put forward a compelling explanation as 
to why Air Koryo was rated the worst airline in the world. Talmadge assembled 
sources who took issue with the Air Koryo being given the wooden spoon in the 
SkyTrax annual airline ratings. The usual sources pointed back at Kim Jong-un and 
North Korea, laughing and jeering or predicting a North Korea-led apocalypse. In 
their place are pilots and aviation experts. Talmadge wrote: 
 
‘I’m not sure that I’ve ever seen or heard any references to Air Koryo being 
unsafe, only that its service is terrible,’ Patrick Smith, an airline pilot and 
author of the Ask The Pilot blog, said in an email to The Associated Press 
before the latest ratings came out. ‘Everything about North Korea is seen as a 
kind of running joke, so we should probably expect that its airline is seen this 
way too, right or wrong,’ he said, with the caveat that he has never actually 
flown on Air Koryo. (Talmadge, 2015a) 
 
Talmadge continued revealing the ratings had more to do with service than with 
safety. Also, Kim Jong-un and his friends are absent in the images in the article. In 
their place are pictures of Air Koryo aircraft on the tarmac at Pyongyang Airport, 
people boarding an aircraft, and a picture of the ‘famous’ in-flight hamburger Air 
Koryo serves to passengers. Despite Talmadge’s effort to bring balance into the 
coverage of North Korea in this article, he still retreats to the bizarre. Talmadge 
wrote: 
 
In-flight entertainment is usually limited to the popular Moranbong Band girl 
group singing patriotic odes to the leader, or North Korean cartoons, shown 
on drop-down screens attached to the cabin ceilings. On the less than two-
hour hop from Beijing, there is a meal of sorts. It resembles a hamburger. 
 
This accompanied by a picture of something that resembles a hamburger with the 




(Image 5.10) (Talmadge, 2015a) 
 
Talmadge went a long way to deliver a thoughtful and balanced analysis but still 
succumbed to the temptation to trivialise North Korea and their attempt at an airline.   
 
5.5.4 Other Stories 
 
There were stories that were outside of the events subject to sub-frames. For 
news.com.au, two revealing stories were published on August 24. The first, “The 
brainwashed youth of North Korea” (Reynolds, 2015) was an odd story concurrently 
ridiculing and admiring the youth of North Korea. The article featured all that is 
normal with stories on North Korea, including assertions on the evil nature of the 
country, unnamed sources, defector sources, other news organisations as sources, 
and a local academic/pundit. Reynolds paints a grim picture of youth in North Korea 
abstemiously doing what they are told. Reynolds led with:  
 
IF THERE’S one thing you wouldn’t expect Gen-Y to do, it’s rise up in support 
of a “sacred war” and pledge their “faith and will to annihilate the enemies”. 
One million North Korean millennials have vowed to defend their country as 
tensions with the South boil over, at least according to the state-run Korean 
Central News Agency. (Reynolds, 2015) 
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It is interesting the KCNA can be a trusted source when what they are publishing 
supports the notion of a country that lives outside the norms of the rest of the world. 
The story went on to describe North Korean propaganda as a means of insuring 
North Koreans, young and old, conform to the North Korean government’s policies. 
The article concluded with a comment on North Korea’s deplorable human rights 
record.  
 
On the same day, news.com.au published an article procured from The New York 
Post about South Korean 14-year-old, Kim Sung-jin, making money from 
broadcasting himself eating online (New York Post, 2015) in a phenomena known as 
Mukbang (a literal translation meaning “eating room”). The article led with:  
 
EVERY evening, 14-year-old Kim Sung-jin orders fried chicken, delivery pizza 
or Chinese food to eat in a small room in his family’s home south of Seoul. He 
gorges on food as he chats before a live camera with hundreds, sometimes 
thousands of teenagers watching. (New York Post, 2015) 
 
Mukbang as a phenomenon has its roots in the much broader social changes. As 
South Korean society has industrialised, the social and communal structures have 
changed.  People have moved to cities, and they have become busier. There is often 
little time to enjoy a meal with friends and family and mukbang has filled a void in a 
country where eating alone is viewed as less than desirable (Pereira, Sung, & Lee, 
2019). There is no effort made on the part of The New York Post to provide such 
context. Rather, the story retreated to the ‘bizarre’. These stories provide sharp 
contrast in the treatment of the people of the respective Koreas. In the North, young 
people are not only subject to, but receptive to North Korean Government 
propaganda. We are presented with a world where people are so conditioned to a 
conformist way of thinking and behaving even the most disagreeable groups in 
society toe the government line. Meanwhile, in the South, we see teens who are free 
but lost. The trappings of success have resulted in South Korea’s teens retreating 
behind their computer screens to engage in activities that are as banal as they are 








(Image 5.12) The brave North Korean generation Y marching in defence of their 
nation (Reynolds, 2015) 
 
These stories serve to illustrate the broader framing across the sample of the two 
Koreas; North Korea as the brainwashed masses bent on destruction and South 
Korea as the vacuous child-state struggling to understand their success. Other 
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stories included a story on a student who spent his gap year in North Korea, a story 
about a succession squabble in one of South Korea’s largest companies, a story 
based on tourist snaps of North Korea, and a story on Kim Jong-un’s purges of the 
North Korean elite.   
 
Outside of those already discussed here, The Guardian published stories on 
Laibach’s Pyongyang concert, North Korean defector “Ask a North Korean” pieces, a 
story about Kim Jong-un’s purge of military elite, and an opinion article by journalist 
Kevin McKenna (McKenna, 2015). This article highlighted that while North Korea 
may be awful, the West has its problems too. He argued we may laugh at North 
Korea and their leadership but in doing so we needed to take a look at our own 
behaviour and the information we consume. At first glance, McKenna made a good 
point. However, in doing so, he still fed into the bizarre frame in uncritically accepting 
North Korea as the lowest common denominator. This did nothing to reframe what 
was salient in the coverage of the country and did nothing to reveal anything other 
than the same hackneyed stereotypes. Amid the threats of war across the DMZ, 
there was also a story from Choi Ha-young sourced through NK News on the ‘in-
betweener generation’ (H. Y. Choi, 2015b) (North Korea’s generation Y) and the 
potential for change from within North Korea. This story provided a contrast against 














5.6 September 2015 - Calm After the Storm and Business-as-Usual 
 
Korea news fatigue was visible in September. After the intensity of August, the news 
analysis and broader coverage of the Koreas across news.com.au and The 




news.com.au published eight stories on the Koreas in September – four each on 
North Korea and South Korea.  
 
There was the aforementioned story on Pyongyang International Airport (Talmadge, 
2015b), a blog post repurposed as a story about a tourist’s trip to North Korea with 
an emphasis on the bizarre (Weller, 2015), a story about a Japanese high school 
student who was abducted from a beach on Japan’s west coast by North Korean 
agents and taken to North Korea (News Corp Australia, 2015b), and a story on North 
Korea’s nuclear ambitions that include the chilling prediction that in a few short years 
only Tasmania will fall outside of the range of North Korean missiles. The story 
featured a single source, academic Leonid Petrov, who was quoted talking about his 
worries and fears for a nuclear-armed North Korea. Again, there was the broader 
construction of North Korea as an irrational country prone to the extreme and lacking 
in basic humanity.  
In the absence of an association with North Korea, stories on South Korea often 
descended into the bizarre. The four stories published on the news.com.au pages 
attest to this. The first two, published on September 14 and 15 (News Corp Australia, 
2015a, 2015c), are thinly veiled advertising for a documentary on the plastic surgery 
industry in South Korea. Both stories featured extensive comment from an Al 
Jazeera article on the South Korean plastic surgery industry and both featured the 
same primary source, So Yi Yoon, a woman who had suffered horribly after a series 
of botched surgeries in the quest to be a ‘living doll’. The second article, “How South 
Korea’s plastic surgery craze is costing lives” led with, “Seoul has become the new 
poster city for a growing Korean obsession to look perfect. It’s a place where plastic 
surgery clinics line the road all the way to the horizon line and business is booming,” 
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(News Corp Australia, 2015a). The gross exaggeration further fuels a sense of a 
population at odds with their new-found wealth and how to spend it. The first article 
painted a picture of an inhuman society where the young are forced into plastic 
surgery to have an edge in South Korea’s hyper-competitive job market. If these 
stories are to be believed, it implied South Koreans valued appearance over 
anything else. This is a gross and dangerous mischaracterisation.  
The inhumanity of South Korean society was picked up again in the third story 
(Ruptly, 2015) which featured a video of Caucasian activists rescuing 100 dogs and 
puppies from a dog farm in South Korea. There is the barest of explanations as to 
what was going on. The final story was on the destruction of an ancient forest to 
make way for a ski run for the upcoming Winter Olympics (Otto, 2015). The story 
was based on claims by an activist organisation and at the time of publication had 
not been verified, yet both news.com.au and The Guardian published the story as if 
the forest had been destroyed. Later, when it was shown no such ecological disaster 
had taken place, neither news.com.au nor The Guardian chose to publish a 
retraction or update. Combined, these four stories framed South Korea and South 
Korean society as self-obsessed to the point of self-destruction and self-harm. These 
stories served to highlight how South Korea as a stand-alone nation was portrayed 
by, and viewed in, the western press.   
5.6.2 The Guardian 
 
The Guardian’s offering in September was more substantial than news.com.au’s but 
no less jaded.  Across September, The Guardian published four stories exclusively 
on South Korea. Three of the four stories were from wire services. The fourth 
appeared under the bylines of Guardian staff writers Justin McCurry and Emma 
Howard and was on the destruction of a “sacred forest” in preparation for the 
Pyongchang Winter Olympics (McCurry & Howard, 2015). Unlike the news.com.au 
article, The Guardian provided a balanced mix of sources on the issue but still erred 
toward the sense South Korea as a country did not understand the value and 
importance of what little natural environment has survived the country’s 
industrialisation. The other three were all news stories including one dealing with the 
capsizing of a boat (AP, 2015b), the sale of a South Korean supermarket chain by 
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British-owned Tesco (Reuters, 2015c), and the jailing of a man who slashed the US 
ambassador to South Korea in a knife attack (Agence France-Presse, 2015f). All 
stories were news in nature. 
 
During the same period The Guardian published 15 stories on North Korea. In the 
wake of the summer conflict, there was a mixture of story topics. A standout was 
pictorial coverage of the Laibach tour by record company executive, Daniel Miller 
(2015). The absurdity of Laibach playing to elite cadre of the Worker’s Party of Korea 
is only accentuated by Miller’s pictures from the concert. 
 
 
(Image 5.13) (Miller, 2015) 
 
One has to wonder if the bemused faces in the crowd put these concert goers at 
odds with the rest of the world? 
 
There is also a series of seven stories speculating as to whether North Korea has 
restarted their nuclear reactors with the goal of further developing nuclear weaponry. 
There were two stories from Guardian architectural and design writer, Oliver 
Wainwright, on the architecture of Pyongyang (Wainwright, 2015a, 2015b) that sat 
well as part of the façade frame. There were two stories on the potential for a 
dedicated BBC service to effect change in North Korea (S. H. Kim, 2015; O'Carroll, 
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2015) with both being sourced from craft mode producers. There was a story on 
surfing in North Korea (Busca, 2015) which took the tone of a Jack London novel 
where young white explorers conquer a strange and foreign land – on surfboards.  
 
Finally, there were several “Ask a defector” articles. Here, the standout was an 
article on what it felt like to be in the North Korean army (Y. S. Kim, 2015b). This 
article informed the reader on life in the North Korean army now, a life that, if the 
author was to be believed, fitted with the Hobbesian maxim of “nasty, brutish and 
short” (Hobbes, 1651). The author noted observing starving soldiers living a less 
than subsistence life from a person perspective. What the article failed to achieve 
was accuracy. What appeared in The Guardian was an adaptation of an article 
originally published on the NK News (Y. S. Kim, 2015c) pages two days earlier. The 
main difference between the two was that in the NK News original Kim was writing 
about his experience in the army some two decades earlier during a period of 
prolonged famine in North Korea colloquially known as the “Arduous March”. This 
was a period where between an estimated 240,000 to 3.5 million people died of 
famine and famine-related diseases in North Korea (Spoorenberg & Schwekendiek, 




In framing the Koreas, both The Guardian and news.com.au gave salience to the 
bizarre. As this analysis shows, this comes at the cost of feeding frames that serve 
to entertain rather than inform. Whether the stories are news or feature-based, it was 
the bizarre that prevailed. It was the sensational, salacious and far-fetched that took 
precedence in the coverage of the countries. This is true for both news.com.au and 
The Guardian.  
 
Across the event-based sub-frames, the emphasis on the bizarre was consistent and 
persistent. This persistence allowed the “bizarre” meta-frame to become a container 
by which the Koreas were framed across the summer of 2015. These frames were 
reinforced by the interplay between words and images across the sample. Within the 
North Korean context, the bizarre nature of the frames was enhanced by the 
persistence of the sometimes ludicrous images of Kim Jong-un pointing at things. 
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The South Korean leader, Park Geun-hye, was not portrayed in the same light but 
this did not prevent The Guardian and news.com.au to use images that were, in their 
own way, bizarre. The focus on Kim and images of the man were understood as a 
part of an effort of the reinforced constructions of North Korea as menacing, 
maniacal, and dangerous while at the same time childlike, comical, and petulant. Kim 
and North Korea were conflated and became one in coverage of the country by the 
Western media.  
 
South Korea was viewed as equally childlike and a spectator to the events that 
shape the Korean Peninsula. Rather than Kim, images of and references to K-Pop 
stars and a vacuous youth reinforced textual frames in stories about the country. 
South Korea was portrayed as a country rendered bizarre by the excesses of 
success. The bizarre frame for the South Koreans was characterised by a successful 
yet largely immature and insipid people struggling to come to terms with the 
trappings of material success. What emerged in the framing of both the Koreas was 
a story of good and evil bound together by a common strangeness.  
 
An interesting and revealing finding was that, despite the networked nature of the 
content that comprised this sample, there was no clear deviation from the bizarre 
except in some of the work published on North Korea by then Associated Press 
bureau chief, the late Eric Talmadge. The persistence of the bizarre frame in its 
various sub-frames and iterations across the network raises questions about the 
broader coverage of the Koreas across the journalistic field. The coming two 
chapters show the bizarre aspects of stories on the Koreas are almost always 
salient. In a journalism environment that privileges expedience over accuracy and 
clicks over depth, this is as equally true for South Korea as it is for North Korea. 
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The framing enterprise is bigger than extracting frames as they appear in a story. 
This thesis argues understanding where frames come from and the conditions under 
which they are generated is as important as identifying the frames (Boesman et al., 
2017; Brüggemann, 2014). From this perspective, extracting and identifying frames 
is a small part in the framing analysis process. To properly understand the frames, it 
is necessary to also delve into the culture and conditions through which frames 
emerge (Van Gorp, 2009). To achieve this, interviews with journalists reporting on 
North Korea and South Korea for an international audience were conducted.  
 
The following two chapters are structured around the questions, “How would you 
characterise the international coverage of North Korea and South Korea?”, and 
“What are the factors that shape international coverage of North Korea and South 
Korea?”. Based on these questions, these findings and discussion chapters are 
divided into two distinct sections. The data collection was semi-structured which by 
its nature is iterative, interviewee-led and serendipitous (Skinner, 2012). This also 
results in no two interviews being the same with interviews arranged and conducted 
around broad themes rather than specific questions. It follows that methods of 
analysis need to reflect methods of data collection (Silverman, 2016). Against this 
backdrop, a six step thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006) was employed. The 
advantage of this specific approach is it allows for the fluid creation of themes across 
a wide and varied data set (Alholjailan, 2012; Boyatzis, 1998; Braun & Clarke, 2006). 
Braun and Clarke (2006) argue there is no hard and fast rules on what makes a 
theme. Rather, a theme is characterised by its significance as themes emerge in the 
data set. In answering questions around why the covering of North Korea and South 
Korea is like it is, clear but varied themes emerged. The next two chapters are 
arranged around those themes. 
 
For the purposes of this chapter, journalists encompass any person creating original 
content for the international news market on or about the Koreas. This includes 
those who regularly or exclusively draw income from this kind of work. This includes 
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The Washington Times’ Anna Fifield, the BBC’s Steve Evans, former Associated 
Press Seoul and Pyongyang Bureau Chief Jean Lee, Wall Street Journal Seoul 
Bureau Chief Alistair Gale, Reuters North Korea specialist James Pearson and The 
Guardian’s Justin McCurry. There are also Korean-born, bred and based journalists 
including Lee Tae-hoon, Choi Ha-young and Choe Sung-hoon reporting on Korea in 
casual, semi-permanent and permanent capacities for a range of news organisations 
including Al Jazeera and The New York Times. There are freelance journalists like 
John Power, Don Kirk, Rob York and Geoffrey Cain based in Seoul who eke out an 
existence on the margins of news on the Koreas. There were also the pundits – 
Andre Lankov and Josh Stanton – who do not identify as journalists but are regular 
primary contributors as well as sources in the space. Deuze and Witschge (2017) 
said the digital disruption of journalism has not only transformed how journalism is 
done and distributed, but also who can be defined as a journalist. Gone are 
homogenous conceptions of the journalist as someone tied to the newsroom with 
journalism as their sole preoccupation. The journalist of old has been replaced by a 
much more diverse cohort. Stanton and Lankov provide interesting examples.  
 
Stanton is very much a product of the digital disruption. A former United States army 
advocate and advisor to the United States of America Congress on North Korea 
(Stanton, 2018), Stanton is a regular contributor to the mainstream press as both a 
content creator and a source to news organisations such as The Wall Street Journal, 
The Washington Post, CNN.com, The Guardian, and Foreign Policy. Through his 
blog, One Free Korea, Stanton advocates for an end to North Korea. He shuns 
attempts at policies of engagement with the North Korean authorities on the part of 
the West and their allies, including South Korea and Japan as evidenced by his blog 
(Stanton, 2018). Stanton is far more interested in isolating North Korea on the world 
stage through the application and sustained use of sanctions as a means of ‘starving 
them out’ (Stanton, 2018). His dogmatic views are not unusual but they run counter 
to leading wire services AFP and AP, who Stanton has termed ‘Associated 
Propaganda’, who have set up bureaus in Pyongyang. In doing so, both AP and AFP 
have made contentious agreements with the North Korean Government, agreements 
Stanton argues are in direct conflict with the spirit of how North Korea should be 
dealt with. Further to this, Stanton raised important questions around restrictions 
placed on the editorial independence by the North Korean Government on foreign 
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news organisations operating in the country. Far from solving issues of journalistic 
access, Stanton argues the few news organisations that have set up in North Korea 
function as nothing more than an extension of the North Korean Government’s 
propaganda arm. Stanton’s views reflect a broader binary in debates on how to deal 
with North Korea where a tug-of-war exists between the doves – those who favour 
engagement – and the hawks – those who favour policies that isolate North Korea. 
Findings as part of this study suggest this debate defines a number of aspects in 
reporting North Korea, including the use of defectors in reporting North Korea, the 
role of the big South Korean news organisations in informing stories relating to the 
North, and the nature of the sources called upon in doing this kind of journalism.  
 
Lankov is interesting as he is difficult to pigeonhole. He is considered one of the 
foremost experts on North Korea and has been an especially vocal critic of the 
nature of international coverage on the Koreas and how North Korea is egregiously 
portrayed in the Western media (Lankov, 2013, 2015, 2016a, 2016b). He is a regular 
contributor to The Korea Times, Al Jazeera, and Bloomberg News among others. 
Looking at Lankov’s vast knowledge on the subject, a natural assumption as to why 
Lankov strays from academia into journalism might be to right the wrongs he sees in 
the coverage of North Korea. Although a civilising mission could well be part of what 
drives him, Lankov identifies far less lofty aims. He says, “I do this for the money. 
News organisations are willing to pay well. I make good money as an academic, but 
living in Seoul is only getting more and more expensive” (Lankov, 2017).  
 
The reality that covering North Korea needs to be profitable reveals an 
uncomfortable reality in doing this kind of work. It becomes clear, part of the 
attraction of covering North Korea is that there is a market for it. For those covering 
both North Korea and South Korea, North Korea is always the priority. This changes 
the journalist’s relationship with both countries. With the threshold for stories 
featuring North Korea being so low, stories on South Korea are often ignored. This is 
especially true for those covering both countries from Seoul. What becomes 
apparent across the course of the interviews is that covering North Korea requires 
less effort, less work and actual journalism. Issues of access in covering North Korea 
have resulted in standards in doing journalism on North Korea being significantly 
lower than those for South Korea. This translates into ungainly approaches to 
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covering the countries where journalists, other news organisations, the KNCA, 
pundits and defectors take precedence as sources. This differs from covering South 
Korea where access to primary sources is relatively open and covering the country 
to an acceptable standard requires more traditional journalistic practices which take 
time and effort. It follows that much of what could be reported from South Korea 
goes unreported in the international news media. For genuine news stories to make 
it into the news-hole, they need to be monumental. These stories appear as islands 
completely lacking in the context that might exist if the threshold for stories on the 
South was lower. The other type of stories to emerge on South Korea are those that 
compete with the weird stories on the North and, as the last chapter reveals, these 
stories are usually related to topics like K-Pop and plastic surgery that serve to feed 
the bizarre framing of the Koreas.    
 
Awareness of the low quality of news on both North Korea and South Korea has 
spurred some to attempt to redress some of the perceived problems in the 
journalistic coverage of the countries. Some, like Anna Fifield, James Pearson, and 
Choe Sung-hoon are swimming against the prevailing currents of industry and 
practice and doing thoughtful and thought-provoking journalism on the Koreas within 
mainstream news organisations. Others have made more risky and extreme 
initiatives in seeking to tell truthful, balanced, and accurate stories on the Koreas. Of 
note here is academic Koo Se-woong who founded Korea Expose, an investigative 
journalism and analytic website in Picard’s craft mode tradition with the express 
intention of: 
 
… “showing Korea as it really is” — to speak to a global audience about the 
two Koreas in a way that goes beyond the clichés and superficial analysis. We 
bring together a diverse crowd of writers who see the peninsula from different 
points of view: South Koreans domestic and abroad, North Koreans who have 
left their homeland, and non-Koreans who study or live in the region. (Koo, 
2018b) 
 
Koo seeks to challenge the restrictive environment journalists operating in South 
Korea. Koo sees this environment as ideologically charged and deeply dogmatic. 
Journalism in South Korea has been forced to function within a challenging structural 
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environment (Breen, 2017; Koo, 2018a; Power, 2014). On the Korea Expose website 
Koo writes he and his team aim to transcend the politically motivated simplistic 
ideologically charged content mainstream “Korea media outlets pass around as 
news”. The findings in this chapter reveal Koo is not alone in these criticisms with 
many interviewed as part of this study making the same criticisms of the South 
Korean journalism environment. Koo goes on to say: 
 
At Korea Exposé, we practice journalism that challenges politically motivated 
censorship and calls on the public to pay attention to the most salient topics in 
today’s Korean Peninsula. We are proud of our access to sources, fluency in 
the Korean language, and deep familiarity with the region that enable us to 
carry out our work. (Koo, 2018b) 
 
Issues of language, access to sources, social, cultural, political and historical 
knowledge, and an unfettered and non-critical reliance on South Korean news 
organisations for news on both North Korea and South Korea are all identified as 
issues that plague international coverage of the Koreas. 
 
Korea Expose is not alone in seeking to tell reliable stories on the Koreas although it 
is one of few organised English language ‘craft mode’ news providers that has been 
able to gain a foothold in news on South Korea. Lee Tae-hoon’s Korea Observer 
predates Korea Expose and was founded on the same aims, yet where Korea 
Expose has become an established and reliable source of news and analysis, Korea 
Observer is dormant. Koo has become a leading pundit for a range of international 
news organisations, including BBC and Al Jazeera while Lee, despite being an 
experienced investigative journalist, has struggled to maintain a foothold both 
mainstream and new media on South Korea. Lee has become a fixer for visiting 
foreign journalists.  
 
It is the same frustrations experienced by Koo and Lee regarding the quality of news 
on the Koreas that have attracted others to establishing small news organisations 
focused exclusively on news and analysis on North Korea. Chad O’Carroll, 
managing director of NK News says he was so shocked by the differences between 
what he experienced on a visit to North Korea in 2009, he saw as the reality of North 
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Korea, and what he was consuming in the international news, that he founded NK 
News, with James Pearson (now with Reuters), as a means of telling accurate and 
reliable stories on the country. In the true spirit of Picard’s craft mode of journalism 
(2014), NK News, like other websites with a similar focus including Daily NK and 38 
North, concentrate talent and knowledge on the topic in an effort “… to be the most 
evidence-based and reliable source of news, information and data on North Korea in 
the world. Funded almost entirely through user subscriptions, NK News has no 
agenda to fulfil beyond being an honest broker of timely and reliable information to 
its readers” (NK News, 2019).  A common finding to emerge from the interviews is 
the regard journalists covering the Koreas have for NK News and Daily NK. Anna 
Fifield, Choe Sung-hun, Andre Lankov, and Joshua Stanton all said NK News was 
their most trusted source of news and information on North Korea. This raises 
interesting questions around the agenda-setting function and the sway these new 
media players have over the more established legacy organisations. This is a 
question that goes largely unanswered as part of this study but will form the basis of 
future research.   
 
To suggest this form of journalism will supplant mainstream organisations doing 
journalism on North Korea would be premature at best and inaccurate at worst. As 
the sample that forms the basis of these chapters shows, stories from Daily NK and 
NK News seldom comprise the foundation of news on North Korea. These 
organisations form part of an ever more complex ecosystem supplying a seemingly 
insatiable market for news on the country.  Although organisations like Daily NK and 
NK News have in some instances helped to lift the quality of news and analysis on 
North Korea and have become the darlings of other journalists covering North Korea, 
they are still small and they are hamstrung by the perennial issues of limited funds 
and resources. These issues limit both reach and potential. For NK News, these 
issues have fuelled a pivot towards providing exclusive intelligence for wealthy 
subscribers, including governments, media, academia, military, not-for-profit 
organisations, and businesses (NK News, 2019). Chad O’Carroll, revealed there was 
a ‘sink or swim’ element to what he was doing with NK News and this was driving 
him to embracing big patrons and alternative revenue stream to news (O'Carroll, 
2016). This mentality had also led to difficulties in retaining staff as well as legal 
issues associated with Korean labour law and underpaying staff. At the time of 
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interviewing, former NK News staff journalist Choi Ha-young was involved in litigation 
against NK News over breaches of South Korean labour law during her time with the 
organisation.   
 
It becomes apparent across the course of the interviews that the quality of journalism 
on the Koreas has suffered with the decline in the business fortunes of journalism. 
This comes despite technological advances on how to cover North Korea and the 
rise of the specialist organisations mentioned above. It is difficult to gauge the exact 
scope and nature of the changes as this study has never been conducted before 
now, but there are clear trends and themes that emerge from the interviews pointing 
to a sustained deterioration in the practice and resourcing of covering the Koreas for 
the international media. A common theme that emerged across the interviews was 
the pressure those doing this kind work feel to feed the metaphorical “beast”. The 
exact nature of the beast was opaque and varied between interviewees from social 
media to commissioning editors to a vague audience. However, the tension that 
exists around keeping ahead and abreast of happenings on the Korean Peninsula 
(real or imagined) and doing more with less results in journalists prioritising some 
stories over others because they were cheap and easy to produce. These pressures 
also affect the framing, emphasis and salience of what is included and what is 
neglected in this form of storytelling to the point the entertaining, bizarre, and weird 
aspects of a story take precedence over other aspects of the story. What emerges in 
approaches to covering North Korea is those doing this work are influenced and 
directed by what is happening and being reported in South Korea, on social media, 
by other news organisations and defector groups. On top of this, covering South 
Korea is generally something that happens in the absence of anything to say about 
North Korea although there are exceptions to this. All of this combines in a 
haphazard approach to covering the Koreas that seldom intersects with reality.  
 
This chapter and Chapter Seven analyse the factors and issues in the practice of 
covering the Koreas. Based on a thematic approach, first covering North Korea is 




6.2 Constructing North Korea 
 
 
Reporting North Korea as you would other places is an exercise in futility. Lack of 
access to the country has made informed, fair, accurate, and balanced reporting 
difficult and created what Lankov terms, “the echo chamber of idiocy” (2016). 
Lankov’s echo chamber is characterised by hyperbolic reporting on North Korea 
driven by an ‘anything goes approach’. This in turn results in “dangerous” (Lee, 
2016), “flawed” (Pearson, 2016), “irresponsible” (O’Carroll, 2017), and “damaging” 
(Choe, 2016) stereotypes and representations of North Korea and North Koreans. 
Based on long form and in-depth interviews with leading journalists dedicated to 
covering the Koreas, this chapter dissects why the coverage of North Korea is what it 
is. In lieu of direct access to North Korea and North Koreans, journalists covering the 
country differ from other sources, including North Korean state media, the South 
Korean government and news media, defectors and refugees, other journalists and 
news organisations, and pundits and experts in an effort to “feed the beast” for 
content on the Kims and their country. All of this combines to drive a construction 
that emphasises the bizarre elements of the country and its people. This section 
focuses on how journalists reporting on the Koreas view the framing of North Korea. 
 
In keeping with the earlier framing studies (Boesman et al., 2017; Brüggemann, 
2014; De Vreese, 2005; Reese & Lewis, 2009), interviews with journalists were 
conducted to tease out the context in which the frames on the Koreas are 
constructed and embedded.  
 
Across the course of the interviews, a key finding was the almost uniformity of the 
views on the framing of North Korea in the Western news media. All agreed that it 
was the bizarre element story that was elevated and made salient. Even the most 
conservative of journalists reporting on North Korea agreed the coverage of North 
Korea was flawed and hyperbolic. For example, when interviewed, Donald Kirk said 
journalism as a whole needed to try harder to reflect the reality of North Korea and 
the lives of North Koreans. Kirk cited a lack of access to the country as the main 
reason behind why the coverage and framing of North Korea was a problem. Kirk 
made the point that in the same way South Korea is more than Seoul, North Korea is 
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more than Pyongyang. For Kirk, a true picture of the state could not be formed 
without regular access to secondary cities, towns, and villages. Kirk also questioned 
the effectiveness of Western news bureaus from the inside in covering the country, a 
theme that was persistent across the interviews but conceded there was a place for 
AP, AFP and others based in Pyongyang because, “In the land of the blind the one-
eyed man is king,” (Kirk, 2016). The wisdom and effectiveness of maintaining foreign 
news bureaus in Pyongyang is a theme that will be explored later in this chapter. 
 
6.3 The Journalist and North Korea 
 
It is a mistake to assume that any story on North Korea is going to find a home on 
the pages of the world’s news outlets. As Lankov says:  
 
There are a lot of important stories on North Korea that go uncovered 
because editors don’t have an appetite for them. These are the kinds of 
stories that take skill and training to do. However, you need to do what 
everybody else is doing, so stories on the North Korean fishing industry will 
not get published. These kinds of stories take analytical skill and those skills 
are seen as unimportant when it comes to covering North Korea. (2016) 
 
This is a tension felt by all journalists, and for those reporting on North Korea the 
situation is no different.  
 
A finding to emerge from the interviews was the tension felt by some of the 
journalists between how they understand their role as a journalist, their personal 
political views on North Korea, and how they would be viewed by others in the 
industry and their audience for telling certain stories. Power commented there were 
times he wanted to tell certain stories about North Korea that did not necessarily 
paint the regime and leadership of the country in a negative light, but he was worried 
he would be viewed as a “shill for Kim Jong-un” (Power, 2017).  This led to him 
making tough decisions to kill off a story and to self-censor. Power said, as a 
freelance journalist covering both North Korea and South Korea, being cast as a 
cheerleader for the North Korea could impact his capacity to sell and publish his 
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work. Self-censoring as a mechanism of meeting market demands was something 
common to all the freelancers interviewed as part of this study, with the exception of 
Kirk. Kirk was reluctant to be drawn into a conversation about the role of the 
journalist in covering North Korea but did divulge favourite sources of information on 
the topic hailed from conservative think tanks in Washington DC. The implications for 
representation here are obvious. Not only do we see journalists being forced to write 
stories on the country that are tabloid in nature but we also see the rejection of 
stories that show a different face to North Korea other than the bizarre.  
 
Stephen Evans, the BBC bureau chief in Seoul, was clear on how he understood his 
role as a journalist covering North Korea. Evans said: “My aim is to report it as I think 
it is. We give them (the audience) the information and they make sense of it” (2016). 
More or less the same definition of the journalist’s role in covering North Korea was 
offered by O’Carroll, Pearson, Gale (The Wall Street Journal), Fifield, Jean Lee 
(Associated Press), Lee Tae-hoon, McCurry (The Guardian), Choe, and York 
(freelance – formally Korea Herald, NK News). The revealing part of the Evans quote 
on reporting lies in where he places emphasis. For Evans this means reconciling 
what he wants to report with what he thinks will make his story appealing to the 
reader and his editorial superiors. Evans said: “You can’t just say, ‘Look, they have 
solar panels too. That’s interesting.’ If you are going to get your piece out, you also 
have to say, ‘This is a regime where nobody chose the leader’” (2016). Evans says 
he believes North Korea to be the most depressing place on the planet and, “Kim 
Jong-un is an unmitigated bad thing and North Korea is nothing more than a 
gangster state,” (2016). He said that while these views are present in his reporting, 
he takes the view that North Korea is a complex place to report on and things are 
changing. So, to report on the country, a reporter needs intelligence and nuance.  
 
Evans takes issue with what he terms the “American approach to North Korea”. He 
says the American approach is one-dimensional and centred around flawed 
conceptions of human rights. Evans says the American approach does nothing to 
further an audience’s understanding of North Korea. He says through the American 
media lens North Korea is nothing but, “’Evil. It’s evil. There’s nothing changing. 
There’s nothing to be said for it. The only way you can report is how evil it is.’” For 
Evans this forms the point of difference between what he views as the British 
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approach and American approach to reporting North Korea which he neatly sees as 
“substance versus colour”.  
 
Pearson also commented on perceived differences in British and American 
journalism, saying: 
 
As a child listening to the World Service hearing distant datelines and bylines 
got me interested in being a foreign correspondent and using observations to 
tell a bigger story. For me that is the cornerstone of good journalism. You see 
the opposite in American journalism where there is a lot of colour but not 
much detail. (2016)  
 
Both Evans and Pearson said it is possible to move beyond the binary dove/hawk 
approach to reporting North Korea through a creative approach grounded in the 
basics of good journalism to write better, more informed news on North Korea, but:  
 
If you want to get on the ten o’clock news you need to be producing a piece 
where people go “wow” including within the organisation and there is a conflict 
there between popular journalism and what was called broadsheet journalism. 
If you want to get ahead of the Daily Mail you need to come up with 
something with impact. (Pearson, 2017) 
 
Not all of those interviewed felt the tension between the role of the journalist and 
what they are writing on North Korea. Joshua Stanton, for example, is 
unencumbered by any sense of journalistic objectiveness for as Stanton bluntly puts 
it, “I’m not a journalist,” (2016). This frees Stanton to use the media to promote and 
advocate for an approach in dealing with North Korea that can be best described as 
“hawkish”. The focus of Stanton’s journalism and advocacy is human rights abuses 
in North Korea. His opinion led journalism across a wide range of news outlets is a 
vehicle to promote his views. Freed from the shackles of any pretence of journalistic 
rules of fairness and balance, Stanton is able to pursue his agenda and attack those 
that do not fit his prescription for what news on North Korea should look like. As will 
be expanded on in a coming section, a favourite target for Stanton is Jean Lee, the 
founding bureau chief of Associated Press in Pyongyang. For Lee, the tension over 
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what a journalist should be and what she became came to define her work and her 
view of her place in the industry. Stanton sees Lee as a target because her 
journalism does not fit with how he sees North Korea being dealt with, but as 
Pearson said on the topic: 
 
Stanton has an extremely simplistic view of how journalism works. He doesn’t 
create the room to see how it works. He cries out for a free media in North 
Korea and yet is guilty of ignoring the nuance and biases in his own analysis. 
He does the same thing North Korea does when they reach certain 
conclusions. I think that can be intellectually dishonest, but I read what he 
writes, and I respect what he writes. (2016) 
 
Despite his professed respect for Stanton, Pearson also said Stanton fuels 
stereotypes of North Korea that, in keeping with Smith (2015), fuels the construction 
of North Korea as a caricature.  
 
The next section unpacks the North Korea stereotype from the perspective of those 
interviewed. 
 
6.4 The North Korea Stereotype 
 
Across the interviews a consensus emerged around stereotypical constructions and 
representations of North Korea in the Western news media. The exact nature of 
these representations differed from interviewee to interviewee but they can be 
uniformly categorised as bizarre. 
 
As founding bureau chief at Associated Press in Pyongyang, Jean Lee had spent 
more time in North Korea and with North Koreans than any of the other interviewees. 
This experience fuelled her commitment to challenging what she viewed as 
inaccurate and damaging representations of North Koreans. Lee said: 
 
What we see is images of North Koreans behaving in a mechanised robotic 
fashion. This strips them of their humanity. When you are on the ground you 
see them as human beings. I have a much more human view of who North 
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Koreans are than what you would get from just looking at their state media 
where you see them looking perfect and synchronised at all times. (2016) 
 
Lee, like Power, Fifield, Pearson, O’Carroll and York was clear on the pitfalls and 
difficulties of deviating from the “evil North Korea” narrative, representation, and 
framing. She said: 
 
Any time we had anything that was considered “soft” on North Korea it drew 
so much ire from critics. That is part of doing journalism on North Korea, and I 
think you have to overcompensate to deal with questions of your objectivity. 
It’s a complicated story, and we haven’t reached a point in our journalism on 
North Korea where we can have broader coverage. At this point it is basically 
entertainment, so that means painting North Korea as a comedy or it means 
being hard on North Korea. (2016) 
 
Issues of painting North Korea as comedy or inhuman came up time and again in the 
interviews. For Lee, as a woman who identifies as ethnic Korean, the easy portrayal 
of North Korea in such negative terms was part of wider issues of racism in the west. 
Lee said: 
 
One of things I find as an ethnic Korean disturbing is the constant barrage of 
negative stories on North Korea gives anyone with a hatred or racism towards 
Asians the grounds to be racist. It somehow feels that we have made it okay 
to paint North Korea as this evil country, and that has given racists the 
greenlight to unleash caricatures that wouldn’t be acceptable anywhere else. 
(2016) 
 
Power also expressed concerns about the inherent racism engendered in coverage 
of North Korea. Power was also well aware of the difficulty faced in combating such 
narratives. In answering the question of representation, Power said the focus was a 
tabloid construction of “Crazy Kim”. He reiterated the difficultly of directly countering 
what he termed the “evil dictator” angle or the narrative of the victim defector. Power 
argued there was wilful ignorance on the part of western media organisations and 
 168 
many of the foreign journalists covering North Korea as to the inherent logic 
exhibited on the part of the North Korean regime. Power said: 
 
For a general audience North Korea is not as crazy as it seems. It is quite 
rational and has a specific strategy that has worked amazingly well by any 
objective account. That is a big thing, and the tabloids are more prone to go 
with “Crazy Kim” and all that stuff. It’s not hard to see it seep into the more 
serious coverage because it is such a weird place. I do think Pearson does 
some very good work, but you do need to stand back and realise it is a very 
strange place. It’s not normal, but there is nothing to actually say the 
leadership of the place is as mentally deranged as our news tells us. (2016) 
 
Much like the bourgeois rational civilisation that defined the early part of the 20th 
century and led to the deaths of millions in World War One, the coverage of North 
Korea emphasises the inhumanity, irrationality, and otherness of the country. Smith 
(2015) is partially correct in arguing the media coverage of the country is a 
caricature. At issue here is caricature is to some extent rooted in truth and it is 
difficult to know how much truth, if any, informs media stereotypes on North Korea. 
Lankov (2016) goes further and argues there is a wilful ignorance in the coverage of 
North Korea in the Western media that is almost always driven by misplaced 
questions of human rights. Lankov said: 
 
I am not a believer in human rights. The human rights argument is a flawed. It 
perverts our understanding of the country …. There is a logic to the country 
that is missing in the Western media. The North Korean regime is more 
rational and predictable than we are shown in the American, British and 
Australian press. (2016) 
 
Shades of Lankov’s “North Korea is rational” argument come up in the Pearson, 
Fifield, Choe, Power, York, O’Carroll, Cain, and Gale interviews minus the outright 
rejection of human rights. At the other end of the spectrum from Lankov, McCurry 
was far more moderate in his criticism of Western coverage of North Korea, but was 
critical nonetheless. McCurry said: 
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The North Korea coverage is fairly one dimensional. You see the same words 
cropping up – secretive, impoverished, authoritarian, dictatorship, human 
rights, hunger, starvation, floods. In that sense we don’t do as good a job as 
we would like to in presenting a more rounded type of coverage of North 
Korea. Inevitably, something is always going to be missing from the Western 
media narrative on North Korea which is why I think it puts a few noses out of 
joint. (2016) 
 
6.4.1 Cannibal Journalism and Stereotypes 
 
A key finding to emerge with respect to the narrative around North Korea was a 
tendency for journalists reporting on the country to cannibalise material from a 
number of different news sources and repackage the disembodied components as a 
stereotypical final offering. These kinds of stories are “stereotypical” in that they 
conform to the view of North Korea outlined in the findings on the framing of North 
Korea in the previous chapter. The stereotypical view is one of a bizarre country 
where life conforms to the Hobbesian maxim of being “nasty, brutish and short” 
(Hobbes, 1651), with a leader that would be at home in the role of a Bond villain. It is 
the pressure “to feed the beast” for ‘click bait’ content and the 24-hour news cycle 
that leads journalists covering the country to “borrow” the bizarre elements of 
existing material to perpetuate a distinctive North Korean stereotype. None of this 
helped the “anything goes” representation that several of the interviewees 
characterised to reporting of North Korea. 
 
In Chapter Five, the use of North Korean state news publication -- The Rodong 
Shinmun -- copy and imagery was cited as an example of how journalists outside of 
North Korea use images of the country, its people and leader to illustrate stories on 
the country. Particularly useful for those looking for images is the “Supreme Leader’s 
Activities” page on The Rodong Shinbum website. The page features images of Kim 
Jong-un mainly traveling here and there, more often than not, surrounded by men, 
and very occasionally, women in military uniform, scientists, children and factory 
workers. The images paint an interesting portrait of North Korean life and provide 
fodder for other unrelated stories on North Korea that make it into the mainstream 
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Western press. For example, Kim Jong-un seems to make frequent visits to fish 
farms across the DPRK. Images from these visits often show him advising lab coat-
wearing scientists at the farms. These images are then used in stories about 
anything with a scientific edge, including stories on the production of weaponry or the 




(Image 6.1) Kim Jong-un inspects fry and fingerlings at Sinchang Fish Farm (KCNA, 
2019) 
 
What the interviews revealed was this practice of misrepresenting an image from the 
DPRK is not limited to images pulled from North Korean state media. According to 
Pearson and O’Carroll, the practice is widespread and targets other sources of 
information on North Korea, including Western sources. Pearson said that it is 
common practice for wire services to “bundle” different media around a story 
together and distribute them as packages. Pearson (2017) said problems arose 
when a single component of the package would be picked up by foreign news 
providers while others were neglected, leading to the story being stripped of context 
or a story being fabricated around a single image or video. Pearson offered the 
example of Dallae or Azalea, depending on which news source you read, the 
smoking chimp. Pearson (2016) said the story had made it onto the Associated 
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Press wire in October 2016 after a KCNA agent attached to the Pyongyang AP 
bureau had snapped pictures and video of a chimp smoking at Pyongyang Zoo. 
Pearson said the story had gone viral and in the process of doing so had become 
distorted. Pearson said: 
 
It was both interesting and depressing to watch the progress of the story. The 
original package supplied by AP was a few photos, a short video and some 
captions that really offered nothing more than the location and the time the 
photos were taken. It was the sort of thing that could end up on the back page 
of a metro or something like that. (2016) 
 
 
(Image 6.2) (Staff and agencies, 2016) 
 
Pearson chronicled the spread and the popularity of the story. He said in the few 
days after the story broke, less of the original AP package was used and more and 
more creative licence was taken on the part of journalists in London and New York 
newsrooms in telling the story. Pearson said, in the original package, there was no 
mention of the chimp maintaining “a pack a day” habit, being addicted to tobacco, or 
the consumption of tobacco products being a widespread problem for other animals 
in North Korea zoos. Yet, according to Pearson, all these details become central to 
the story as it found its way onto the pages of news providers across the world. 
Another more disturbing part of this story was the representation of North Korean 
people as callous, brutal and cruel, who had no qualms in feeding the primate’s habit 
and taking pleasure in the suffering of animals. These kinds of stories feed a 
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representation of North Koreans being something other than human. It fuels a vision 
of a people who lack basic humanity and are driven by a primal sense of selfish 
instant gratification not unlike the Big Brother household.  
 
For Pearson, when these kinds of stories appear with a wire service byline, they 
undermine their credibility and fan the flames of those who are critical of the work 
they do. Pearson highlights the contentious case of the Associated Press in 
Pyongyang. Leading the charge against the AP engagement in North Korea is 
Joshua Stanton. Stanton is passionate and often unrestrained in his condemnation 
of the North Korean leadership, their record on human rights, and attempts made by 
the media to paint North Korea as anything other than the vilest of states. Pearson 
said: 
 
What happens is the text and the images end up doing the rounds separate 
from each other and you get the likes of Stanton saying, “This is all they write 
about. They think this is a story.” So by the time something ends up on the 
internet, I’m making a lot of assumptions about why something was written 
and how it was written rather than just taking a picture and selling it. It makes 
it very difficult to trust what you are seeing. (2016) 
 
After the interview with Pearson, I tracked the emergence of the story across the 
internet. The first news outlets to break the story were the London tabloids with The 
Daily Mail breaking a story that clearly departed in style, context, content and truth 
from the original package. The New York Post followed with more or less the same 
story. There are no surprises in that but what followed was interesting. The longer 
the story persisted and the more traffic it saw and shares it received across the 
internet and social media, the more it started to bleed into the more serious 
broadsheet-oriented media. News organisations such as The Guardian and The 
Independent, The New York Times and The Times all published the story as 
presented by the tabloids, changing the style and adding sources including 
representatives from animal welfare and right organisations to add an air of 
indignation to their stories. Pearson said: 
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I’m always flabbergasted, no matter how highly the news organisation is 
regarded, that when it comes to North Korea many journalists throw their 
standards out the window. This has to do with journalists thinking North Korea 
is odd and doesn’t qualify as a real news story. With North Korea, the 
standards get lowered. At this level, the distortion is the story and vice versa. 
(2016) 
 
Pearson said that even in working for a wire service, the pressure to be across all 
stories breaking on North Korea was immense whether those stories were true or not 
and under those conditions anything can become a story. He said that if something 
on North Korea was trending on Twitter or Facebook there was an expectation that 
he or one of his colleagues in the Seoul bureau would cover the story. He said there 
was always pressure from editors to meet and conform to what everybody else was 
covering if those stories were doing well on social media regardless of whether the 
story was based on reality or not.  
 
Pearson went on to say that, as a wire service journalist, there was nothing he could 
do to rectify the misuse or distortion of his work in London or New York. He said 
once a story had gone out on social media it took on a life of its own and this was 
compounded by news organisations reproducing stories and feeding off one another 
in an effort to keep up with what was trending. For Pearson, issues in the distortion 
of North Korea and North Koreans were exacerbated by the South Korean news 
media. Pearson said: 
 
We have (local) news organisations in Seoul that we are suspicious of but 
give more credence to than others because they are politically centrist. We 
will look at who the journalist is. We offer all the usual health warnings – we 
can’t independently verify this etc. The next day you see it in the UK press 
and it has turned into its own beast. There is really nothing that can be done 
about that. I have had my own stories, not pick-ups, and they have gone out 
there and they have been reinterpreted or misinterpreted and become their 




The next section looks at the impact the South Korean news media have on how 
North Korea is presented in the Western news media. 
 
6.5 South of the Border – South Korean Sources on North Korea 
 
South Korean sources for news are key to the popular construction of North Korea. 
Given most journalists reporting on North Korea are based in Seoul, this is 
unsurprising. South Korean Government agencies and the mainstream news media 
are prolific in the quantity of stories they produce in both Korean and English for local 
and foreign sources alike. This makes government and media in South Korea an 
attractive place for foreign journalists and news organisations to go and feed the 
beast for the market for news on North Korea. 
 
This section looks at the issues of the uncritical use of information and stories 
coming out of government and the mainstream news media in South Korea in 
reporting on North Korea.  
 
The interviews that inform this chapter took place as conservative South Korean 
president, Park Geun-hye, was waiting on a decision from the South Korean 
constitutional court that would eventually see her impeached and imprisoned. Like 
other conservative administrations before her, her government was hostile to North 
Korea. Her policies on the north were mirrored, and sometimes amplified, in the 
coverage of North Korea in mainstream news media which, by definition, holds 
conservative views in respect to North Korean engagement. Factually dubious 
stories leaked into the South Korean press by agencies including the South Korean 
military, intelligence and spy agencies are then published across the pages of the 
Western media. This phenomenon emerged as a key determinant in the framing and 
construction of North Korea in the Western news media, according to the 






6.5.1 Learning to Read South Korean News 
 
Without exception, the interviewees were knowledgeable of both North Korea and 
South Korea. Not all can speak Korean but all had an appreciation of the 
complexities of South Korean politics and relations with North Korea. For the most 
part, this made them sceptical of many of the stories emanating from the South 
Korean government and mainstream media. According to the interviewees, this 
scepticism was not always shared by journalists outside of the region, those lacking 
an appreciation of nuanced complexity of Korean politics, society and history, and 
inexperienced and overburdened journalists. Issues around under-educated and 
under-skilled journalists feeding the market for news on the Koreas represent a 
theme that came up repeatedly during the interviews. More concerning is the way 
their content distorts the construction of both Koreas and conforms to the ideology 
and political bent of third parties.   
 
For Jean Lee, the overreliance on the South Korean news organisations by foreign 
journalists residing in the South was a problem of skills and resourcing. She argued 
that many of the foreign crowd reporting from the peninsula lacked the basic skills to 
effectively work as a journalist in the Korean setting, and, as such found themselves 
relying on what was being reported in the South Korean media in order to do their 
jobs. She said that without proper language training, an in-depth knowledge of the 
history and culture of the Koreas, and an understanding of not only the political 
orientation of the different facets of the South Korean news industry, journalists 
reporting on North Korea with a reliance on South Korean news were prone to 
distortions in their stories that were consistent with South Korean conservative views 
on North Korea.  
 
She also expressed concern over a lack of awareness in the differences and the 
failings of the practice of journalists in South Korea. Lee said South Korean domestic 
journalism maintained very low standards and was plagued by issues of sourcing 
and attribution whereby much of what was coming out of the South Korean 
mainstream press on North Korea was informed by a single anonymous source. She 
said the standards for South Korean news are far below those of any western 
country, and this was a concern because of the premium placed on stories 
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appearing in the big Seoul dailies on North Korea by foreign journalists and news 
organisations. She placed the blame for this phenomenon squarely on the 
competitive nature of the market for news on North Korea and the desperation to get 
“something” out. She said stories on North Korea coming from South Korea tended 
to be underpinned by dubious, nebulous or anonymous sources, and “seek to disrupt 
rather than inform” (J. Lee, 2016). Here, she was making reference to South Korean 
conservatives’ desire to drive a wedge between the Koreas and attempts at 
engagement. Choe, Choi, Fifield, Gale, Pearson, Power and O’Carroll and York all 
expressed concern over journalistic standards in South Korea. Jean Lee said: 
 
Because they know very little about North Korea, many of the foreign 
correspondents rely on the South Korean media to give them guidance on 
what’s happening in the country. South Korean media have very different 
standards than we do in the western media. (2016) 
 
Jean Lee and Choe Sung-hun emphasised the driving force behind foreign news 
organisations picking up dubious unattributed stories was a fundamental ignorance 
in understanding the nature of the South Korean press. In an article he wrote for 
Korea Expose (Koo, 2017b), Editor-in-Chief, Koo Se-woong, said the reporting of 
innuendo and rumour in the South Korean media was endemic and was harnessed 
as a cynical force to create “fake news” against those who fall foul of big media, their 
stakeholders, and their interests. In his article, Koo termed the proliferation of rumour 
throughout the South Korean news media hadeora. Koo defines hadeora as: 
 
…a verb meaning “it is said that….” This particular way of phrasing something 
is a cop-out, though. It conveys information without taking ownership of the 
fact. And given that Korean verbs do not require a subject, it is not clear most 
of the time whom the information is from. (Koo, 2017b) 
 
In the case of news, Koo argues hadeora used as a suffix in a sentence indicates the 
preceding statement is hearsay. Despite this, or because of this, Koo argued with 
these kinds of stories as they appear in South Korean news, there was far greater 
emphasis placed on the allegation rather than the fact. Koo said, “Ask who the 
source is, and the person is likely to say, ‘I don’t know, I heard it somewhere.’ 
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Whether a family member, a friend or the mother of one’s child’s classmate, that 
someone can end up not being very authoritative at all” (2017a). Koo said the 
practice of publishing rumour and innuendo is so widespread in mainstream South 
Korean news organisations that local people have termed the industry Kadeora 
Tongsin which translates to “So and So News Agency” because, as Koo argues, 
none of them can be trusted. He says this has resulted in South Korea’s very own 
style of fake news. He said: “Dubious, sensational, and without discernible origin, 
fake news and alternative facts have found the perfect breeding ground on the 
Internet, accessible to anyone with a smartphone or a computer.” For Koo, rumours 
thrive in South Korea because there is little trust in authority, so people turn inward 
to their networks for news, networks that are fuelled by hadeora and Kadeora 
Tongsin.  
 
Given this background, for foreign journalists reporting on North Korea using South 
Korean media as primary sources of news would seem fraught and something to be 
treated with healthy scepticism but, as the interviews revealed, all too often if a story 
on the North breaks in the South Korean media, that is enough for it to make it into 
the international news outlets. Again, the structured inaccuracies that are built into 
and sustained through the practice of South Korean journalists are well documented 
(Sa, 2014, 2016). The interviewees who commented on this phenomenon said they 
were all aware of instances where stories presented as rumour or based on the 
comment of opaque or anonymous sources had made it through mainstream 
western media as authoritative and reliable news on North Korea. For example, 
Choe said: 
 
I have seen this happening very often. If Chosun Ilbo reports using an 
anonymous source, by the time it is picked up by some British newspaper the 
lead paragraph is stated as a fact – “Kim Jong-un did this…” and several 
paragraphs later the reporter who wrote this will reveal the story was based 
upon a story in a South Korean newspaper based on one anonymous source. 
I see this happening again and again. The story is a pickup from a South 
Korean newspaper story but they don’t say it’s a pick up. Or somewhere in the 
middle of the piece they will say, “This is actually based on a story from story 
on a South Korean cable channel based on anonymous sources.” They do 
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that because it’s safe to do that. You don’t get a law suit or complaints from 
the North Korean government, and you are not going to be challenged by 
other reporters. (2016) 
 
All of this is compounded by a mainstream media in South Korea that is 
conservative, meaning there is little or no appetite to present North Korea and the 
North Korean people as anything other than a threat to South Korean, regional and 
global security, and a media that is in most cases controlled by governmental and/or 
chaebol interests. Chaebol are the large South Korean companies that dominate the 
South Korean corporate landscape and economy. They include Samsung, LG, and 
Hyundai. These factors combined should create scepticism over the use of 
anonymous sources in South Korean news stories on North Korea that is not always 
present. 
 
For Lee, questions around hadeora, or “the very low standards of attribution” in the 
South Korean media was a key issue in the reporting of North Korea in the west. Lee 
was concerned by this because often, “… these stories get a lot of play …” and, like 
Pearson, Lee said there was pressure and a compulsion to pick up these stories. 
Lee said in many cases, the viral nature of a story saw it find widespread coverage, 
but she was active in trying to maintain standards. Lee said:  
 
I had strict standards as an AP bureau chief in Seoul, and we didn’t go with 
every story on North Korea. I was criticised for pulling punches but my policy 
was to not soft-peddle North Korea. Rather, we applied the same standards to 
North Korea that we would to any other country. The standards have dropped 
when it comes to North Korea and that’s universal. Journalists don’t try hard 
enough to confirm information, and just saying “it can’t be confirmed” 




There’s dishonesty in the way we cover North Korea because there is no time 
nor money to chase up decent sources unless the story is huge. Who has the 
time or the resources to really dig deep and do decent journalism? At the end 
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of the day, do you want to be the person to discredit a rape or torture victim? 
The appealing and morally satisfying narrative is the one with death, despair 
and agony. Who wants to be the guy who undoes that? (2016) 
 
Choe (2016) said with so much of news on North Korea being written outside of 
Northeast Asia, it was hardly surprising there would be a tendency for those writing 
from outside of the region to be uninformed on the topic and to go for “the low 
hanging fruit” in terms where they were getting their story ideas and leads or simply 
repackaging the original South Korean story and calling it their own. 
 
Choe said these kinds of stories can start as tabloid stories in the morning and, 
provided the story was doing well on Twitter and Facebook, by the afternoon the 
story would be everywhere. Choe said these stories are usually sensational and 
focus on the more bizarre aspects of the North Korean leadership and the North 
Korean people. For Choe, the typical cycle for a story of this nature is as follows: 
 
A British tabloid does a story on Kim Jong-un. It’s based on a South Korean 
newspaper report which is based on a single anonymous source. I look at it 
and say “that’s interesting”. But you never know if this is true or not. It’s 
probably made up. So you ignore it. But in the back of your mind I know I’m 
going to get a phone call from an editor in New York – “There’s an interesting 
story in the Daily Telegraph that is going wild on Twitter and Facebook” – that 
happens to a lot of foreign reporters based in Seoul. Anything goes when it 
comes to North Korea. (2016) 
 
Choe (2016) said none of this helped in informing his audience on the reality of North 
Korea, and for him that caused an ongoing tension between the representation of 
North Korea and what he saw as his role as a journalist covering the area as 
someone who speaks the language, many years of experience on the topic, and 
understands the logic and ideological underpinnings of the regime. 
 
Power (2017) attributed the persistent use of unreliable South Korean news media in 
reporting North Korea to the economics of doing the job. He said he had seen 
innumerable instances where a story that was clearly false had been published in the 
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South Korean press and then picked up by foreign news organisations for 
consumption beyond the Korean Peninsula. For Power, as a freelance journalist, this 
was annoying but there was little or no financial incentive to do anything about it 
because filing stories ‘about poor journalism’ “doesn’t pay the rent” (2017). Power 
went on to give several examples of instances where clearly factually loose stories 
had filtered through from the South Korean media to the Western media without 
questions over the veracity of the stories being raised. Power said: 
 
There was a North Korean defector in Denmark supposedly attacked by North 
Korean agents outside his asylum camp or whatever. They tried to strangle 
him to death – really dramatic. That was picked up all over the place. A few 
weeks go by and I think “hmmm I wonder what happened to that guy?” I rang 
the prosecutor in Denmark and he said the case had been dropped because 
there was no evidence it happened.  
 
Then there was the guy who supposedly went to Finland with a hard drive of 
biological weapons. Another great story. And that was from was from 
someone big – Chosun or Yonhap. He was supposed to go to the EU and 
again I sent an email to the EU and replied “no”, “we don’t know of anyone 
like that.” It is not difficult to see there are issues here. (2017) 
 
Yonhap is the major Korean wire service. In the interviews with Power, Gale and 
O’Carroll, the news agency was referred to as a prime source of some of the more 
unreliable and biased news on North Korea coming from South Korea. Gale (2017) 
said this was because they are a mouthpiece for the South Korean right. He said: 
“They're partly funded by the government and mandated by the National Assembly 
to promote South Korea. What did you expect?” O’Carroll (2016) went further to say 
their coverage of North Korea was not improving: “There is literally no data to back 
up many of their headlines. It seems they are in the business of making egregious 
'journalistic' claims. As someone that has read Yonhap material for many years now, 
I can safely say the material is at its worst in years.” 
 
Power, who worked as a staff writer for Yonhap, said the wire service’s news culture 
did not include an emphasis on accuracy. For Power, the issues with Yonhap’s 
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coverage did not stem from a deep-seated desire on the part of Yonhap and their 
government masters to control or manipulate the narrative but more of a culture of 
laziness and lassitude within the organisation. This resulted in the repetition of a 
narrative that suited the government of the day because it painted North Korea as 
both comical and terrifying. Power said he had little agency in how he presented 
North Korea in his work at Yonhap. He said: “If you make substantial changes to 
copy, you are just seen as an annoyance. They have a very high turnover of foreign 
staff,” (2017). 
 
6.6 Outside Influences and Third Parties 
 
O’Carroll (2017) identifies a nexus between conservative elements in Seoul and 
Washington as a key influence in the framing of North Korea. O’Carroll said 
conservative governmental and non-governmental groups in Washington DC had 
been active in flying groups of South Korean journalists to the US with the express 
intent of sharing information ahead of news embargos to sway the coverage of North 
Korea in South Korea. Those stories were picked up and published by leading 
conservative South Korean news agencies and then in turn picked up by foreign 
news organisations. For O’Carroll, this was clear evidence of outside stakeholders 
taking control of the news agenda. O’Carroll said things were made worse by foreign 
news agencies looking to reach daily quotas of news on North Korea taking anything 
on the country no matter how thin a story may be. It is interesting to note at this point 
Pearson was critical of O’Carroll for the same reasons. Pearson said, “There is 
always pressure from editors. My partner at NK News wanted to get a paper out 
every day. That made the bar low for what is a story. With that kind of policy you run 
the risk of anything becoming a story.” 
 
O’Carroll’s concern with a congested feed of news on North Korea was about the 
deteriorating quality of the content. O’Carroll said the competition for news on North 
Korea was so great that wire services in particular would cover anything and 
everything on North Korea in the hope that something would get traction in the 




They have someone dedicated to Korea now and she writes six, sometimes 
seven, articles a day. It’s a straight pick up from the South Korean media 
often with dubious sources and some very sloppy rewriting. What is troubling 
is some academics and people I respect then use that to pin their analysis to. 
 
You might have a case where a single source story is put out by Radio Free 
Asia (RFA) and then that piece is picked up by the Chosun Ilbo and then UPI 
pick that up. So it’s gone through three or four layers of repackaging and this 
has an impact on the quality of the story. This is problematic when people like 
Joshua Stanton or Stephan Haggard at the Petersen Institute for International 
Economics (PIIE) write a blog post about that and then really start to enter the 
North Korea watchers community. (2017) 
 
O’Carroll makes an interesting observation here. Within the journalist community 
covering North Korea, there is widespread reliance on pundits to provide legitimacy 
and authoritative voices to stories on North Korea. Pundits on North Korea are 
subject to the same issues of access to information on North Korea as anyone, 
journalists included. Gale said there needed to be greater scepticism around the use 
and inclusion of pundits on the part of journalists because pundits had a habit of 
seeing things that were not there and tended toward the hyperbolic. Choe said about 
pundits: 
 
When it comes to North Korea, South Korea is a very divided country. When 
you talk to pundits or college professors you need to understand whether that 
person belongs to the progressive camp or the conservative camp. Pundits 
have strong opinions and rarely do they change those opinions. That is how 
pundits are. (2016) 
 
Under these conditions the pundits relying on factually compromised and false news 
that goes through the packaging and repackaging as O’Carroll describes it is clearly 
problematic, and only serves to perpetuate an echo chamber as it applies to news on 




6.7 Reporting from North Korea – Challenges and difficulties 
 
6.7.1 A Question of Access? 
 
Access, or lack thereof, defines the coverage of North Korea. Lack of regular and 
free access to the country and sources within North Korea has created a vacuum in 
accountability in the stories many tell about the country. The result has been 
attention grabbing rumour, innuendo or falsity, or what is trending on Twitter, 
Facebook or being discussed on Reddit becomes fodder in the race to report on 
North Korea. Yet, none of this means there are no international journalists on the 
ground in North Korea.  
In the past decade, particularly after the effects of the Arduous March (the North 
Korean famine of the 1990s and early 2000s) have faded into history, there is a 
growing legion of fly in fly out or “parachute journalists” (Erickson & John, 2006). 
Most of the non-South Korean journalists interviewed as part of this study had been 
to North Korea although most questioned the effectiveness of such trips. For 
example, Fifield (2016) said the restrictive nature of what could be covered in the 
country made journalistic trips to North Korea an exercise in diminishing returns. She 
said once you had visited Kim Il-sung Square, visited the towering bronze statues of 
Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il, marvelled at the traffic free streets, taken in a 
synchronised gymnastics event, and unsuccessfully tried to evade your minders, 
handlers and those charged with making sure you see only the preordained, there 
was not a lot of benefit reporting from North Korea. Better, she said, was to spend 
time north of the North Korea border in China talking to recent defectors and 
Chinese truck drivers who ply the cross-border trade routes if you were looking for a 
less managed view of what was happening within North Korea. Pearson and Power 
made the same observation. In addition, Fifield said in her opinion visas to visit the 
country were contingent on how a journalist covered the country in their everyday 
rounds. For Fifield, the prospect of a North Korean visa was not enough to have her 
alter her approach to covering North Korea. Gale, Evans, and Kirk all said the 
potential for getting visas to go on these kinds of media trips to the DPRK often 
rested on the tone of their work on North Korea. All three said they put their freedom 
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and integrity as journalists over visa considerations and would be happy to forsake a 
trip to Pyongyang over any compulsion to sanitise their coverage of North Korea.  
For those who did make the trip, there was a sense of futility in reporting from 
Pyongyang. At the time of the interview, North Korea had just celebrated the 70th 
anniversary of the founding of the Workers’ Party of Korea and the 7th Party 
Congress a few months earlier. On both occasions, the North Korean Government 
had invited a large contingent of foreign media. On neither occasion were the foreign 
media allowed to attend the actual proceedings. In the case of the 7th Party 
Congress, the foreign media contingent was cloistered outside across the road from 
the building that hosted the congress. The foreign media were relegated to the level 
of Dickensian waifs with their faces pressed up against the curtained windows of the 
North Korean elite. In the absence of anything to report, the foreign press corps 
started reporting on themselves. Both Evans and Pearson were critical of this. 
Evans’ criticism was based on the ethics of the journalist becoming the story.  
For Pearson, the issue was one of wasted opportunity. Across the course of the 
interviews, Pearson was widely viewed as the most talented and enterprising 
journalist covering North Korea. Pearson has built a reputation for finding stories on 
the country where others cannot. For example, during the 7th Party Congress, while 
many of the other foreign contingents were reporting on themselves and their 
Pyongyang experiences, Pearson was able to separate himself from the pack and, 
along with his minders, head into some of Pyongyang’s more trendy areas and walk 
about. During this walk, Pearson observed young mothers from the Pyongyang elite 
using a specific brand of French baby carrier. These baby carriers were new, and as 
it was later revealed, readily purchased at one of Pyongyang’s government-owned 
department stores. As a fluent speaker of Korean, Pearson was able to talk to the 
mothers. After returning to Seoul, Pearson was able to trace the supply of these 
baby carriers to an importer in China who was then transhipping them by truck into 
North Korea. This is important because during this period the European Union was a 
signatory to United Nations sanctions on North Korea, and the presence of this 
particular brand of baby carrier on the streets of Pyongyang was evidence of 
sanctions being flouted. Pearson was able to find this story because he is daring, a 
student of Korean culture, language and economy, and he puts accurate and 
meaningful journalism ahead of himself.  
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In covering North Korea, the notion a journalist can simply go there and cover the 
country the way you would any other place is hubris (Fifield, 2019a; Tudor & 
Pearson, 2015). In the event journalists are granted access to the country, access is 
conditional. It is no secret that those who have the opportunity to report from North 
Korea do so under conditions that are far from ideal. In saying this, with some 
journalistic skill and the power of basic observation, Pearson (2016) demonstrates it 
is possible to tell meaningful stories on North Korea; however, it remains to be seen 
whether he will be invited back. 
 
6.8 Associated Press in Pyongyang 
 
Alongside the growing presence of non-permanent international journalists in North 
Korea, there has been a growing presence of international wire services in 
Pyongyang. Associated Press (AP) opened its first news bureau in Pyongyang in 
2012. In 2016 Agence France-Presse (AFP) followed suit. While Associated Press 
was hardly the first foreign news bureau in Pyongyang (China’s Xinhua News 
Agency, Russia’s ITAR-TASS News Agency and Japan’s Kyodo News Agency have 
all maintained a presence in Pyongyang for many years), both AFP and AP have 
been controversial additions to Pyongyang’s foreign news gallery.  
 
In the context of this study the Associated Press bureau in Pyongyang matters not 
only because they are a news agency in Pyongyang but also because the arguments 
around the existence of the bureau reflect the broader arguments in international 
relations and foreign policy studies about how to deal with North Korea. For a more 
detailed overview of this argument, refer to Chubb and Yeo (2019). The argument 
around AP in Pyongyang becomes the site of an ideological struggle between those 
who believe the best approach to dealing with North Korea is through engagement 
and those who believe North Korea should be isolated and starved of outside 
resources and trade through the imposition of sanctions. 
 
These two approaches are best exemplified by Jean Lee and Joshua Stanton who 
both blur the lines between policy, punditry, and journalism, and this forms the crux 
of the coming analysis.  
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While none of the interviewees said the existence of an AP bureau in Pyongyang 
had a demonstrable impact on the way they practiced covering North Korea, the 
presence and role of Associated Press in Pyongyang was a divisive issue among 
them. When talking to participants about AP in Pyongyang, the dialogue revolved 
around two central themes: whether AP in Pyongyang can actually practice 
journalism in Pyongyang; and the broader political implications of maintaining a 
presence in North Korea. The final concern, like the coming discussion on role of 
defectors and defector testimony in reporting North Korea, revealed the interviewees’ 
political stance in relation to engagement with North Korea.  
 
6.8.1 The Value of a Pyongyang Bureau 
 
All of those who spoke on the issues of the AP and AFP presence in Pyongyang saw 
these bureaus as unique in that they could not function as any normal bureau in any 
other country could. However, these idiosyncrasies did not dampen enthusiasm for 
maintaining the likes of AP in Pyongyang. The question then became, “what’s the 
point of maintaining wire services in Pyongyang?” For Lankov, Kirk, York, Pearson, 
Fifield, Choe, Cain, and Jean Lee the answer to the question lay in simply being 
there. That does not mean they are satisfied with the coverage offered by AP 
Pyongyang, but they did believe there was a place for news bureaus even under the 
most draconian of settings. Pearson represented a pragmatic idealism in making a 
case for AP staying in Pyongyang. He said: 
 
We absolutely need to be there. The point of the foreign correspondent is to 
go into the fire and cover things. If you are not doing this, especially on the 
grounds of principle, then that is just bollocks. Your job is to report what is 
happening on the ground. Living by these big puritanical principles is 
completely unhelpful when it comes to doing your job as a journalist. 
(Pearson, 2017) 
 
The “big puritanical principles” Pearson refers to here will be explored in the coming 
section when the ideological battle characterised by the difference in opinion 
between Stanton and Lee is discussed.   
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Both Fifield and McCurry recognised coverage from bureaus within North Korea 
makes up a small part of the mosaic that comprises the coverage of North Korea. 
Fifield said: “It’s similar to journalists embedding with the US forces in the war in Iraq. 
If that is the entirety of your coverage of the war then that is a problem” (2016). 
Fifield put an onus on there being a diversity of sources of news on North Korea, 
even if that diversity results in questionable stories being published. “With all news 
on North Korea you need to have a keen bullshit detector, and what comes out of AP 
Pyongyang is no different” (2016). Fifield makes a good point – there is more than 
one source of news on North Korea. 
 
For the others, it was important to have a foreign media presence in the country in 
preparation for the collapse of the Kim regime. Both Lankov and York emphasised 
the benefits of AP having a presence in Berlin during Nazi rule and downfall, and 
said the same could occur with the eventual downfall of North Korea. In his very 
direct fashion, Lankov described AP in Pyongyang as a “fake operation”, but he said 
that mattered little. He said: 
 
At AP all the North Korean staff are security officials. They get their salary 
through the North Korean intelligence service. It’s still not a problem. 
Presence on the ground is more important than not being there if and when 
things start to change. The AP chief of staff is a former intelligence colonel. 
He is smart, and he will be useful if change happens. The more foreign media 
on the ground the better even if they have not had access to stories of any 
substance for half a century. (2016) 
 
Choe and Cain made similar remarks about being on the ground if, and when, 
change comes.  
 
For Kirk, under the current conditions there was not a lot of point in foreign news 
agencies operating in North Korea, and he said Stanton’s characterisation of AP’s 
activities in North Korea as “Associated Propaganda”, while playful, was not 
altogether an inaccurate lens through which to view AP’s activities in North Korea. 
Despite this, Kirk was not particularly negative about the AP and AFP maintaining a 
presence in the north. Kirk said: 
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I think it would be a mistake for AFP and AP to shut down their bureaus. If 
another Korean War should break out they will be right on the scene. You 
know the old adage, “In the land of the blind the one-eyed man is king.” I think 
their bureaus are open to a lot of criticism, but I would not say they should not 
have those bureaus (2016).         
 
There was a general acceptance that AP Pyongyang is under the control of the 
North Korean Government. The exact degree of control and what that means to the 
big issues facing North Korea’s engagement with the outside world is the focus of 
the third point. Among the interviewees there was little argument the coverage of 
North Korea that emanated and emanates from the Pyongyang AP bureau lacks 
accuracy and balance.  At best, the content lacks a critical perspective on the DPRK 
and at worst it is nothing more than propaganda for the powers in Pyongyang. Kirk 
described much of Lee’s coverage of North Korea in her time as bureau chief in 
Pyongyang as nothing more than “happy talk”. Kirk said, “It was too perky and cliché 
featured which didn’t reveal what was going on there,” (2016). This was a common 
criticism. Gale, for example, questioned how many stories on the Pyongyang 
dolphinarium and exhibitions of portraits of Kim Il-sung and his progeny were too 
many (there was one such story feature in the last chapter), in reference to the kind 
of coverage he sees from Associated Press wire in Pyongyang. There was also a lot 
said on who was more effective in the role of bureau chief in Pyongyang - Jean Lee 
or her successor, the late Eric Talmadge? While the answers to these kinds of 
questions can titillate, they do nothing to answer the big question to emerge -- to 
what degree is AP Pyongyang controlled or guided by the North Korean authorities? 
Again, with the exception of Stanton, the interviewees agreed it was better to 






6.8.2 ‘Boots on the Ground’ or ‘Associated Propaganda’? 
 
At the vanguard of the attacks on Lee and her former role as Associated Press 
Pyongyang Bureau Chief is Stanton. His hawkish views on the approach the 
international community should take with North Korea forms the basis of his 
ideological approach and opinions on AP engagement in the country.  
 
Stanton’s attack on AP in Pyongyang has come at a number of levels. Like many of 
the others interviewed as part of this study he has been less than impressed by the 
coverage coming from AP in North Korea. Across his blog, in news articles and in his 
interview as part of this study, he cites numerous occasions where the AP team in 
Pyongyang has been left wanting because of missed and soft stories. Stanton said: 
 
It is disturbing what AP has not covered. There was the hotel fire. There was 
the building collapse not long ago. And in 2012 there were rumours of a 
famine not 20 minutes drive from the bureau office. There have been rumours 
of purges and the health scares of Kim Jong-un. The AP has given us no 
elucidation about the truth of these things. (2016) 
 
Stanton follows with one of the one-liners he is famous for in North Korean watching 
circles: 
 
AP in North Korea has told us nothing newsworthy that is exclusive and 
nothing exclusive that is newsworthy. (2016) 
 
Stanton’s attack on AP, and more recently AFP, in North Korea rests on the notion 
that foreign news services in North Korea are not and can never be independent of 
the North Korean authorities, and are, therefore, rendered useless as providers of 
news. In that light, they become instruments of the North Korean propaganda 
machine. 
 
While Stanton’s ‘propaganda’ thesis in relation to AP’s presence in North Korea may 
seem extreme, his position is not without precedent. In 2016 German academic, 
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Harriet Scharnberg, caused a firestorm within the international news media and 
journalism academia after publishing Das A und P der Propaganda Associated Press 
und die nationalsozialistische Bildpublizistik (The A and P of Propaganda: 
Associated Press and Nazi Photojournalism) (Scharnberg, 2016). Scharnberg 
argues AP went along willingly with the Nazi regime in order to maintain a bureau in 
the German capital in the years leading up to World War Two. Scharnberg goes 
further, arguing the AP were important to overseas Nazi propaganda. Scharnberg 
said:  
In 1935 the ability of all Anglo-American picture agencies to report from and 
about Germany was drastically restricted. The Deutsches Nachrichtenburo 
purchased the Berlin branch of Keystone View Inc. in 1935, and Wide World 
Photo closed its Berlin GmbH, or limited liability company, in the same year. 
The third large news picture agency, Associated Press, chose not to close its 
Berlin subsidiary. Instead it accepted the Editors’ Law, thus ceding 
considerable influence over the production of its news pictures to the Ministry 
of Propaganda both in terms of staff and the content of the images 
themselves (p.27). 
The AP was the only foreign news service to maintain a fulltime presence in Berlin 
after ceding all editorial control under the Schriftleitergesetz (Editor’s Law) in 1935. 
This included terminating the employment of six staff deemed Jewish by Hitler’s 
administration (Oltermann, 2016; Scharnberg, 2016). In 2017, AP published a 
lengthy report defending their decision to continue reporting from Berlin during the 
run up to and the duration of World War Two, likening themselves to the world of the 
US Marine Corps – they are always the last to leave (Victor, 2017). There were two 
distinct periods between 1931 and 1945 that characterised AP’s activities and 
involvement in Nazi Germany demarcated by America’s entry into World War Two in 
1941. From 1933 – 1941, American AP staff were able to operate in Nazi Germany 
subject to restrictions on movement and censorship. After the United States declared 
war on Axis Japan in the wake of the Japanese bombing raids on Pearl Habour, the 
five American AP staff working in Germany were imprisoned to be freed in a prison 
exchange the following year. What remained of AP’s staff and operations in 
Germany were absorbed into the Waffen SS. In 1942 the German government 
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entered into an agreement with AP in neutral Portugal to distribute and disseminate 
photos produced by the remnants of the AP within the Waffen SS.   
In defending their involvement with Nazi Germany in different capacities from 1933 
to 1941, Associated Press says: 
AP covers the world, which includes dictatorships and democracies, countries 
at war and countries at peace. This means AP journalists need to cover 
authoritarian governments and undemocratic political movements from within 
borders that these regimes control. This was the struggle of the Berlin bureau 
in the years 1933–41. This review of the historical data leads to the 
conclusion that AP succeeded in its journalistic mission in spite of the turmoil 
of the period and the enormous pressures the AP staff faced. (Associated 
Press, 2017) 
Certainly, it is unfair to judge AP by the discursive standards of another age. 
However, whether AP see themselves as the metaphorical Marines of journalism or 
not, the fact remains they cooperated and colluded with an odious regime that saw 
them as a vehicle for spreading propaganda to the rest of the world (Berlin, 2016; 
Wiseman, 2017).  
In both cases AP has willingly entered into contracts with despotic governments. In 
both cases AP has allowed themselves to become manipulated to the point the 
independence of their editorial policy in relation to these countries has been called 
into question. Against this backdrop, Stanton’s charges that the “P” in AP having 
more in common with propaganda than “press” could be sustained. 
Since becoming the founding bureau chief of AP Pyongyang in 2012, Jean Lee has 
received intense scrutiny and criticism. Lee was reluctant to be drawn into the impact 
AP Pyongyang naysayers had had on her except to say she found the relentless 
criticism of her work in Pyongyang tiring. She said the market for journalism on North 
Korea was not at a point where there was an appetite anything other than extreme 
entertainment driven stories on the country. 
 
Lee said part of her mission in reporting on both North Korea and South Korea was 
bringing a greater awareness to her readers as to the complexity of the Korean 
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situation and condition on both sides of the DMZ. If this meant telling positive stories 
about North Korea as a country and a people, so be it. In much the same way as 
Pearson, in her interview Lee said the role of the journalist was to provide balanced 
context in reporting and to not shy away from reporting something on the grounds of 
ideology or principle. Lee said: 
 
The question of whether we can truly report from North Korea is a difficult 
one, but we can’t consider ourselves true journalists if we don’t try. We need 
to be on the ground. It is different from covering it from outside. That said, the 
North Korean regime keeps foreigners separate from locals and manages the 
flow of information. The basic challenge was getting candid information you 
could trust – you can’t just report what you see. (2016) 
 
Lee went on to talk about the challenges of reporting in an environment where she 
was under constant surveillance, there was no freedom of movement and she was 
viewed by the state as a double enemy – first for being American, and second for 
being a journalist. Despite these impediments and the howls of her critics, Lee 
maintains there is a place for journalists on the ground in North Korea. Lee said: 
 
Just being there is pushing the boundaries. For them to allow a journalist from 
an enemy nation to come and set up shop is an important first step. Being 
there day in and day out was an achievement. Every little thing is a hard-won 
battle when it comes to North Korea. (2016) 
 
The battle Lee refers to here is the battle of engagement with North Korea. For Lee, 
engagement is a slow burn, and in the role of reporting from the country, the 
symbolic value of being there was an achievement. By her own admission she was 
actively blocked from covering the kinds of stories she wanted to.  
 
What was more important for Lee was being there and the prospect of building a 
lasting relationship that over time would lead to more freedom for her successors 
and a corresponding increase in trust in foreign correspondents living and working in 
North Korea. To this end, she said what she hoped for upon leaving her job in 
Pyongyang was her successor would continue her work with the same vision. Lee 
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sees direct engagement in North Korea as the best way to deal with the state, and 
this forms one half of the ideological binary introduced at the beginning of this 
section. 
 
North Korea is a magnet not only for news audiences but also for journalists (Fifield, 
2019a; Lankov, 2013; Tudor & Pearson, 2015). The wanderlust exhibited by those 
looking for adventure reflect some of the more unbridled romantic notions of being a 
foreign correspondent for the sake of being so, a wanderlust that in the current 
shifting sands of journalism will increasingly be relegated to fantasy. As McCurry 
(2016) said, “There is no way The Guardian will be forking out for a one-off trip to let 
me open a permanent bureau in North Korea.” Cohen’s (1963) grey flannel clad 
swashbuckling foreign correspondent has been well and truly relegated to the annals 
of history.  
 
As Fifield argues in The Great Successor (2019b), reporting on North Korea from 
inside the country is an idiosyncratic enterprise characterised by a highly restrictive 
reporting environment. And yet, AP and AFP are among an exclusive group of news 
organisations maintaining news bureaus in the DPRK. As this study shows, although 
some had a hard time seeing the immediate value in terms of news, almost all of 
those interviewed said they had no fundamental objections to AP being in the 
country. In fact, for some, allowing journalism to happen for the sake of journalism 
and despite the obvious impediments to the craft was an end unto itself. This was 
especially true for former AP Pyongyang bureau chief, Jean Lee, whose journalism 
embodied an ‘engagement first’ perspective. 
 
At the other end of the ideological spectrum was Joshua Stanton. At first glance, 
Stanton’s views on AP in Pyongyang to North Korea seem overly deterministic and 
rigid. Set against AP’s engagement with Nazi Germany in the years prior to World 
War Two (Scharnberg, 2016), Stanton’s views become much more palatable raising 
questions over what kind of ethical and moral lines Associated Press would cross in 
having ‘boots on the ground’. Questions of ethics aside, the quantity of content 
coming out of Pyongyang is small. Lee and Fifield are right in arguing what 
emanates from AP in North Korea forms a small part of a much bigger mosaic of 
content on North Korea. This is especially true in a networked news environment. 
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Yet, AP in Pyongyang is at the heart of arguments around the ideology of reporting 
North Korea. In the next section, the debate of engagement rears its head again with 
the discussion of the role of defectors and defector testimony in reporting North 
Korea.  
 
6.9 Defectors, Escapees and Refugees as Sources 
 
An important finding in the practice of covering North Korea was the use and misuse 
of North Korean defectors in the mediated construction of North Korea. Song and 
Denny (2019) say, “As a subject of academic inquiry and fascination, North Korean 
defectors garner no small amount of media and academic attention as sources of 
information on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).” Stories of 
deprivation, courage and escape from North Korea have become the fodder of the 
mainstream news media (Murray, 2017). Beyond personal accounts of life in North 
Korea, this author (Murray, 2017) found defectors have also become a staple in day-
to-day news on all things North Korean. Green (2017) defines defectors as people 
who have voluntarily left North Korea without approval of the North Korean 
authorities. Others, including Lankov (2013), refer to defectors as escapees or 
refugees. The interviewees informing this chapter expressed almost universal 
scepticism about the popular use of defectors in covering North Korea although not 
all went as far as condemning the practice. In keeping with Song and Denny (2019), 
these findings point to issues of monetary and publicity incentives offered to 
defectors acting as sources, issues of sample bias, researcher/interviewee power 
relations, and issues of language. On top of these, much like the arguments around 
AP in Pyongyang, there is a clear ideological thread that runs through the practice of 
using defectors in reporting the DPRK. As with all reporting on opaque North Korea, 
there are the perennial issues of verification and accuracy and this is found to be 
true of defectors sharing autobiographic accounts and those contributing to news 
and other journalistic spaces. 
Defector testimony has become one of the pillars on which the reporting of North 
Korea rests. According to Jean Lee (2016), the use of defectors and their testimony 
in reporting North Korea to a Western audience took off since 2012. She said during 
her time at the helm of the Seoul Bureau of the Associated Press from 2008 to 2012, 
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there had been less emphasis on using defectors in reporting north of the DMZ. Kirk 
(2016) made a similar observation, saying mainstream media use of defectors in 
reporting North Korea was a relatively recent phenomenon and had been a boon for 
foreign correspondents looking to enhance their stories on North Korea and add an 
air of authenticity to their stories. Kirk also urged caution in inclusion of defector 
voices in reporting North Korea because of issues of reliability, and this wariness 
came up in the interviews quite frequently. 
Green (2017) identifies seven waves of emigration from North Korea since 1953. Of 
interest and relevance within the scope of this study are waves six and seven. Green 
defines the sixth wave as the people who left North Korea because of the “Arduous 
March” in the late 1990s and early 2000s. This resulted in the state losing absolute 
control of the country and moving from a state first societal model to a military first 
model to secure control over the country (Myers, 2015, p. 211). This also resulted in 
the emergence of small-scale private enterprise in North Korea under the guise of 
the jangmidang (market) generation (Hastings, 2016; Lankov, 2013; Smith, 2015; 
Tudor & Pearson, 2015). In simple terms, the sixth wave of defectors was driven by 
starvation and extreme hardship in North Korea. The interviews with those reporting 
on North Korea showed many of sixth wave cohort were popular sources on North 
Korea among non-Korean journalists.  
Green (2017) characterises the seventh wave of defectors as economic. Song and 
Denny (2019) say more than 90 per cent of seventh wave North Korean defectors 
come from the provinces bordering China with 85 per cent of defectors being 
women. Green (2017) says this is a group that is more opportunistic than the earlier 
waves of defectors being driven to leave North Korea in search of economic 
opportunities abroad. They are likely to have contacts in the form of friends or 
relatives who have defected ahead of them. This is a group that is well-represented 
in the Western media as sources for journalism on the country and as sources of 
autobiographical tales of escape and hardship. These stories are best represented 
by Hyeonseo Lee’s The Girl with Seven Names (2015), Park Yeon-mi’s In Order to 
Live (Y. M. Park, 2015), and Blane Hardin’s Escape from Camp 14: One Man's 
Remarkable Odyssey from North Korea to Freedom in the West (2013) in which 
Harden tells the shocking story of now infamous defector Shin Dong-hyuk. There 
was deep scepticism over the reliability, accuracy, and truthfulness of these 
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accounts among the interviewees. This was fuelled by the discrediting of Shin’s 
account of his escape from North Korea in the mainstream news media and a 
mounting body of evidence from within South Korea’s defector community 
suggesting Park’s account included exaggerated and fabricated elements.  
In his interview, Lankov (2017) argued there was a commercial imperative at play 
driving the market for defector testimony. This was supported by Song and Denny 
(2019) who said the prices for defector testimony range from US$30 to US$300 per 
hour. For Choe (2016), this was a key driver in why defectors, no matter whether the 
story be autobiographical or news-based, tell stories the way they do. Choe said: 
Defectors in a capitalist world quickly learn reporters in a capitalist world are 
looking for sensational stories and they think they are expected to present a 
very dramatic version of their experiences – even exaggerating them if 
necessary. (2016) 
With bluntness, Lankov offered his explanation as to why money perverts the 
defector story. Lankov said: 
The real story of the refugee does not sell. It’s easier to create some fake 
stories about obligatory torture in the camps every second Saturday than to 
tell the real story which is boring. Something like, “I was starving. My sister 
starved to death. My brother tried to run away and was shot by border guards. 
I had nothing to eat. I went to China. In China I worked on a farm. I was raped 
by the owner. I was then intercepted by the police. They sent me back to 
North Korea where I spent a few months in prison. I was beaten occasionally 
and released. I then went back to China because I had nothing to do. There, 
brokers sold me into a brothel, but I escaped, and some kindly Chinese 
peasant took me as his wife. He was 20 years older than me but unless he 
was drunk he never beat me. We had two children. Someone then told me if a 
move to South Korea I can make some money, live much better and get an 
education for my children, so I decided to move.” This is a typical story. Is it 
going to sell? At most a little. (2017) 
Choe and Lankov argue defectors, as a group, are unreliable because they are 
conditioned to tell journalists, researchers, and other interested parties what they 
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want to hear. Both agreed reliability of defector testimony was further degraded by a 
competitive market for such stories.  This was a theme that was echoed across the 
interviews. Despite the clear issues of reliability, none of those interviewed admitted 
to paying defectors for their testimony.  
 
6.9.1 Changing Industry and Changing Practice  
 
An interesting finding to emerge from questions of the use of defectors related to 
broader changes and shifts in journalism.  
Over-reliance on, and the misuse of, defectors in reporting North Korea was widely 
viewed as a product of inexperience in covering the DPRK. Lee (2016) suggested 
this was more likely to occur with journalists reporting on North Korea from 
newsrooms outside of the Korean Peninsula and foreign correspondents parachuted 
into Seoul to cover a specific event. Lee said this type of journalist lacked the context 
and understanding of the North Korean story to tell it in anything other than clichés 
and stereotypes. Lee went further in saying this was also often true of foreign 
correspondents based in Seoul for a limited time who rotate out after a couple of 
years. These, too, were the types of journalists who lacked Korean language skills 
and, therefore, had a much greater reliance on those around them to communicate 
effectively. 
For O’Carroll (2016), problems in the use of defectors lie in the 24/7 news cycle. 
O’Carroll said the pressure on journalists to produce endless stories on North Korea 
resulted in journalism that was inaccurate and sloppy. O’Carroll highlighted the 
example of wire service, the United Press International (UPI). O’Carroll said it was 
usual for the UPI correspondent to file eight stories a day on North Korea. These 
stories were often sourced from, or informed by, dubious sources including defectors 
and were never checked for reliability. O’Carroll said, “These stories go out on the 
wire and are picked up all over the world. It’s not uncommon for a single quote from 
an anonymous defector to make headlines around the world. Whether these stories 
are truthful or accurate has no bearing on their popularity,” (2016). 
For Lee, Power, Cain, York, Pearson, Choe and Kirk the phenomenon of the reliance 
on questionable defector sources was enhanced by the closure of some of the 
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Seoul-based bureaus and the consolidation of country-based bureaus into regional 
bureaus with offices in Tokyo, Beijing, Shanghai or Hong Kong. This has happened 
at the expense of Korea dedicated staff with the knowledge, background and skills 
needed to properly report from the Korean Peninsula or properly evaluate the 
reliability of their sources.  
In many instances, the void created by the closure of foreign news bureaus in Seoul 
has been filled by freelance journalists and stringers who by their own admission are 
sometimes lacking the training, resources and institutional backing to do the job well. 
Lee, Gale, Fifield, Choe and Pearson all commented on the advantages being 
attached to a large recognised news brand offered in reporting the Koreas both in 
terms of access to authoritative sources and a diversity of sources.  
 
6.9.2 The Hidden Implications of Using Defectors as Sources 
 
Central to a lack of experience, knowledge and longevity in reporting in and on the 
Koreas was a sense on the part of the interviewees that journalists gravitated 
towards defectors because it was easy to do so. For example, Cain (2016) said: “I 
think using defectors is the easy way out. There is no diversity in North Korea 
coverage. Everybody is going to call the same person and get the same quotes.” 
Pearson went further in his assessment of defectors as sources. He said: 
Defectors are like any other source. I’ll look at them on a case-by-case basis, 
and I’ll decide how reliable they are. There is a tendency for defector 
testimony to be viewed as gospel when often what they are saying is based 
on rumour and they are reporting what others have said. There is a gap 
between rumour and experience.  Much like the criticism of defectors 
testimony being black and white there exists problems with the criticisms of 
those who criticise defector testimony, too. It’s impossible to say “defectors” in 
general. Who do you mean by that? They are people from diverse parts of 
North Korean society. I’ll try to find people who match the topic I’m writing on. 
(Pearson, 2016) 
Working for Reuters gave Pearson access to resources that eluded many other 
journalists reporting on North Korea. This made it possible for Pearson to spend time 
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on the northern North Korean border with China and interview defectors shortly after 
they had left North Korea. For Pearson, the advantage in doing so was he was able 
to get more accurate, timely, and less slanted testimony on what was happening in 
the country.  
It is the lack of a nuanced approach in dealing with the defectors and their testimony 
that Pearson and others took aim at. A common criticism to emerge across the 
interviews was how ignorant many journalists reporting on North Korea were to the 
political and ideological implications of using defectors in their work. Among the 
experienced set of journalists interviewed as part of this study – namely Choe, 
Fifield, Kirk, Power, Lee, Lankov, Cain, Choi, and York – the use of defectors is all 
too often a result of larger and ubiquitous strategies to promote certain approaches 
to dealing with North Korea propagated by third parties. At this juncture, the familiar 
hawks and doves binary narrative emerges.   
For Pearson and Choe, the way experienced journalists used and represented 
defectors in their work reflected their views on North Korea as a whole. In addition to 
this, Choe, Fifield and Pearson said defectors were peddled as sources by third 
party organisations purportedly looking to advocate for human rights in North Korea. 
Choe took issue with feeling pressured to present North Korea in a certain way and 
the use of defectors to push a very specific way of thinking about North Korea. Choe 
said: 
I see human rights activists doing the same thing to me. I have a serious 
problem with that – I’m a journalist and that’s not what we are supposed to be 
about. The human rights problem in NK in a serious one but that doesn’t 
mean we have to exaggerate and make up stories to bring attention to that 
problem. I see this happening all the time and that is why I’m very sceptical 
about talking to defectors. That doesn’t mean I don’t talk to defectors. I do. If 
you really are looking for the story behind the story it is really messy how 
journalists are being taken from one place to another and interviews are being 
arranged. (2016) 
The linking of North Korea’s human rights problems with a diplomatic hard line on 
the country is part of what Chubb and Yeo (2019) see as a “top down” (p. 228) 
approach to effecting regime change in North Korea. This approach is underpinned 
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by the notion that change in North Korea can only be achieved from the outside. 
Linking human rights to regime change gives acolytes of this approach a potent 
discursive weapon in the argument on what to do with North Korea.  
At the other end of the spectrum on approaches to North Korea are those who see 
engagement with North Korea as the best way to deal with the country. Chubb and 
Yeo (2019) correctly point out this approach is seldom couched around issues of 
human rights. Rather, it is seen through the lens of “humanitarian engagement”. This 
approach emphasises lifting the living standards of North Koreans through 
engagement with stakeholders in the country and the provision of food, clothing and 
shelter. Traditionally this has been an approach adopted by the United Nations and 
Minjudang (Progressive) South Korean governments. This approach is unlikely to 
promote voices that paint the North Korean regime as evil and inhumane as that 
makes constructive dialogue much more difficult. Pearson was pragmatic when it 
came to the use of defectors and was circumspect to any outright declaration 
sidelining the use of defectors. When it came to his views of others, he offered a 
direct and clear appraisal: 
Choe is a progressive. He believes in one Korea. This means he is unlikely to 
use sources that accentuate the differences in the two Koreas. This include 
defectors. He is always going to avoid taking on issues of human rights or 
anything else that drives a wedge between the north and south. (Pearson, 
2016) 
Beyond approaches to engagement, views on what it means to be Korean and 
indigenous views on nationalism shape relations across the 38th Parallel. Shin (2006) 
breaks Korean nationalism into two broad but binary opposed perspectives. The 
respective perspectives tend to be factional, but both conform to specific 
characteristics and historical trajectories. They also shape mainstream national 
politics in South Korea. The first perspective is conservative and based largely on 
the rule, thought and subsequent policy of former South Korean dictator (1961-1979) 
and strongman, President Park Chang-hee. Park was vehemently anti-North Korean. 
His policies reflected the existential threat he felt from the north (Cumings, 2005). 
Not only did he isolate South Korea diplomatically from North Korea, he also sought 
to distinguish the south in nationalistic and ethnic terms. This involved purging the 
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south of North Korean sympathisers, excluding popular discourse on engagement or 
favourable relations with the north from the public sphere, and censoring and 
excluding all pro-North Korean sentiment and publications (Oberdorfer & Carlin, 
2013, pp. 30-36). Transgressions were deemed traitorous. Park created a legacy for 
conservative administrations that were still visible during his daughter’s presidency 
more than three decades after his assassination. Both recent conservative 
presidencies, Lee Myoung-bak and Park Geun-hye, were marked by adversarial and 
provocative relations with the north.  
The other side to Shin’s (2006) binary is what he calls the ideology of Korean Ethnic 
Nationalism or Minjok. Minjok was born out the period of Japanese rule over Korea 
(1910-1945). It emphasises a form of inward-looking blood or ethnic based 
nationalism that came to characterise the post-war North Korean state (Myers, 
2015). The idea is rooted in the notion Koreans are a distinct race with a unique 
shared culture and traditions. Myers (2010, 2015) correctly points out this way of 
understanding race is not rooted in the modernist ideologies that shaped much of the 
rest of the post-World War Two world. Rather, it was based on notions of 
isolationism and racial purity. Myers (2015) and, to some extent, Lankov (2013), 
argue the North Korea we see today is far more the product of this way of thinking 
than mis-guided notions of Marxist-Leninism. Myers argues North Korea is much 
closer in composition to a feudal monarchy with fascist overtones than anything 
approaching socialism.  
In South Korea it is the same forces not only shaping mainstream politics but also 
relations with the North. These forces also explain why South Korean national 
politics do not fit neatly into a western left versus right binary. Thus, Minjudang is 
referred to as “progressive” rather than “leftist”. South Korea elected their first 
progressive president, Kim Dae-jung, in 1998. For many, this was the first real 
blooming of South Korean democracy despite the first elections being held a decade 
earlier (Cumings, 2005). South Korea had seen 37 years of unbroken conservative 
anti-North Korea rule, and the divisions between the Koreas could not have been 
starker.  
Kim’s Sunshine Policy of engagement with the north signalled a thaw in relations. 
For Kim, the time was ripe for inter-Korea dialogue and talk of reunification. Snyder 
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(2018) says, “The Soviet Union had collapsed; Russia became a secondary player in 
the region; China normalised its relations with South Korea; and North Korea 
suffered a massive famine,” (p.87). On top of these events, for the first time since the 
Korean War Minjok became a potentially unifying political force on the Korean 
Peninsula. Kim Dae-jung was successfully able to woo the North Korean leader Kim 
Jong-Il culminating a summit between the two in Pyongyang that made the cover of 
Time Magazine, the opening up of a tourist precinct for South Koreans at North 
Korea’s Mount Kumgang, and the opening of an industrial park in North Korea’s 
Kaesong City for South Korean businesses. In 2002, the nation’s respective football 
teams marched together under a united flag at in the opening ceremony of the FIFA 
World Cup. 
Minjok held sway in relations between the two Koreas through into the presidency of 
South Korean Roh Moo-hyun before giving way to the conservative presidencies of 
Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye. The Lee and Park periods can be characterised 
as periods of antagonism between the Koreas with the return of South Korean 
administrations looking to keep North Korea at arm’s length. The impeachment of 
Park Geun-hye in early 2017 paved the way for South Korea’s third progressive 
government under Moon Jae-in. Moon was quick to find rapprochement with North 
Korean leader Kim Jong-un.  
6.9.3 Ideology in Practice 
 
In the context of this study, approaches to North Korea from the south matter. The 
ideological underpinnings of how North Korea is understood from a South Korean 
perspective impact how the rest of the world understands North Korea. As already 
revealed, his study found the conservative mainstream news media in South Korea 
is responsible for framing much of the discussion around North Korea around issues 
of human rights. It is worth remembering conservative media was emboldened 
during the Park administration. Questionable use of defectors is central to their 
approaches to covering the north. Sometimes all it takes is the mention of fictitious 
defectors to create a groundswell around the evil that may or may not be North 
Korea. 
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Power offers a potent example of this in practice. On July 2, 2015, South Korean 
wire service Yonhap News Agency published a piece on the defection of a scientist 
identified only by his surname, Lee. Yonhap reported Lee had defected to Finland 
via the Philippines. It was reported Lee had arrived with 15 gigabytes of information 
on the use of human subjects in testing biological weaponry. It was reported Lee was 
going to deliver his information to the European Parliament as proof of human rights 
violations in North Korea. Yet, no such submission was made. In a piece for The 
Diplomat (Power, 2015) Power investigated and found neither the Finnish 
Government nor representatives of the European Parliament had any knowledge of 
Lee or a cache of information and he had never been to European Parliament. 
Power concluded Lee had never existed. 
These are stories that are picked up by western media organisations and 
subsequently make their way into popular discourse around North Korea. Power said 
stories of this nature were a common occurrence. He said given the chance he 
would dedicate his life to uncovering inaccuracies in the reporting of North Korea. 
However, he was also circumspect on the issue because there was no money in 
“spending your life uncovering defector lies”, and “It’s almost impossible to verify the 
details. It takes a lot of time to debunk a defector. And who wants to question a rape 
victim? It makes you look like an arsehole, and journalists don’t want to look like 
arseholes,” (Power, 2017). 
 
6.9.4 The Baby with the Bathwater 
 
Among some of the experienced journalists interviewed in this study was a sense of 
being careful not to completely discount defectors when it came to the use of 
defectors in reporting North Korea. The consensus was there is no one-size-fits-all 
defector, and to get the most reliable information it was important to get to defectors 
before they were conditioned in dealing with journalists. 
Fifield, Power, and Pearson all spoke of the advantages on travelling to the Chinese 
side of the border with North Korea and China to meet recent defectors. There was a 
general sense that defector stories and information degrade with time. Pearson said 
this was especially true once defectors settled in South Korea and had completed 
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their time at Hanawon (the South Korean government institution set up to familiarise 
North Koreans with life in South Korea) and the National Intelligence Service (NIS) 
interrogation. Fifield said the trips to the northern North Korean border were more 
beneficial in reporting North Korea than actually going to the country because you 
weren’t restricted in the questions you could ask. Fifield also followed the defector 
migration routes into Laos and Thailand where she has done some notable reporting 
on the trafficking of female defectors into online and telephone sex work by South 
Koreans operating in the area (Fifield, 2016).    
Pearson goes one step further and says while there is benefit in talking to defectors 
emigrating from North Korea to China, the majority have little information of worth 
and therefore are not always useful as sources. He said because of the restrictions 
on communication within North Korea, it was not uncommon for people in one town 
or village to have no knowledge of what was happening in the next town or village. 
When information was shared, it had often been through the “North Korean rumour 
mill” and not much stock could be placed in it. For Pearson, a better strategy was to 
speak to the people helping defectors in China. Pearson said:  
It’s like frogs in wells. What you need to do is speak to a lot of them and I 
spend a lot of time talking to defectors but I spend more time talking to people 
who talk to defectors. I have a friend Sokeel Park who runs the NGO Liberty 
in North Korea and he helps organise defectors to get to Seoul from Thailand. 
He will conduct Skype interviews with the people that they bring through, so 
he is able to give the most accurate and nuanced description of what’s really 
going on there. (2016) 
Again, Pearson distinguishes himself as a journalist by doing simple journalism and 
not deferring to what everybody else is doing. This is why he, Fifield, and Choe came 
repeatedly in the interviews as exemplars on how reporting both North and South 
Korea should be done. 
Despite these exemplars, defectors are poorly used in stories about North Korea. In 
an increasingly financially-challenged journalism industry, the allure of using 
defectors is strong no matter how manufactured or hyperbolic their testimony may 
be. Feeding the beast for content on North Korea is an expedient enterprise, and the 
bizarre and weird prevail.  
 205 
The use and promotion of certain defectors and their stories by the conservative 
news organisations in South Korea is rife. A common criticism across these 
interviews was these stories were then picked up by foreign news organisations 
without the critical eye to properly evaluate the veracity of such stories. Despite 
failings in the use and promotion of defectors and their testimony, defectors have a 
place in the lexicon of doing journalism on North Korea. Gale says: 
Defectors are important. When we are laughing at stories about Kim Jong-
un’s cheese habit, we need to remember what he and his regime do to the 
people of that country. Whether the defector arrived in the south in 1995 or 
yesterday doesn’t matter. They are important in reminding us when we write 
about North Korea we are writing about people. We as journalists should not 
forget that. (2016) 
Gale is right. Defectors are people, but, like any source, the onus is on the journalist 
to properly vet that source in constructing an accurate and reliable picture of North 
















Covering North Korea for an international audience is not easy. A combination of 
restricted access to the country, unreliable sources, and ideology-driven 
stakeholders leaves many of those reporting on the country despairing.  The cyclical 
nature of covering the country results in a kind of “North Korea fatigue” for 
journalists. The repetitive nature and sheer boredom of covering North Korea has 
resulted in some of the key journalists in the area feeling the need to move away 
from covering North Korea for the sake of their sanity and their continued 
involvement in the industry. Pearson is one such example. Viewed by his peers as 
an exemplar in how to report North Korea, Pearson expressed frustration over the 
lack of impact his methods in reporting North Korea have on the framing and 
representation of stories on the country. Pearson said: 
 
The story is very cyclical. I feel I have done three years of telling the story of 
the real North Korea. I’ve focused on how people live and spend money - 
basically how money works because that is what makes North Korea spin 
round and it is interesting. Basically, I’ve run out of fresh stuff to tackle. I’ve 
had to become a physicist and a rocket scientist because of all the missile 
tests. After the missile tests in January it erased a year of nuance I had been 
building into our editors about this stuff. They reverted back to their old ways. 
They reverted to an understanding of North Korea that was not really very 
helpful. (2016) 
 
Despite this frustration, Pearson felt there had been an improvement on the way 
North Korea was covered from the foreign contingent in Seoul. He, like O’Carroll, 
said some of these changes were possible because of new players such as NK 
News, Daily NK and 38 North entering the market with specialist coverage of North 
Korea. He said this had led to journalists in the area competing on North Korean 
stories and looking at ways to tell stories that included more than ripping off the 
South Korean press and interviewing defectors. However, Pearson said these 
changes had had little or no impact on “changing headlines in London”. 
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It is the market that drives the coverage of North Korea more than what is happening 
in the country. Some of those interviewed lamented journalism on North Korea is 
nothing more than entertainment. This results in entertainment values being 
elevated. Hyperbole, distortion, and lies take precedence over journalism that seeks 
to inform in a fair and balanced fashion. This chapter shows this kind of reporting 
permeates across the network for news on the country. When efforts are made to 
address the often wilfully inaccurate representation of North Korea, those journalists 
run the risk of being labelled “Kim Jong-un shills”. They also risk their livelihoods. 
Outside of a few niche publications, there seems to be no market for deep 
considered journalism on the country, and there is little to no appetite to fund this 
kind of journalism on the part of the mainstream Western news media. The impacts 
on the framing of North Korea are clear and manifest. North Korea is presented as a 
freak show and the bizarre that is the order of the day. The next chapter examines 





















Findings from Chapter Four showed that, compared to North Korea, South Korea 
barely qualifies as a source of stories. Evans put it best when he said: “South Korea 
is a moderately well-run middle country. They are also going to play second fiddle to 
what is happening in North Korea or China.” The threshold for stories on South 
Korea far exceeds that of North Korea. In an impoverished post-disruption news 
industry, the attraction in doing serious journalism on South Korea has diminished, 
as conditions for those covering the country are increasingly piecemeal and 
casualised. Journalists are drawn to stories that they are going to sell and, sadly, 
stories on South Korea do not (Seo, 2018).  
 
This chapter analyses the issues facing journalists covering South Korea and what 
this means in terms of the framing of the country, the people, and the events that 
define the South Korean experience in the Western news media. As the chapter 
progresses, it is important to remember it is the same people who cover South Korea 
for the Western media who also cover North Korea. At the same time, as this chapter 
will detail, there are different standards for what makes news on South Korea and 
North Korea, and this directly impacts on the kind of story that is told for both 
countries. This manifests in different thresholds of news for South Korea and North 
Korea. For South Korea, only the biggest and strangest stories are covered in the 
international media, leading to an overall representation of the country that is 
extreme, decontextualized, and as short-lived. By contrast, almost anything will be 
allowed through the metaphorical gates and into publication on North Korea. It is an 
environment where the future of journalism, and by extension the journalist, is less 
than assured; the pressure to get published is immense. In such an environment the 
tendency is to pursue the story that is going to create the biggest impact with the 
least effort. This rings especially true when in South Korea. The emphasis becomes 
“feeding the beast” material that will be picked up and more often than not this 
privileges stories on North Korea.  
 
Much of what was found in this study on the reporting of South Korea felt Orwellian. 
By this is meant the rich, the powerful and the elite in South Korea had been 
 209 
successful in insulating themselves from the scrutiny of all media, including the 
foreign news media. The distance between the government and the media had 
increased with the ascendancy of President Park to the presidential palace and the 
mechanisms in place to enable her to maintain her exclusivity and gag her detractors 
had been strengthened early in her presidency (Snyder, 2018). Likewise, issues of 
access to South Korea’s big industrial conglomerates proved perplexing for those 
interviewed, with one interviewee arguing that covering the inner machinations of 
North Korea with honesty would be easier than doing the same thing with Samsung 
or Hyundai. What become obvious, as part of the findings of this chapter, are the 
fortifications that have been built to shield South Korea’s elite from the gaze and 
scrutiny of journalists.  
 
On May 9, 2017, progressive Moon Jae-in was elected as Park Geun-hye’s 
successor as president of the Republic of Korea. Moon, who had lost to Park four 
years earlier, rode to power on the back of anti-Park backlash and a fractured 
conservative political power base licking its wounds after Park’s spectacular fall from 
grace. Western media coverage of the South Korean election focused almost 
exclusively on Moon’s North Korean policy of engagement over isolation, which in 
reality was not a key issue for Moon and his team. Moon’s campaign for president 
came at the same time as an escalation of tensions on the Korean Peninsula over 
the usual issues of South Korea/United States military drills and North Korean 
weapons testing. The 2017 round of North/South tensions was heightened by 
American President Trump threatening pre-emptive military strikes on, and an 
invasion of, North Korea, and so the connection between Moon and North Korea was 
there to be made. This reflects a key finding in Chapter Four, and can be seen again 
in this chapter.  
 
At the time of writing, Moon was enjoying a presidential honeymoon. At home, he 
was being painted as Barack Obama, Justin Trudeau of Canada, and former South 
Korean president Kim Dae-jung, all rolled into one shining package. Both South 
Korean and foreign news media gush about “Moon” the common man rolling up his 
sleeves and, along with his dutiful wife, being seen with ordinary Koreans. In the 
style of Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, photos of young Moon have 
emerged running up hills, playing with dogs and the like. In his early days as South 
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Korean president, Moon demonstrated a willingness and capacity to embrace the 
local and international media (Bicker, 2018). It remains to be seen how this will 
impact reporting on and of South Korea. The contrast with Park could not be starker. 
Park came to power as a woman who had sacrificed everything, including her 
mother, father and the prospect of marriage in the service of her country (Lee, Er, 
Pazos, Chong, & Hui, 2017). There are obvious parallels here to the “Virgin Queen” 
(Snyder, 2018). At the same time, she was distant from the Korean public and the 
media, shunning public engagement. At peak, she was viewed as chaste by the 
mainstream Korean media. In her decline, the connotation shifted to one of an 
uncaring cloistered fool indifferent to the problems facing her country and its people. 
This comparison is significant in the changes that have rocked South Korea. Four 
years before taking power, Moon and Park went head-to-head in the 2013 
presidential election. In that election Moon was painted as insipid, weak, and 
indecisive by the conservative South Korean media whereas Park came across as 
strong and determined.  
 
At the time of the interviews that inform this chapter (September 2016-February 
2017), questions around Park’s effectiveness as a president became more common 
in the South Korean media (Koo, 2017c). During this period the tide was turning 
against her with the crowds of people choking downtown Seoul in protest against her 
presidency every Saturday, with numbers swelling as the weather got colder. It is 
worthwhile remembering, as this chapter unfolds, the mainstream majority 
conservative news media in South Korea championed by the likes of The Chosun 
Ilbo, The Joongang Ilbo and The Dong-a Ilbo were still supporting Park at the end of 
2016. Park’s grip on, and control of, the mainstream South Korean news media, 
while loosening, still looked tight. When it came, Park’s downfall was both 
spectacular and swift. Instrumental in Park’s fall from grace was the conservative 
South Korean media (Snyder, 2018). Once it was clear Park was toxic, the migration 
away from her and her power base was equally spectacular and swift (Koo, 2017c). 
 
In the interviews, there was reluctance on the part of most of the interviewees to 
openly condemn Park or her presidency although there was a sense that things may 
not end well for Park. In the few months after the disintegration of the Park 
administration, it was easy to forget she cast a long shadow over the news media in 
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South Korea and people were very cautious of her and her power. It was in this 
“chilling” environment the interviews for this chapter were conducted. This explains 
why issues of access to elite sources and a willingness for the government to gag 
journalists loom so large in these interviews. As the interviews show, the structural 
mechanisms enacted and reinforced by the Park regime vary, but some of the most 
pervasive were the legal deterrents put in place to stop journalists from functioning 
as part of the fourth estate. This also explains the frequent parallels made by some 
of the interviewees to similarities in difficulties in covering both South Korea and 
North Korea. This theme is addressed later in this chapter.  
 
7.2 South Korea as News 
 
In answering the question on how they viewed international coverage of South 
Korea, the participants felt the country was reported and represented in the Western 
news media as “shallow” and “narrow”. The reasons for these succinct appraisals 
vary but they can be broadly categorized in two ways. First, there were the news 
industry structural issues. These included issues surrounding the broader changes 
that have taken hold and taken a toll on the industry. The interviews showed there 
has been a decline in the demand for general news on the country, in keeping with 
shrinking budgets on the part of traditional news organisations. This has resulted in 
news organisations leaving the Korean Peninsula and many of the organisations that 
once took stories from freelance journalists and stringers covering South Korea 
losing their appetite for such stories. The foreign freelance journalists who have 
survived have done so on the back of the news market for niche and specialist news 
topics, including business, tech and the ever-present North Korea.  
 
As a reaction to the “digital disruption” that has cut a swath through journalism, 
journalists covering South Korea for an international market have not only had to 
meet the demands of a new multi-media reporting environment, but also understand 
what that means for the style and type of story that makes it onto news-focused 
websites. For those who have lived through the changes, there was an 
overwhelming sense that the pendulum had swung in favour of stories that were rich 
in entertainment but poor in background, context, and depth. In keeping with 
research on the digital disruption of news (Anderson et al., 2012; Deuze, 2005, 2011; 
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Deuze & Witschge, 2017; Zelizer, 2017), this had resulted in fundamental changes in 
the way stories on South Korea were told. 
 
The second category comprised day-to-day and institutional factors that impacted 
the practice of doing journalism as a foreign correspondent in South Korea. Although 
the pressures that shape the way South Korea is reported on for the foreign media 
market have gone uninvestigated, the pressures on indigenous South Korean 
journalists have been investigated. Key here is Sa and her work around the nexus of 
South Korea journalism, industrial change and South Korea democracy (Sa, 2009a, 
2009b, 2009c, 2013, 2016). For Sa and the interviewees in this study, the key issue 
facing journalists operating in the Korean context was access to sources. At the 
institutional level, getting access to government and corporate sources proved 
frustrating for foreign journalists. The interviews revealed this has led to a tendency 
for the foreign journalists to rely on local coverage and news organisations for their 
stories often without casting a critical eye over issues of practice and political bias 
that plague the local news industry. This has resulted in anonymous single source 
stories becoming commonplace in reporting both North Korea and South Korea.  
 
Access to government and corporate press clubs that dominate the South Korean 
reporting landscape also proved to be an obstacle for those interviewed. This was 
compounded by an insipid Seoul Foreign Correspondents’ Club, described by one 
interviewee as “the mother of all circle jerks” (Ramirez, 2016), that did nothing to 
support and facilitate foreign journalists in their reporting of South Korea.  
 
Again, in keeping with Sa (2016), another issue that impeded the day-to-day practice 
of doing journalism in South Korea was the legal environment with the spectre of 
criminal defamation also identified as a limiting factor in how the country was 
covered. According to some, the prospect of defamation had resulted in foreign 
journalists becoming reluctant to pursue deep investigative stories instead opting for 
lower cost safer stories that, again, were already covered in the local news.    
 
To exacerbate matters, all of this takes place in the shadow of North Korea that, 
according to some of the interviewees, makes a concerted effort to control the 
international news agenda on the Korean Peninsula. The North casts such a long 
shadow over the South. Given the international hunger for news and stories on North 
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Korea, South Korea was relegated to play second fiddle. It was noted repeatedly that 
the threshold for what would pass as news on South Korea was much higher than 
North Korea, making South Korea more onerous to cover. Also, being sandwiched 
between two economic powerhouses, news on and from South Korea was often 
eclipsed by whatever was happening in China and Japan, although the point was 
made that Japan was under-covered in much the same way South Korea was.  
 
7.3 Views on the coverage of South Korea 
 
All of the interviewees who spoke on the representation of South Korea and the 
practice of reporting from the country concluded there was a limited market for news 
from the country. Where there was interest, it was limited to events that were “big, 
weird, and unexpected” (Pearson, 2016). The high threshold for stories on South 
Korea meant stories that did not meet the threshold went untold. This resulted in 
stories that did meet the threshold appearing random and lacking in background and 
context. This, in turn, resulted in stories that formed part of a complex series of 
issues or events being presented as random. According to Pearson: 
 
The classic story to come out of South Korea is very sudden, very unexpected 
and nobody understands what is going on. It’s on the front page for several 
news cycles and then it goes away and everybody forgets about it. Every big 
South Korea story from the Sewol, to the Park Geun-hye crisis, to MERS, do 
you remember MERS?  Every single story out of South Korea is like this. 
(2016) 
 
Jean Lee said it was difficult for correspondents in Seoul to sell news on South 
Korea unless there was a focus on the freakier or weirder elements of a story as 
these types of stories had to compete with North Korea not only for publication space 
but also for the journalists’ attention. Lee said this was a deliberate effort on the part 
of the North Korean government to control and dominate the news and the headlines 
being generated on the Korean Peninsula.  
 
Fifield said although she thinks South Korea gets more coverage in the mainstream 
foreign news media than it did during her time there from 2004-2008 as a 
correspondent for The Financial Times, she said in her current role South Korea 
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could only play second fiddle to North Korea because, “… all the reader interest, 
editor interest and my interest is in North Korea because it’s an unknown place, a 
challenge to report and there’s such a fascination with it” (2016). From her role as 
Tokyo bureau chief for the Washington Post responsible for Japan and the Koreas, 
Fifield said her inclination was toward covering North Korea. 
 
Lankov said the Western coverage of South Korea could be best described as 
exotic. He said that when South Korea is covered in the Western news media, “… it 
is usually stereotypical and reinforces the image of an exotic undeveloped nation far, 
far away.” He said the coverage focuses on the strange and lacked context and 
background. He said the coverage was “… like covering Indians in the Amazon 
Jungle,” when the reality of modern South Korea is more like a European country 
than what is portrayed in the Western media. 
 
Gale was blunter in his summation of the coverage of South Korea, characterising it 
as “weird”. Gale said, “In covering South Korea, other than the weirdness, there is 
not a lot of international interest. It’s relatively small and insignificant as a country.” 
Gale said: 
 
Stories about South Korea for the sake of it being a good story don’t fly. For 
example, the current presidential drama, those kind of stories will not have a 
big audience. When you are running a bureau and you have to come up with 
stories your editors like and will get people reading, clicking and subscribing. 
Those are the things that keep us in jobs as journalists. You have to go for the 
things that interest editors and readers. You end up writing about Samsung all 
the time because Samsung is significant so there is a very narrow scope to be 
able to do things outside the well-trodden story. (2016) 
 
Gale said at the Wall Street Journal the demand for stories on South Korea outside 
technology and shipping was quite limited with the exception of the odd story on 
plastic surgery or the online eating culture that was published in the expectation of 
drawing in readers to the website. 
 
Cain, like Gale, said there was not a popular demand for stories on South Korea. 
Cain said part of the problem is there are a lot of barriers erected to getting good 
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stories on the country. Cain took aim at the Chaebol, South Korea’s huge industrial 
conglomerates, for being particularly obstructionist with journalists and likened the 
Chaebol in character to the North Korean regime. Cain said even if these barriers did 
not exist, “I don’t think there is any interest in South Korea at all,” and South Korea 
was something that was covered when North Korea was quiet.  As a result, when 
Cain could file something on South Korea, there would be no depth and little if any 
context. Cain said most editors were looking for shallow stories. Cain said deviate 
from this and you will not get published.   
 
The BBC correspondent in Seoul, Stephan Evans (2016), said even with an 
organization as vast as the BBC, finding a place for stories on South Korea 
presented a challenge. He said this led him to favour “soft news” over “hard news”.  
He said covering stories on South Korea that explored issues like the gender gap or 
elderly poverty insured you would not get published, even in the vastness of the 
BBC. He said South Korea is ignored in international news because, like Canada or 
Belgium, it is a well-run middle country so news stories that do surface need to have 
significant impact or need to be somehow tied to North Korea. The BBC presents an 
interesting example in the context of these interviews. Although Evans does feature 
on the pages of The Guardian or news.com.au, Evans and the BBC bring shade to 
the study because the BBC is state-funded and not as exposed to many of the same 
harsh realities of operating in the post-digital disruption news environment the 
commercial media face. This makes his comments on his tendency to pursue “soft” 
stories, like so many in the commercial news media, revealing.      
 
New York Times correspondent, Choe Sung-hun, said it was the “narrowness” of the 
topics in covering both North and South Korea that led to an equally narrow 
representation of both countries in the Western press. Cain, Gale, Power, and Choe 
all agreed the representation of South Korea was weird and quirky but good as 
juxtaposed against the northern neighbour presented as unpredictable, dangerous, 
and, ultimately, evil. Choe despaired at how sloppy coverage of South Korea was in 
foreign media. “In the foreign media on South Korea there are many careless factual 
mistakes. These are the kinds of mistakes a Korean is not going to make” (2016). 
Choe said the problem was not confined to the same topics being reported 
repeatedly but also narrowness in the framing of a given story. He said, like North 
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Korea, for South Korea there was a repertoire of stories that were recycled and 
wheeled out regularly by foreign journalists. He said: 
 
In South Korea we have plastic surgery, Panmunjeon (the village that 
straddles the DMZ). We used to do stories on anti-Americanism.  There are 
better ways to tell these stories. With the focus on Chaebol, the stories are 
always remarkably the same – the same analysis. You have to wonder isn’t 
there more to this story than what you read in a western newspaper? (2016) 
 
Choe said the outcome of the narrowness of topics across Western media coverage 
of South Korea was stereotyping. He said that did not mean the journalist had set out 
to lie about or distort South Korea. Choe said, in focusing on only one aspect of a 
story, there was a tendency to underplay or neglect other aspects or angles of the 
same story. Essentially, a single story is in play making stereotypes, 
characterisations, and construction at best incomplete. He said:  
 
If you take the Chaebol as an example, if you try bring context to your story 
you fear being labelled an apologist for the Chaebol. You have to be very 
careful. Also, with the space and time limits of presenting a piece of 
journalism it is very difficult to present the cultural nuances beyond the 
stereotyped story of the corrupt Korean Chaebol. (2016) 
 
He added there was a practicality to conforming to popular stereotypes under such 
conditions: 
 
We are all human. We have distractions in our lives. We all know what the 
ideal situation to do journalism looks like, but life doesn’t work like that. (2016) 
 
Choi, like Choe, said the issues she saw in the coverage of South Korea in the 
Western news media stemmed from experts, including journalists and their sources, 
making basic factual mistakes in their reporting. These errors are then quoted and 
reprinted in other stories by people who know even less than the original “expert”. 
She said in instances such as this, the story can end up being inaccurate and this 
has the capacity to become viral. Choi pointed to examples of foreign experts on 
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South Korea making the basic errors in reporting the country and those errors being 
replicated across the foreign media. She said these experts seldom live up to their 
title. At the heart of this issue of coverage, for Choi, was a lack of Korean language 
ability on the part of many foreign correspondents, making them dependent on local 
media in English, translators and secondhand accounts of what was making news in 
South Korea. Under these conditions, Choi said, it was natural errors would creep 
into the coverage of the country. 
 
In evaluating the coverage of South Korea, Kirk chose to focus on those he thought 
did a good job accurately representing South Korea. He singled out Choe, Fifield and 
Gale for praise, but he said there were fewer and fewer foreign journalists dedicated 
to the country, but they cover the country well. Kirk also lamented that South Korea 
played “second fiddle” to the Middle East and North Korea.  
 
Lee Tae-hoon (2016) was far more vocal in his thoughts on the reporting of South 
Korea. He said South Korea has no international news value. North Korea, he said, 
attracts the clicks so that is where the market is. Although research is yet to be done 
as to whether Lee’s claim holds true or not, Lankov (2013) argues when it comes to 
broader international attention in the fields of diplomacy and foreign policy, South 
Korea is always in the shadow of North Korea. Again, in using the anti-Park protests 
of the time as an example, Lee said that even though they were grabbing headlines, 
the coverage of the protests was again “shallow” and lacked context. Instead, the 
stories focused on obvious details like the number of people who attended the 
protests and the weather. Along with a lack of appetite for stories from the south on 
the part of international media organisations, Lee said the foreign media 
organisations on the ground in South Korea lacked the necessary resources to build 
better context into stories on the country. Lee said: 
 
The international media does not have the resources. CNN has no power 
here. None of them do. The international media has no power to expose 
information on anything important because without the manpower there is no 
incentive to do so. Their audience doesn’t care. The audience only cares if the 
president dies. It’s all about scandal and major things happening. (2016) 
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For Lee, the social stories he sees as important and stories of corporate and media 
corruption are too complex for the foreign media to tackle and, for the most part, they 
are left alone. When they are taken on, they are done in a way that renders them 
impotent because they lack context and meaning. 
 
Power echoed much of what Lee said with the broader representation of the country 
lacking context and shade. Power said for many foreign correspondents reporting 
from South Korea, lack of access to sources caused by all the usual suspects -- lack 
of resources, an inability to communicate in Korean, no willingness to understand the 
politics, history and culture of the country, the contemporary demands of doing 
journalism, and the dominance of North Korea in the market for news all resulted in 
shallow reporting on South Korea. He said the market for journalism on South Korea 
was driven by neatly curated cultural phenomena like Korean pop music and the 
bizarre, including topics like the craze for plastic surgery, exam stress, and high 
suicide rates than actual news. At a scholarly level, what Power describes is a 
reaction to the digital disruption of news and raises questions of how we understand 
what journalism is and the role of the journalist (Deuze, 2005, 2006, 2008a, 2008b, 
2011; Deuze & Witschge, 2017; Zelizer, 2017). This combined with the ascendency 
of South Korea’s soft power and cultural products that paint an idealised but shallow 
(Kim, & Connolly, 2016; Kuwahara, 2014) country enamored with material excess 
create an inaccurate construction. As for Power, these are the stories that pay the 
bills when North Korea was not dominating the headlines. This resulted in some of 
the big stories on South Korea, including Power’s passion – the government’s 
repression of the news media – going untold.  
 
Power was careful to draw a distinction between what he described as the “stock 
standard” piece on topics including plastic surgery addiction and the miracle of the 
Korean pop music phenomena and the kind of story he likes doing on topics that 
delve deeper into social and cultural impact of different issues impacting Korean 
society. Power offered the example of how Korea is coming to terms with treating 
and preventing HIV-AIDS. He said he was interested in this topic because of the 
inherent tensions the illness presented in Korean society. He said this story had 
done well, but he conceded: “There are limits to the kinds of stories I can do.” Power 
said when he worked at The Korea Herald he could cover a much wider range of 
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stories than he does now because then he was writing for a Korean audience in 
English. He said many of the stories he covered then would not have been saleable 
to a foreign publication. For Power, a limitation for him as a freelancer feeding a 
largely American news market was packaging his stories so there would be some 
kind of direct connection between the reader and the topic. This, according to Power, 
often resulted in good stories never finding their way into publication because a 
“good yarn” was not enough. This tension was not exclusive to Power or freelance 
journalists in South Korea, with Gale, in his capacity as Wall Street Journal bureau 
chief in Seoul, making the same observation. None of this should be surprising, 
given revenue loss and funding cuts to almost all news publications have had to 
make them think carefully on what they do and do not spend money on, and this 
includes foreign copy. 
 
McCurry offered insights into one of two journalists in the sample based in Tokyo 
charged with covering South Korea. In writing for The Guardian, McCurry said 
reporting South Korea ranked third as a priority after Japan and North Korea. 
McCurry said most of his trips to South Korea were about finding North Korean 
stories and reporting on South Korea was an afterthought. McCurry said like North 
Korea, South Korea was one-dimensional in the international press. Again, the issue 
of lack of context cropped up with McCurry arguing it was difficult to tell meaningful 
stories on South Korea as he felt he could not assume his readers would have 
anything but the most superficial knowledge of the country. He drew parallels with 
the coverage and representations of Japan that all too often were reduced to what 
he termed “a fetishized” view of the country with stories focusing on issues like 
suicide and the peculiarities of an aging society. McCurry said whether or not North 
and South Korea featured in the same story, he saw a tendency for a binary 
representation to emerge on the countries. McCurry said: 
 
When you are writing about poverty in the DPRK or these fledgling moves to 
encourage some sort of private investment or free market activity inevitably 
you compare the two Koreas. Here you have South Korea with the fastest 
internet and K-Pop stars as household names and here you have North Korea 
where people eat grass. As a journalist it is very tempting to make these good 
and bad, black and white comparisons. (2016) 
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In her interview, Ramirez said she found the popular representation of South Korea 
as “overly simplistic” and lacking in context. She said the stories on South Korea 
were gendered in a way that fetishizes both Korean men and women, a point also 
made by Lankov. She said it was foolish to expect the mainstream media to provide 
anything other than the most basic of information on anything including South Korea. 
As a freelance journalist operating in South Korea, Ramirez covers mainly business, 
tech and information technology for a variety of news organisations. She is avowedly 
averse to covering North Korea which she describes as nothing more than a “click 
farm”. She said if readers really wanted to know more about South Korea they could 
dig deeper.  
 
The overwhelming finding to emerge from these interviews was the view the 
coverage of South Korea was shallow, one dimensional and lacking context. With 
the exception of Kirk, all of those interviewed expressed dissatisfaction with the 
mainstream coverage of South Korea in the English-speaking foreign media. The 
interviews revealed a frustration on the part of some interviewees over what they 
saw as a shallow representation and the narrowness of topics covered on the 
country. The interviewees identified a consistency in the coverage of South Korea in 
story and tone that saw the same narrow range of stories recycled over time. The 
question that begins to loom large is, “why is the coverage of South Korea like it is?”  
 
In answering this question, different interviewees emphasized different reasons and 
factors. For example, Jean Lee focused on a diminishing number of what she saw as 
highly-trained and skilled journalists working on South Korea. Lankov identified 
similar phenomena but also emphasised the pull of the exotic – real or imagined – as 
a key factor in how the world sees South Korea. Others, Pearson, Gale, Power, 
Evans and Cain, identified issues of access as a driving force behind the 
representation and framing of South Korea. Here, barriers erected by government 
and big business alike make doing anything other than the most basic stories on 
these organisations and their activities impossible. For Cain, this was the biggest 
frustration trying to meaningfully report South Korea. Journalists from across the 
spectrum – be they freelance or staff journalists – all saw access as an issue. 
However, the degree to which this impacted on journalistic practice was contingent 
on the masthead under which the journalist worked, with those working for big name 
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news organisations having a slightly easier time of it than those working 
independently.  
 
What McCurry termed “feeding the beast” was also central to how many understood 
what they should and should not report in South Korea. “Feeding the beast” roughly 
translates to meeting perceived and actual demands of editors and an audience that, 
according to almost all of the interviewees, had a very low tolerance for news and 
other kinds of reportage from South Korea. Reporting North Korea was also 
identified as a limiting factor in covering South Korea. These issues are explored in 
the coming pages.  
 
7.4 Market Forces – A Digitally Disrupted Industry  
 
McChesney (2012, 2013; McChesney & Pickard, 2011) argues it is the market for 
news that drives type, style and form of content published, and the market for news 
on South Korea is no different. The market for news on South Korea was a key 
determinant of how and what was covered from the country. Changes in journalism 
as an industry have resulted in a smaller market for news on and from South Korea, 
and this had resulted in a shift in the style of stories written and the way the country 
was covered. This was as true for those working for wire services, prominent 
mastheads and publicly funded news organisations as it was for freelance 
journalists. The pressures resulting from a changed and fractured industry and 
market for news presented themselves in different ways across the interviews but for 
each of them the pressures to conform to a perceived market for the material they 
produced was real and drove the coverage of the country. This was further 
complicated by the primacy of news on North Korea leading many charged with 
covering both countries to prioritise one over the other. What follows is a discussion 
and analysis of this theme. 
 
 
7.4.1 A Changed Landscape 
 
Both Kirk and Choe were mentioned in the interviews with other journalists as the 
most experienced journalists reporting on foreign news. Veteran journalist Don Kirk 
was able to offer a window on the long-term changes in the structure of the market 
for news on South Korea. After reporting on the Vietnam War in the late 1960s and 
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early 1970s, Kirk moved to South Korea reporting under the Park Chung-hee regime, 
and then the Chun Doo-hwan years. He then covered the slow push to plural 
democracy culminating in the election of progressive Kim Dae-jung in the late 1990s. 
Kirk still reports on both North and South Korea from Seoul for The Korea Times, 
CBS Radio, Forbes and a host of other news organisations. When I spoke with Kirk 
in December 2016, he was impatient to finish the interview and leave his Seoul 
apartment to cover the anti-President Park demonstrations in downtown Seoul.  
 
Kirk has lived through and reported on the changes that have transformed South 
Korea from one of the poorest countries in the world to one of the richest. He has 
also experienced the decline of journalism from what he termed the “golden age” to 
what we see today. Kirk said over the past decade the willingness for many foreign 
news organisations to maintain a fulltime presence in the country has waned to the 
point there are a few still hanging on. 
 
Kirk said: “Print media have basically bowed out. The Washington Post, The New 
York Times and The Wall Street Journal are still here, but other papers have left and 
do not take stories anymore” (2016). It is worth noting The Washington Post covers 
the Koreas from their Tokyo bureau and at the time of writing The Wall Street 
Journal was in the process of transferring at least some of their Seoul operation to 
Tokyo as well. Another long-serving Seoul-based journalist Geoffrey Cain said: 
 
The number of correspondents has been on a very sharp decline. If you go to 
the Seoul Foreign Correspondent’s Club these days it is usually empty. It’s 
irrelevant. What has happened to it is reflective of the falling numbers of 
foreign journalists covering the country and based in Seoul. Korea is not a 
priority country. Everybody seems to be in Beijing or Tokyo. (2016) 
 
Kirk said the big American papers he once filed for, including the The Boston Globe 
and The Atlanta Journal-Constitution, no longer take copy. There is an important 
distinction to be made here in the decline in the market for South Korean news. Kirk 
identifies a decline in a physical presence for foreign news organisations in Seoul 
while also identifying a falling demand for what freelance journalists are offering.  
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Kirk said the style of stories being filed had changed too, with a clear shift toward 
publications that were publishing on the internet. Kirk said any expectation the 
internet would deliver journalism from the troubles the industry was now besieged 
with had been quashed. He said the irony was that, even though he could reach a 
much bigger audience by publishing on the internet, there was an ever-shrinking 
pool of buyers for the stories he was producing, making it more and more difficult to 
see a future in doing his brand of freelance journalism. At a structured level, Kirk’s 
thoughts are in keeping with broader trends in the digitalisation and the dumbing 
down of journalism (Tandoc, 2014; Tandoc & Thomas, 2014). 
 
Choe said he had also noticed significant changes in the type and style of stories he 
had been filing for The New York Times. Choe said that while doing the kind of deep 
analytical pieces he had always done and The New York Times was famous for, he 
said he was being pressured to do stories that were short and ‘punchy’. Choe put 
this shift down to The New York Times being a website with a newspaper – not a 
newspaper with a website. Choe is referring to the recent preference for news 
organisations like The New York Times for what is euphemistically seen as ‘colourful’ 
content rather than the analytical content The New York Times is famous for. Again, 
this is in keeping with much of the literature around the digital disruption of 
journalism as an industry (Deuze & Witschge, 2017; Picard, 2014). This had led 
Choe to pursue stories with little news value that dwelt beyond his comfort zone as a 
journalist, including a story on the phenomenon of experiencing your own funeral – 
what he called “little features” and “off-beat stories”. Choe said: 
 
My individual observation is since they switched to the website the landscape 
has broadened a lot and they are wanting to attract people to the website and 
the short colourful stories do that. They want to keep them there for as long as 
possible and to do that we need to present them with all kinds of stories. Then 
there are the videos, photographs and the graphics. (2016) 
 
What Choe identifies here is an example of “feeding the beast”. Zelizer (2005, p. 72) 
defines “feeding the beast” as a “… reference to an always hungry press, (and it) 
describes a reaction to situations in which journalism’s demands are excessive and 
go too far, not unlike those of an overly demanding child.” More recently, Usher 
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(2018) defined “feeding the beast” in terms of a newsroom culture that values 
immediacy above other concerns. For Choe (2016), “feeding the beast” is a means 
of survival in contemporary society. It means telling stories that are rich in colour and 
short on substance for an unseen audience. These are stories of Mukbang, plastic 
surgery and K-Pop. For Choe, that is what sells and what keeps him in a job.  
 
7.4.2 Today’s Market for News on South Korea 
 
The market for news on South Korea can be categorized into three: business and 
industrial news; stories on culture and the culture industry; and the occasional hard 
news piece that examines both relations with North Korea or political strife in South 
Korea. The following section looks at the current market for news on South Korea 
and how this market drives journalism on the country. 
 
Pearson said Reuters’ bureau in Seoul remained profitable neither on the back of 
news of North Korean nor political or cultural news from South Korea. Pearson said 
Reuters was able to maintain and indulge his position and work as a North Korean 
specialist because Reuters’ core coverage of investor and company intelligence was 
profitable and readers saw value in it. For Pearson, there was no revelation in this as 
he conceded that, from its inception with Paul Julius Reuter dispatching carrier 
pigeons from Paris to London to the opening of the London stock exchange, Reuters’ 
core business has been covering business in the interests of “making people rich” 
and this has kept Reuters profitable.  
 
Seoul Bureau Chief for the Wall Street Journal, Alastair Gale, made similar 
observations. Gale said while “the Journal” in Seoul had not gone backwards, it had 
not become more profitable in the five years he had been at the helm of the Seoul 
bureau. Gale said maintaining a healthy balance sheet had come at a cost:  
 
There are lots of great stories in South Korea on things like elderly poverty, 
the high suicide rate and we have written about them but we have to focus on 
our core strength which are business, finance, economics and politics so 
other things have gone by the wayside. We have lost staff. With limited 
resources you need to deliver the stories your paycheck is intended to pay 
you for. (2017) 
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The grim prophesy for the news industry laid out by McChesney and Pickard (2011) 
at the beginning of this decade have been true for news on South Korea. Globally, 
the changes in both the industry and market for news and journalism have been in 
decline (Newman, 2019). Research from the Reuters Institute (Newman, 2019) 
shows the decline has been characterised by job losses and a transformation in the 
production and distribution of journalism. For Cain, a freelancer and author based in 
Seoul, changes in the industry have driven changes in content and this has resulted 
in corresponding changes in the style and content he files in covering South Korea. 
A familiar trope to emerge across all of the interviews on South Korea was the 
recognition to report on what was going to sell ahead of other considerations in 
reporting South Korea to a foreign audience. This rang true for freelancers as well as 
staff writers writing and producing for established wire services and mastheads. For 
Cain, this change in what editors in Sydney, London, or New York wanted on South 
Korea was in line with the tumultuous changes inflicted on the news industry. Cain 
said: 
 
When I first came here I was covering both North and South Korea for Time 
Magazine. Back then once every two or three weeks I could write a nice long 
1500 word feature about what’s going on in Korea – anti-US military protests 
or what’s happening in local politics, the four rivers project – just things that 
were going on outside of nuclear missiles. Now, there has been a collapse in 
what the magazines I had been working for are able to run and take. Time 
Magazine in particular – if you are going to choose a once iconic magazine 
that has suffered a lot it is your Times and Newsweeks – those news 
weeklies. It used to be 1500 words based on reporting in the field. Now it is a 
500 word summary of what is happening on Reddit and make sure it is about 
Gangnam Style and that’s it. There is nothing else that really gets in. (2016) 
 
Cain said in making a living out of covering Korea as a freelancer, you had one of 
two choices. The first was to focus on light and “fluffy” pieces. Stories on the plastic 
surgery industry, Korea pop music, the healing properties of Kimchi, and the 
peculiarities of South Korea online and cyber behaviour were all offered as 
examples, but, as Cain conceded, there is really no need to be in the country to do 
these kinds of stories. He said in many instances this kind of story circulates and is 
 226 
repackaged on a regular basis across platforms and news organisations. This 
conforms to Johnston and Forde’s (2017) conception of “churnalism” whereby, “The 
internet has also facilitated a type of ‘news cannibalism’ (Phillips, 2010) through 
which journalism insidiously feeds off itself and swallows up rivals; consumes and 
regurgitates, or to put it more politely: recycles, recontextualises and repurposes,” 
(p. 944). 
 
The second type of coverage is the kind of article and analysis that is published by 
organisations with deeper and more dedicated coverage of the Koreas and North 
East Asia. For Cain, these are the “pompous” publications, or as Cain put it, “The 
kind of thing you carry with you to make yourself seem smart and impress your 
friends”. Cain conceded there was next to no money in writing for the ‘highbrow’ 
publications like The Economist and that kind of work was also going to play second 
fiddle to the fluff.  
 
The other freelancers interviewed mirrored Cain’s views. Ramirez and Power, both 
of whom have a background in the mainstream Korean print media in English, said 
they had made the shift away from “writing in English for a Korea audience”, as 
Ramirez put it, to trying to create more freedom in doing the kind of journalism they 
wanted to do on South Korea. For Power, this was “doing important stories on Korea 
that weren’t being properly covered in the mainstream”. Power said these kinds of 
stories included cultural and political stories that offered more depth and context than 
what he was seeing elsewhere. Power echoed Cain. He said the reality of working 
as a freelance reporter was about “feeding the beast”. He said doing serious 
analytical stories on South Korea was intellectually rewarding but financially perilous. 
Power clarified that “feeding the beast” was writing the kind of stories that have a 
market. For Power, this meant mainly reporting on North Korea for digital startups 
like The Diplomat and NK News and the few remaining legacy media that buy 
content on North and South Korea, including The Christian Science Monitor. 
 
Power said shrinking and disappearing newsrooms had put pressure on those who 
remained and those who stepped in to fill the void or the “desert” to make tough 
choices over whether to pursue quality or quantity. Power differed from the other 
freelancers in saying from the general news and, what he described as “soft news” 
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perspective, there were plenty of opportunities to cover stories and topics, albeit in a 
shallow form, that would never have been of interest to an international audience 
even a few years ago. Power says: 
 
In 2012 Psy’s Gangnam Style went viral. That created a lot of interest from 
editors and their audiences on South Korea. The kind of stories they were 
after was different for the kind of thing before that. Almost overnight there was 
an interest for pop and cultural stories and I have done a lot of that stuff. 
There is still a good demand for that kind of story. (2017) 
 
Still, Power said he felt compelled to move away from the kinds of stories he wanted 
to cover in the interests of making enough money to justify working as a freelance 
journalist. For Power, this meant shifting his focus together to the more lucrative 
business of covering North Korea. Power said this meant forsaking the issues that 
were close to his heart in the pursuit of maintaining a career in journalism. 
 
The story was much the same for Ramirez. While serving as a staff journalist at The 
Korea Herald, Ramirez took the editor’s position at Groove Magazine, a Seoul street 
press targeted at expats. Here, she was able to steer the agenda of the magazine to 
issues facing Korea’s foreign community, including issues of exploitation, alienation, 
and labour. Ramirez said that while she found these issues both important and 
compelling, there was no market for that kind of thing if you wanted to survive as a 
journalist in South Korea. Ramirez said: “Most of what I do is tech related. For me 
that is where the money is …. Even though I have no interest in North Korea, I have 
been doing some of that lately, too.” Ramirez said she had picked up John Power’s 
Diplomat column when he had left South Korea for Australia, and her technology 
reporting had appeared across a range of publications, including Forbes and The 
Guardian.  
 
Her freelancing had taken her into the unfamiliar territory of reporting on business 
with a focus on Korean taxation as part of her work with Forbes. Ramirez said while 
it has been a struggle, she had been able to make being a freelancer pay without 
making North Korea her priority because she had found a niche in covering tech 
startups, Internet technology, and some economics and politics. As a side note, 
Ramirez said not being able to speak Korean did not pose a huge issue in the niche 
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she covered because in the Korean tech start up world, the lingua franca was 
English as many of those chancing their hand in the industry had been educated in 
the United States.  
 
The notion that journalists have the agency to cover what they want in the way they 
want simply does not align with the market for journalism. This is as true for the 
Koreas as it is anywhere else. The issue here is the respective markets for news on 
the Koreas determines what stories get picked up and the framing of those stories. 
Recent research by this author and Downman (2018) shows this phenomenon is true 
across categories of journalism – from the hyper-local through to international news. 
 
7.4.3 Freelance Journalists on the Edge 
 
The grim prospects for freelance journalists covering South Korea are made grimmer 
by a lack of institutional support and training. The romance of being a ‘foreign 
correspondent’ was a draw for those wishing to fill the void vacated by full-time staff 
journalists although the result was often far from good. For Jean Lee, the former 
Associated Press Bureau Chief for South Korea and North Korea, the exodus of staff 
journalists from Korea has had a negative impact on the quality of news coming out 
of South Korea, whether the stories filed be on North Korea or South Korea. In her 
view, a toxic combination of a lack of experience, training and journalistic institutional 
support leave a lot of those working in a freelance capacity over-exposed to the risks 
associated with doing journalism. 
 
Lee cites the case of Steve Borowiec, the former Los Angeles Times stringer in 
Seoul. The LA Times maintained a bureau in Seoul from 2001 until 2012. Since 
2012, they have relied on stringers for exclusive coverage of both North and South 
Korea. Weeks prior to the US Presidential election, in response to a Time pictorial on 
Trump’s life, Borowiec tweeted from his private account, “I’d rather see Trump die.” 
Rightwing media in the US led by Breitbart, the controversial “alternative” media 
start-up, and The Washington Examiner took the Tweet and framed it as a liberal 
media attack on Trump. In the days that followed, The LA Times formally severed 




The Los Angeles Times is committed to fair, evenhanded coverage of the 
presidential campaign and expects all journalists representing the paper, 
including non-staff contributors such as Borowiec, to adhere to this standard 
in their articles and social media posts. Borowiec’s tweet was a violation of the 
organization’s professional standards, and The Times has ended its 
relationship with him. (Edgar, 2016) 
 
 
Borowiec was disgraced as a journalist and quickly disappeared from Seoul’s foreign 
correspondent community to later re-emerge as a politics and society writer at Koo 
Se-woong’s Korea Expose. After vicious and sustained attacks from Trump 
supporters on social media, he also disappeared from Facebook and Twitter. Lee 
said this kind of incident was a direct result of the lack of training and support offered 
by news organisations to their stringers and freelancers (2016). Lee said she was 
able to develop into the journalist she is because she was able to learn in the 
newsroom, something lost on those who have never been exposed to the 
institutional benefits of learning and training the craft within a newsroom environment 
(2016). I approached Borowiec for an interview as part of this study after his 
infamous tweet. He did not respond.  
 
What this episode shows is how readily the The LA Times were to dump Borowiec at 
the first signs of toxicity. Beyond training, what freelancers and stringers lose are the 
benefits of institutional resources, cover and safety. In terms of resources, all of the 
freelance journalists interviewed said they were on their own, and this had a direct 
impact on the style and types of stories they could cover. Even Choe Sung-hun, 
working under The New York Times masthead, said there was a limit to the stories 
he could cover on South Korea because he was a “one-man bureau”.  
 
The pressure on freelancers covering South Korea and North Korea is driven by a 
variety of factors, and chief among them is writing what pays and getting paid. As 
discussed in Chapter Six, there is a much greater demand for stories on North Korea 
than South Korea. This imbalance is exacerbated by the ease of doing stories on 
North Korea. It is the norm for freelance journalists covering the Koreas to be paid 
per story, so, naturally there is a tendency for those doing this kind of work to chase 
the story that pays the most. According to Cain, these are North Korea stories: 
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Writing the North Korea stories is very formulaic. You speak to the same 
people and write basically the same story ever time. It takes about 30 minutes 
to do one of these stories whereas doing something that pays the same on 
South Korea takes something like five hours and you have to go out into the 
field. So, yeah, South Korea is something that happens when North Korea is 
quiet. (2016) 
 
In one form or another, this was repeated also in the interviews regardless of who 
they worked for.  
 
Making a living wage and getting paid were identified as issues by Power, Cain, 
Ramirez, and Lee Tae-hoon, with them all saying this was one of the more stressful 
aspects of doing freelance work. Alongside the uncertainty of getting paid was the 
difficulty of doing good stories with an intermittent cash flow. For Ramirez, this was 
the most difficult part of being a freelance journalist in South Korea as she relied on 
her income not only to support herself and her work, but also to employ a translator 
and researcher who she joked she was jealous of for having a regular income. The 
uncertainty of if and when they would be paid also made it very difficult to plan ahead 
or launch investigations leading the freelancers to often go for the easy stories and 
events to report on, which in this case were stories that had already been covered in 
the local news. According to Lee Tae-hoon, this puts the independent journalists in 
direct competition with journalists working for the big foreign news organisations who 
also all too often rely on local news for their copy, and this reliance on local news 
exposes both groups to issues of practice and culture that plague the South Korean 
media.  
 
7.5 Brand Power and Access to Elite Sources 
 
Access to government and corporate sources of information was identified as a key 
factor limiting the practice of pursuing and producing stories from South Korea. 
Access to sources was often dependent on who a journalist was working for, with 
freelancers expressing frustration over being shut out from some stories due to not 
working for a recognized news brand. Fisher (2018) argues, internationally access 
for journalists to all manner of sources has become more difficult. She attributes this 
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to the fundamental weakening of journalism as an institution as part of the digital 
disruption. In neighbouring Japan, the impact of the Abe Government’s restrictive 
policies on journalists’ access to government sources has been well documented 
(Fackler, 2016). 
 
Interwoven and interrelated to issues of access to elite government and corporate 
sources was the issue of source anonymity. Those willing to speak or be interviewed 
on even the most benign topics related to government and big business would often 
do so on the condition of anonymity, making it difficult for the stories they were 
informing to be accepted in some foreign publications. Source anonymity was also 
revealed to be a practice that was common across the South Korean domestic 
media landscape. 
 
7.5.1 Accessing the Chaebol 
 
Across the course of the interviews on South Korea, there was a consensus the big 
South Korean family owned corporations, hereafter referred to as Chaebol, do not 
like being scrutinized by journalists. The Chaebol are a product of South Korea’s 
authoritarian period (Eckert, 2016; P. Kim & Vogel, 2011). Under the rule of dictator 
Park Chung-hee, the Chaebol, including Samsung and Hyundai, were able to get 
cheap loans from the government to complete ambitious public works projects. In 
return for meeting targets, the Chaebol were able to operate largely free from 
government and public scrutiny (Brazinsky, 2007; E. M. Kim, 2011). The Chaebol’s 
success in building the South Korean economy has to a large extent elevated them 
above the rules and laws smaller organisations and South Korean citizens are 
subject to (C. Kim, 2014; Tudor, 2012). 
 
The most outspoken interviewee on the topic of corporate access was Cain who at 
the time of being interviewed was putting the final touches on a book on the darker 
aspects of the Samsung Corporation, The Republic of Samsung (Cain, 2019). 
Others expressed frustration in covering the Chaebol, with Evans (2016) saying, 
“Even if you can get access to their press conference, you get nothing from them.” 
Evans said the same thing of getting access to government sources, a refrain that 
was supported across the interviews. The following section centres around issues of 
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access as they relate to the Chaebol and then follows with issues of access to 
government sources of information. These were key themes to emerge in the 
interviews with journalists’ coverage of South Korea.  
 
Barriers in reporting the Chaebol were chief among the frustrations expressed in the 
interviews on covering South Korea. Yet, the degree to which access was gained or 
blocked often relied upon South Korean perceptions of news brands. For those 
working for a recognizable masthead, covering the chaebol was made easier. Fifield 
of The Washington Post said, “Koreans are status conscious and they care about 
titles and names. Going to the Blue House (the presidential palace) or Samsung is 
easier if you work for an internationally recognized organisation.” This point was 
repeated by Choe, Jean Lee, Gale and Pearson – all operating under major 
mastheads, including The New York Times, Associated Press, The Wall Street 
Journal, and Reuters. This difference was not lost on those working outside of the 
big brands. Cain, Power, and Ramirez all said they struggled to access any Chaebol. 
Ramirez said this was the reason she chose to focus on tech start-ups in South 
Korea as a niche because the culture surrounding the smaller new tech companies 
was much more open to journalists than that of the big companies. Cain and Power 
said despite a deep desire to cover all aspects of the Chaebol and their operations, 
they found it so difficult and time consuming there was no money in it. The 
implications here are obvious. With the Chaebol less likely to grant access to 
freelance journalists while, at the same time, the number of staff correspondents was 
on the decline, there was going to be less in-depth foreign journalism done on the 
Chaebol – the key drivers of the South Korean economy.  
 
Despite this brand awareness, even those in the privileged position of being 
connected to recognized news brands still struggled to get news leads on the big 
companies and more often than not had to find other ways into the story. Fifield said: 
“For me, I go back and talk to people who used to work in the Chaebol and talk to 
them for inside information as an alternative to going through the official routes. It is 
difficult to out the Chaebol, and their press operation is very controlling” (2016). Gale 
said brand value might help in getting the occasional interview with people 
connected to the big companies, but in terms of long term and sustained 
engagement there were other impediments. Gale said, for the local media, the main 
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point of access to the Chaebol was through the press clubs run by the Chaebol. Gale 
said: “There are the press clubs that offer exclusive stories but the local media fight 
tooth and nail to make sure the foreign media is not granted access” (2017). This 
was a point that was also made by Power and Cain.  
 
Journalists’ entry into the press club is highly restricted with those allowed in being 
rigorously vetted by the Chaebol that controls the respective press club. This leads 
to a situation where the Chaebol controls the message and the journalist. This 
summation led Power to ask: “What’s the point of being part of all this? You end up 
being nothing more than a shill for the Chaebol. There are better ways to spend your 
time.” Again, this is in keeping with the research and findings of Kim (C. Kim, 2014). 
Kim found that not only had the Chaebol from inception been averse to outside 
scrutiny, they had also been active in buying up South Korean media and imposing 
their policies of secrecy on the day-to-day workings of these organisations. In 
addition, they had bolstered local press clubs, only giving access to journalists they 
had vetted and trusted. Again, this enabled the Chaebol to control the narrative on 
how they were presented to the outside world.  
 
The reasons for the Chaebol keeping the foreign news media at arm’s length 
stemmed from the Chaebol’s relationship with the Korean media. Cain, Power, Lee 
Tae-hoon, York, and Choe all agreed that although most of the mainstream Korean 
news organisations were Chaebol or government controlled, the relation between the 
two groups had been far from acrimonious. Cain said: 
 
They (the Korean news media) have always been viewed as one of the 
instruments of power in the country. There is a fear the media’s power could 
be something that could undermine you, so the approach of the government 
and chaebol is always to play defense. This is the basic relationship. The 
government and chaebol don’t see the press as something positive that can 
be put to work as an advantage, so they play defense. This extends to the 
foreign media, too. We don’t get to talk to important people. (2016) 
 
Cain goes further in talking about why the Chaebol/media relationship is at its heart 
toxic. Other studies into this relationship have highlighted Chaebol ownership and 
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control of South Korea’s mainstream media outlets (Sa, 2009b, 2014). Cain said the 
South Korean media operate more like a cartel than a watchdog using their influence 
to bully those around them into buying advertising. Cain said: “This creates a lot of 
hostility towards them including from the Chaebol.” Cain said Chaebol use the media 
they control to exert influence over other big South Korea corporation and 
government, making media organisations instruments of corporate power. Cain also 
said the problem for those producing for foreign media organisations stems from a 
lack of differentiation on the part of the Chaebol in dealing with the foreign media and 
the local media. In simple terms, all outside news media organisations are viewed as 
the enemy by Chaebol, whether local or international, and are treated as such. Cain 
said: 
 
They treat the foreign media as they would the Korean media. They don’t 
understand that if I am doing an interview for The New York Times, for 
example, they are operating to a different standard. They have to go through 
fact checkers and editors. The New York Times is not going to extort or 
blackmail them or try to humiliate them in some unfair way. (2016) 
 
The consensus was the Chaebol public relations machine is very good at keeping 
the media out of their affairs. Gale said for both the government and the Chaebol the 
role of their public relations people is to “make sure nothing bad happens”. He said 
they do nothing to facilitate access or communication between themselves and the 
media, and their role is defensive. Gale said: “They don’t see the press as something 
that works to their advantage by putting something positive.” It should be 
remembered Gale is talking about his interactions with the Chaebol.   
 
Cain goes further than Gale in explaining the role of public relations people and 
media managers in their role as gatekeepers for the Chaebol.  
 
When I contact big companies or government ministries usually it is just a 
blanket “go away” or no response or “thank you for your interest, but go away, 
please”. The job of public relations people is interacting with journalists - to 
put together information to make it understandable and accessible to the 
media and the general public. The job of public relations people in Korea is 
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the opposite. It is to make the journalist go away. They are the gatekeeper or 
the guardian for the “glorious chairman” – the great leader at the top – 
something both the north and south have in common. (2016) 
 
Although Cain is talking about South Korea, the tension between journalism and the 
public relations industry globally has led some to define public relations, “… as an 
inherently negative force, a cancer eating away at the heart of modern journalism,” 
(Currah, 2009). Macnamara (2014) characterises modern journalism as a tug-of-war 
between journalism as an industry, the government, and corporate public relations 
for control of the narrative. What Cain and others are describing here is public 
relations with Korean characteristics. 
 
What emerges is a Chaebol that is concerned with how the rest of the world views 
them. They are keen to control their public perception and they see the best way to 
do this is by shutting the outside world out. Cain argues there are direct comparisons 
to be made between the organisation and structure of the Chaebol and the North 
Korean state. Cain describes the Chaebol as the “weak link” in the news coverage of 
South Korea and “more difficult to cover than North Korea” because of the barriers to 
access for journalists. Cain said the Chaebol have a strong aversion to reporting that 
exposes the inner workings and culture of the organisations. Cain said such 
reporting, “… makes them look crazy. It makes them look North Korean.” Cain 
added: 
 
This is an environment where people praise their leaders without limit. When I 
talk to people at Hyundai or Samsung, they praise their chairman to no end 
like he is a god. It makes for great reporting fodder because it really is the 
same structure as North Korea. The top job is hereditary, there is a militaristic 
style of rule, there is a family dynastic battle going on. At Samsung the 
younger kid did a coup d’état against the older kid for power and that’s what 
happened in North Korea, too. The older kids were exiled and on the run for a 
long time. There is presence of mass games. Samsung had their own mass 
games for a long time. North Korea has its own mass games. (2016) 
 
Cain said there are cultural forces at play in the Chaebol and North Korean state. He 
adds that these forces are heavily informed by two historical forces – post-Meiji 
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Japanese militarism, expansionism and the subsequent colonisation of the Korean 
Peninsula, and the impact of almost a millennium of neo-Confucianism. These result 
in vertical organisational structures and a fanatical loyalty to the leader. This fits 
within Myers’ (Myers, 2014, 2015) rejection of Juche as the organising and 
ideological principle under which North Korea is ruled, instead, like Cain, deferring to 
the deeper historical roots that both the North and the South share. Cain adds: 
“Minus the prison camps and minus the human rights abuses, if North Korea were to 
make smartphones it would be Samsung and there would be no difference between 
them in that regard” (2016).  
 
Cain, like Jean Lee, Kirk and Power all emphasized that, in reporting the Chaebol, 
and to some extent the South Korean Government, a deeper knowledge of more 
than contemporary South Korea was required. Cain argued that the history of 
Japanese colonisation and the social and political restructuring and reorganisation 
that followed were essential to properly begin to understand reporting the Chaebol. 
However, Cain said that beyond basic stories on technical and product innovation, 
there is little that can be reported. Cain added: 
 
Whenever I read Chaebol coverage it is overwhelmingly product focused. It 
would be like every article ever published about Apple was about the iPhone 
and they never make any mention of Steve Jobs. You need to have people in 
the company who are making decisions. You need characters. The best 
articles on the chaebol are the articles that get beyond the Business Week 
stuff and look how the business is actually informed by this dynastic structure 
of pure race, an emperor at the top, of cultural rituals – things like mass 
games and the mass incineration of book and products that aren’t up to speed 
– there are a lot things that culturally reporters could look at but choose not to. 
(2016) 
 
This again takes us back to Jean Lee’s (2016) point on having the right people 
reporting on areas, issues and topics they are experienced and have expertise in. 
What is needed are journalists who understand the environment, are well resourced, 
and have the desire and mandate to tell meaningful stories on the Chaebol and their 
activities. However, Lee concedes making the dream team in the current journalism 
environment is never going to be anything more than a dream given a lack of 
 237 
resources and the near non-existent market for deep analytical substantive stories 
on South Korea.   
 
Both Cain and Power are students of Korean history and both have a desire to see 
better reporting on Korea in the Western media, yet Cain admits there is no or little 
market for this kind of news. Power says that with the exception of what Cain termed 
the “highbrow publications” doing serious analytic journalism on South Korea is the 
stuff of imagination. Power said: “For almost every story I write on South Korea I 
need to include a lot of scaffolding. Stuff like, ‘Korea is of 50 million people and it’s a 
little bit like China but not really.’ This makes digging deep difficult” (2017). Power is 
correct. Under these conditions it is doubtful if the shallow representations and the 
focus on the wackier elements of the South Korean experience will change.  
 
Lee Tae-hoon lumps the interests of the Chaebol and government interests together 
in a very cynical appraisal of their relationship with the news media. Lee sees the 
foreign media’s role in South Korea as nothing more than an entertainment provider 
for a foreign audience. Despite or, maybe because of this, Lee was convinced 
stories of corporate corruption and collusion with the media needed to be told to a 
foreign audience because: 
 
There are lots of ways those big companies are harming society. The media’s 
role is reporting what needs to be heard. For the unfortunate and the victims 
of industrial accidents, for those trying to have a voice, and for those trying to 
organise a union – because the media in Korea can only survive as colluders 
and overlooking the important factors, those big companies can enjoy a good 
brand identity. (2017) 
 
For Lee, the relationship between the Chaebol and media was all about maintaining 
a good brand identity. At the local level of the Chaebol this meant employing 
complex and sophisticated means like the press clubs and a culture of white 
envelopes (bribes) to control the narrative. At the level of the foreign correspondent 
working in Seoul, this meant freezing them out of all but the most superficial 
channels of communication. Lee said this results in an ineffectual foreign media 
relegated to doing nothing more than product and tech reviews. Lee went on to 
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argue that even if the foreign media had the capability and capacity to cover the 
Chaebol in depth, would there be a market for it? He said: “As bad as things are 
here, they are much worse in Vietnam and China. South Korea is not a priority.” 
Despite a desire to tell these stories, Lee, like Cain and Power, is agnostic as to 
whether there might be a market for such stories.  
 
The foreign media operating in South Korea have little or no access to the Chaebol 
in pursuit of news. At best, as was pointed out earlier in this chapter, those feeding 
the Western media from South Korea, be they staff journalists operating under 
established mastheads or freelance journalists, can cannibalise local media in hopes 
of “feeding the beast”. Throughout this section on the Chaebol, there have been 
references to the South Korean government, and this topic is discussed next. 
 
7.5.2 Accessing the Government  
 
7.5.2.1 Defamation and Park 
 
It is difficult to talk about issues of access without surveying the nexus between 
journalism and the government and the power the government wields over local 
journalism. This is expressed through an oppressive legal environment for 
journalists.  
 
It is worth remembering that at the time of these interviews, President Park was 
about to be impeached after being embroiled in a scandal with her friend and 
confidant, Choi Soon-sil. The excitement from the interviewees was palpable. For 
example, Evans said: “There is blood in the water now and they smell it. The press is 
being very tenacious with Park.” What surprised the interviewees was how quickly 
South Korea was to turn on Park once it was clear she was facing impeachment. 
Choe said this was especially surprising given the powerful South Korean media 
organisations are conservative with many of the senior appointments in broadcast 
media being political. Choe said: 
 
It shows in South Korea when the president is powerful they can more or less 
control the media but it is also the case if they become unpopular and the 
organization can be profitable from writing critical articles against the 
president they will do that. In South Korea the president has resources to 
 239 
control the media – major newspapers, major television stations – the 
government has the power to control them. Now, they must also realise once 
they are unpopular the media will turn against them because attacking 
unpopular presidents sells newspapers and brings in the audience. (2016) 
 
With the scandal reaching a crescendo, it may not have been the best time to reflect 
on the question: “Has the environment for journalists changed under the Park 
administration?” Certainly, reports from Reporters Without Borders (2015), Human 
Rights Watch (2014), and Amnesty International (2015) suggested significant 
deterioration in conditions for local journalists. This is in keeping with emerging 
literature on Park that suggests as conditions for the Park presidency became more 
and more trying, Park threw up barriers to distance herself and her administration 
from the news media (Snyder, 2018, pp. 172-191). The participants all agreed 
conditions had not improved under Park, but the degree to which things had 
deteriorated was contentious. Again, the relative inexperience and the short time 
some of the participants had been doing the job of reporting on South Korea made 
the question a difficult one to answer beyond making observations on the difficulties 
of doing the job now. This did not stop Power from saying:  
 
I think it is a mistake to think Park Geun-hye is uniquely dictatorial. This idea 
that Korea was a bastion of freedom before her is nonsense. Freedom of 
expression here has always been shit, but the Kato case immediately 
enforces the perception she is authoritarian. None of this is new. The liberal 
presidents in Korea were never friends with the press. Roh sued four 
newspapers. (2017) 
 
Cain, Choe, and Kirk all argue the same point – South Korean governments have 
always distanced themselves from the media and especially the foreign news media.  
 
The interviews revealed until 2014 foreign journalists in South Korea felt insulated 
from the governmental scrutiny their local peers had endured. The arrest of 
Japanese Sankei Shimbun bureau chief Tatsuya Kato in 2014 on charges of criminal 
defamation saw chills ripple through the foreign press corps and demonstrated 
foreign journalists were subject to the same draconian laws as local journalists. Kato 
had been arrested after publishing a story on the whereabouts of Park Geun-hye 
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during the “seven missing hours” after the sinking of the Sewol passenger ferry in 
April 2014. Kato had published rumours President Park had been with a man in the 
hours after the Sewol had started taking on water. In publishing his story, Kato was 
repeating a rumour that had been widely circulated in the Korean news media with 
scarcely an eyebrow raised. Despite the Kato arrest, the interviewees were 
unanimous, saying while the Kato arrest was concerning, it had not changed the way 
they practiced their craft.  
 
Choe said while he had not changed the way he reports on Korea as a direct 
response to the Park regime, he thought the reporting environment under Park had 
not improved and conceded it had deteriorated. Choe said: “We see the government 
people using defamation law suits to intimidate reporters publishing articles critical of 
the Park Geun-hye administration.” 
 
Choe’s comments conform with the research and findings of Sa (2016). Sa found 
under the Park administration, local South Korean journalists had become 
increasingly risk averse as a response to what she viewed as a draconian journalistic 
environment. 
 
Choe identified political expedience in the use and application of criminal defamation 
against Kato. Going after Kato and the Sankei Shimbun was a shrewd move on the 
part of the Park Geun-hye administration in that it was an effective way to send a 
message to both local and foreign journalists that Park was not prepared to tolerate 
scrutiny from the news media on issues that had the potential to embarrass her. The 
other important point Choe makes on this was that attacking Kato and Sankei was 
safer than going after a reporter from the local Chosun Ilbo or one of the popular 
foreign mastheads like The New York Times or the BBC. Choe said: 
 
Sankei is not very popular in South Korea because it is a rightwing newspaper 
that publishes opinions that anger South Koreans. If you are a politician, 
Sankei is a good target because very few South Koreans are going to come 
out and defend the Sankei. It is very difficult to defend Japan in South Korea. 
Sankei is a very rightwing newspaper and that is how South Koreans 
understand it. Even if you sue Sankei for defamation, you are not going to get 
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the criticism from civic groups or the media you would get if you filed a law 
suit against a regular paper. (2016) 
 
At the time of Kato’s arrest, Park and the Japanese Prime Minister Abe were 
engaged in a very public war of words over the post-colonial territorial issues and the 
issue of comfort women. Park’s willingness to stand up to Abe early in her 
presidency came as a shock to those who anticipated Park would follow her late 
father’s lead in building and maintaining close economic, political and diplomatic ties 
with the island neighbour.  
 
During this period there were very public and well publicized anti-Korean far right 
nationalist demonstrations on the streets of Tokyo and Osaka making the mood in 
South Korea very anti-Abe. It was during this period, too, there was talk of amending 
the Japanese constitution to allow a resurgent Japanese military able to operate in 
an offensive capacity beyond Japanese territory. This was not a popular narrative in 
Seoul.   
 
There is a distinction to be made here. While this was the first instance of Park going 
after a foreign journalist or news organization, there had been numerous suits filed 
against Korean journalists. Park had already been criticized by the leftist media, 
human rights groups, freedom of press groups and freedom of expression groups in 
South Korea. To repeat Power, this was surprising because amongst foreign 
journalists there was a sense they were immune from this level of scrutiny. Also, 
again repeating an earlier observation from Power, the specter of legal issues ruining 
a career in journalism were nothing new, but as Cain, Choi, Fifield, Gale and Kirk all 
argue, under Park the glare of the government over the news media had intensified 
with a greater willingness on the part of those in power to bring the full force of the 
law on those deemed troublesome.  Cain said: 
 
The number of criminal defamation cases from public officials has been on the 
rise since 2008 under Lee Myung-bak. When Park Geun-hye became 
president she picked up Lee Myung-bak’s legacy and continued with what he 
was doing with the defamation laws. This is all part of Park’s eagerness to 
hide herself away and restrict access. (2016) 
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The imposing spectre of defamation was not the only barrier erected to keep 
journalists at arm’s length. The Park administration had also sought to become 
cloistered.  
 
7.5.3 Accessing Government 
 
The way the government interacts with both the foreign and local news media in 
South Korea is no different from the way the chaebol interacts with journalists. The 
interviews revealed both Chaebol and government use the press club system to not 
only limit and control the flow of information from inside out but, like the Chaebol, to 
vet journalists and control who will be reporting what. Again, the foreign media are 
frozen out from these channels of communication leaving them to again republish 
what the local media have put out and rely on sources beyond the official channels. 
Fifield said: 
 
People are taking stuff that is already written and re-publishing it. You uncover 
a lot when you have a conversation with someone. The conversation can go 
in surprising ways and you can get insights that you could never get if you are 
just taking it from online. Sitting online and ripping bits and pieces from here 
and there is not journalism but it seems it is how a lot of people are doing it 
here. (2016) 
 
As with reporting North Korea, the onus then becomes finding pundits and 
commentators to add colour to the story beyond what has been reported by the 
Korean press. For Gale, Evans, and Pearson, this was easily solved and explained 
away by the compulsion to tie every story on South Korea to something that related 
to their audience. This meant having a commentator or pundit in London or New 
York make sense of what was happening in Seoul or Busan. Power and Cain both 
said this made it tough to report on things South Korean if there was no obvious link 
to what was happening in their audience’s lives or home countries.  
 
Across the interviews there was a clear sense that there had been deterioration in 
access to reporters to the Blue House and government departments since Park 
Geun-hye had taken power. Unlike her predecessor, Lee Myong-bak, Park has 
distanced herself from both the local and foreign news media. Gale, Cain, Power, 
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Choe, and Kirk all saw her withdrawal from the media glare as part of Park’s extreme 
sensitivity. This sensitivity intensified in 2014 when she failed to account for her 
whereabouts during the early stages of the sinking of the Sewol, or what became 
known as “the seven missing hours”. This was a sensitivity that, according to the 
above, has resulted in greater application of legal means to silence those who 
pursued her in the news media. 
 
For Fifield, one of the more alarming aspects of Park’s media strategy along with 
becoming more and more media shy was her tendency towards email interviews as 
the primary form of communication with journalists. Fifield characterised this form of 
interaction as “not an interview” because it offered no chance for follow-up questions 
and, “you don’t know if that is her you’re really speaking to.” Fifield said this was 
nothing more than a form of government propaganda: 
  
The other phenomenon that gives me grief is the email interview. There is no 
such thing. For the coverage of South Korea this is common practice now. 
Going back to Park Geun-hye, she is incredibly media shy and has become 
more media shy over the course of her presidency. She hasn’t done a foreign 
interview since the beginning but before she went to DC or New York recently 
she did an email interview with Bloomberg which they ran. I thought, ‘why is 
Bloomberg agreeing to this?’ It was so bizarre. I don’t believe she was the one 
who answered those questions. And then there is no chance for follow-up for 
anything. This a trend I really lament. (2016) 
  
For Gale, like Fifield, this was one of the aspects of covering the goings-on in the 
South Korean government that had made the job more difficult. Gale is interesting in 
that before Park’s downfall, he was almost alone on Twitter as a foreign journalist 
criticising Park and her administration and seemingly unconcerned over how Park 
and her people might react to his tweets. As Wall Street Journal bureau chief, Gale 
was also unusual in that he had a face-to-face interview with Park in 2013. Since 
then he has not been granted a further interview, and all access to senior figures in 
her administration has been severed. Gale said in President Lee’s time in office he 
had been able to interview Lee twice and he had access to some of the senior 
figures and their staff in the administration. Gale went on to say: 
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Under Park she has stopped doing interviews. Now she does ‘written 
interviews’. This is insufficient and we have complained to them. There is also 
a disconnect between The Blue House and the other ministries under Park. 
There is a detachment under the current administration. Under Lee it wasn’t 
great, but it was better. For the Korean press it is even worse. They have no 
access. (2017) 
 
This theme was repeated in conversations about all levels of government – from 
district to national. If there was a story to be told, it would first emerge as a press 
release through one of the press clubs and then would be published verbatim in the 
South Korean press. It was then the foreign press would get wind of the story.  
 
Here, the masthead brand value touched upon earlier comes into play. For the 
freelance journalists at the bottom of the journalistic pile, the story has always been 
grim. Even when there was greater access to government sources to those working 
under recognisable mastheads, freelance journalists were shut out. For those 
working under prominent mastheads, the erection of barriers on the part of the Park 
Administration had been a bitter pill to swallow. This move signalled the tightening of 
the channels of communication for all in the news media and a greater control of the 
South Korean narrative on the part of Park.  
 
 
7.5.4 Issues with Available Sources 
 
An inability to communicate in Korean was identified as a theme in shaping stories 
on South Korea although this was less important to those who could not speak the 
language. There were two key components here. First, in an effort to source stories, 
non-Korean speaking journalists gravitated towards English-speaking Korean 
sources. Second, non-Korean speaking journalists tended to be more reliant on the 
Korean English language news media for their stories while at the same time unable 
to understand the largely conservative nature of such publications and organisations. 
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7.5.4.1 Conservative Sources 
	
Lankov, Choi, Power, Cain, and Choe all noted some reliance on the part of English-
speaking-only journalists in Korea to rely on a certain type of source in writing their 
stories. All five agreed this had a very clear impact on the way stories on South 
Korea were selected and told.  
 
Lankov said he has observed two fundamental sourcing issues that led to the “exotic 
representations” and the “exoticization” of Korea in the English-speaking media 
inside and outside of Korea. First, he identified the use and over-presentation of 
English-speaking non-Korean experts and pundits on the country. He said this can 
lead to the Orientalisation of news on Korea “as a strange place very, very far away”. 
The kind of source Lankov refers to here is a Korean fluent in English after being 
educated in America and very conservative in their political views. He said they 
tended towards representations of South Korea that conformed to how the average 
American sees South Korea.  
 
Lankov referred to these sources as “the Gangnam crowd”. Gangnam is Seoul’s 
most affluent district and is home to the country’s wealthiest residents and many of 
South Korea’s biggest and most successful businesses. Lankov said: 
 
The western educated Korean elite feed these stories to the Western public 
and without realising it bring something of their own presumption. Let’s not 
forget Korea is a remarkably egalitarian society, but English speaking people 
are always part of the elite because for a Korean to master English is as 
difficult, expensive and time consuming as an English speaker to master 
Korean. They present views and opinions of Gangnam people plus stuff the 
Gangnam crowd rightly or wrongly believe to be of interest to the western 
readers. They are very selective in talking about the real political issues. Big 
debates around things like national history are only partially represented in the 
English language media in Korea. It’s okay to talk about Japan, but the really 
big debates over the foundation of the Korean state go almost unnoticed by 
the English language media. (2016) 
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Both Choe and Choi agreed with Lankov’s characterisation of the Gangnam crowd 
and the over-representation of their views in the Western media. Choi said the 
privilege allowed them access to American education and this naturally left them pro-
US. She said relying on this kind of person as a source was a problem on many 
levels but this was keenly felt in stories regarding South Koreans’ views on and 
responses to North Korean activity which were overwhelmingly pro-US and anti-
DPRK. Choi described this style of reporting as self-serving, self-fulfilling, and 
dishonest in that it failed to come close to representing anything other than 
conservative views on the issue. Power echoed this view saying there was not 
enough in these types of stories to shed light on and represent what he described as 
South Korea’s ideological and nationalistic divide. 
 
Choi said when these analysts are relied upon at the exclusion of those who do not 
have a voice in English, an imbalance in coverage was created and the full story 
became obscured because groups representing other political views and 
stakeholders lacked the resources to disseminate their message in any language 
other than Korean. 
 
For most of those interviewed, the choice had been to cover what they could with the 
resources available which often resulted in stories being covered in the foreign 
media that were already heavily plundered in the South Korean media. This also 
meant a reliance on local media in finding stories.   
 
7.5.4.2 Reliance on Local Media 
 
Another theme to emerge, as in the previous chapter, was criticism of the tendency 
on the part of some journalists to rely on the mainstream South Korean media. Choe, 
Gale, Fifield, Power, Cain, Choi, and O’Carroll were all highly critical of the practice 
of recycling South Korean news media for reasons of unreliability, poor journalistic 
practice, and bias.  
 
For Lee Tae-hoon, the uncritical use and exploitation of local media for stories and 
story ideas was deeply problematic. In his interview, Lee painted a picture of a South 
Korean news media that had lost sight of what he understood their role to be. 
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According to Lee, any semblance of a fourth estate role had been lost to government 




In the traditional media in Korea the number of outlets is increasing and media 
companies are expanding – at the same time their influence over the 
audience and readers is decreasing. They are becoming less relevant, but 
there are making more money and have more staff than ever. It doesn’t make 
sense. The only explanation for the survival of these media companies is by 
extorting or colluding with the government and the chaebol – writing 
sponsored articles –unethical articles in favour of those who have vested 
interests. (2017) 
 
Lee makes connections and draws conclusions other interviews were reluctant to 
talk about. Although cronyism exists in the South Korean media, the extent of the 
links between big business and government and mainstream media is a topic for 
further research. What is certain, is big media in South Korea exists on the familiar 
left/right political spectrum. Big media is often chaebol-owned and live on the right. 
This was a theme that emerged in the last chapter, and it stands here, too. The right 
have a clear ideological stance, and they will report events in South Korea and the 
Korean Peninsula through that lens. Problems arise when those drawing on this 
material in their reporting fail to understand or acknowledge heavily biased views 
they are transmitting into the international media. This is in line with the previous 
section where ease of access to a source trumps careful consideration as to the 
veracity or ideological stance of that source.  
 
 
7.6 The Case for Hope 
 
This thesis paints a grim picture of the effectiveness of foreign news media based in 
South Korea in covering the country and bringing about change. This is not always 
the case. Depending on how you view it, the beginning of the end for the Park 
presidency was in April 2014, with the sinking of the Sewol and the cavalier and 
ham-fisted way the Park Administration dealt with the families of the bereaved. As 
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the first snows of 2016 signalled the transition from autumn to winter, the number of 
protestors marching through Seoul swelled to over a million. Yet, mainstream South 
Korean news media were silent on the demonstrations other than warning people to 
steer clear of the centre of Seoul due to traffic congestion. According to Fifield, 
Choe, Kirk, Gale, and Power, Park had learned from the experience of her 
predecessor Lee who had been plagued by protests and bad press for the duration 
of his presidency and ordered a media blackout of the protests. Conservative 
mainstream media had complied as had all the major broadcasters. It is worth 
remembering the executive positions for the nation’s broadcasters are political 
appointments. Park’s control did not extend to the foreign media, and this contributed 
to her downfall.  
On November 12 a piece on the protests appeared (Choe, 2016) in The New York 
Times under Choe’s byline. This set an unusual set of events in motion. The 
following day, the South Korean ambassador in Washington DC sent a letter to The 
New York Times demanding they withdraw the piece from circulation and print a 
retraction. The editorial team at the The New York Times closed ranks around Choe 
and published a piece (New York Times Editorial Team, 2016) saying neither they 
nor their journalists would bow to bullying or intimidation from any quarter including 
the South Korea Government. They said they stood on the side of freedom and 
democracy and published a piece to this effect under the byline “New York Times 
Editorial Team”.  
Coverage of the protests on the part of the mainstream South Korea had by this time 
become inevitable. In an about face as swift as it was destructive to the Park regime, 
the South Korean media turned on Park and she was tried in the court of public 
opinion. By the time the spring sun started to melt the winter snow and ice on the 
streets of Seoul, Park and a growing number of associates, including her friend and 
confidante Choi Soon-sil and Samsung Electronics CEO, Lee Jae-yong, were 
awaiting trial in a prison in Seoul’s northern suburbs. The degree to which Choe’s 
journalism precipitated regime change in Seoul is a matter for debate, but what the 
episode did demonstrate is big media brands like The New York Times do matter 
and have the power to help shape the future of the Korean Peninsula.   
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7.7 Conclusion 	
This chapter found, to a large extent, it is the market for news on South Korea that 
determines stories on the country. As a middle country, South Korea is eclipsed in 
demand for coverage by neighbouring North Korea, China, and Japan although, 
according to Justin McCurry, Japan is also under-covered at the international level. 
 
Lack of interest in news on South Korea on the part Western news organisations 
translates into a very high threshold for stories that are deemed worthy of 
publication. For some of the journalists interviewed, this was frustrating as a high 
threshold resulted in big stories on South Korea that emerged from a vacuum. 
Disembodied and random, these stories paint a picture of a bizarre nation where the 
inexplicable and surprising leads the news agenda. Although the threshold for news 
on South Korea is higher than North Korea, the overarching emphasis is still on 
bizarre stories and this comes at the cost of deeper more analytical journalism.  The 
other type of story to emerge is the strange variety. These stories tend to focus on 
the extreme side of South Korea and South Koreans and often frame the country as 
one struggling to come to terms with wealth, consumerism and financial success. 
These stories are often on South Korea’s love affair with plastic surgery, the bizarre 
ways South Korean’s make use of the internet, suicide, Korean pop music, and 
South Korea’s extreme work culture. These stories are cheap and easy to produce 
and appeal to resource poor journalists who know there is a market for such content.  
 
The results of this chapter show telling serious and considered stories on the 
Chaebol and government is all but impossible. Lack of access, resources, and, 
sometimes, language and journalistic skills result in stories on these key South 
Korean institutions going untold in the foreign press. Yet, in light of the international 
media’s preference for colour over substance in constructing the nation’s narrative, it 
becomes arguable whether if access was granted to key Chaebol and government 
figures the framing of South Korea would change. 
 
This chapter explained the factors that impact of the framing of the South Korea as a 
country. On the odd occasion South Korea does feature in the international news, it 
does so as an oddity. The same set of factors that have ravished the mainstream 
media have rendered South Korea little more than something that makes news when 
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nothing is happening to the north. These are the conditions under which South Korea 









































This study investigated the framing of the international coverage of North Korea and 
South Korea in The Guardian and news.com.au in times of profound change for 
journalism. It is argued in this study that the transformation of journalism as an 
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industry, a practice, and a means of constructing an understanding of the world 
beyond our immediate experience has necessitated a fundamental shift in the way 
journalism is studied and practiced. It means accepting the role and function of the 
newsroom has changed. Within the bounds of framing as a scholarly pursuit, the 
disruption of journalism as an industry means interrogating the ‘journalist frame’ 
(Boesman et al., 2017; Brüggemann, 2014). In the context of news on North Korea 
and South Korea, this means investigating the network for news on the countries and 
seeking to understand journalists as part of that network. This enables an 
understanding of the factors that determine the way they construct narratives on and 
about the Koreas for an international audience.  
 
Since Tuchman (1978) wrote her seminal study in the construction and framing of 
news, the news landscape has changed beyond recognition. This thesis not only 
accepts those changes but seeks to contextualise them as part of a progressive way 
to the framing of news. In seeking to understand the construction and subsequent 
framing of the Koreas, a simple analysis of bylines revealed very little of the content 
on those countries in The Guardian and news.com.au was generated in those 
newsrooms. Rather, this content was drawn from a complex network of contributing 
journalists. “Journalist” is used loosely here as many of the contributors did not 
conform to traditional definitions of who and what a journalist is.  
 
Picard’s Twilight or New Dawn of Journalism (2014) offered a framework for what a 
changed journalism industry looks like in crisis (Anderson, 2013; Anderson et al., 
2012; McChesney & Pickard, 2011). Testing this framework enabled this thesis to 
move beyond traditional ethnographic approaches to studying the construction of 
news and investigate a networked journalism focused on North Korea and South 
Korea.  
 
A tension emerges between the treatment of the complex and nuanced story of the 
Koreas and the changing nature of journalism as an industry. This leads to a 
situation whereby the framing and the story of the Koreas is incomplete. Although it 
is outside the scope of this study to know whether such framing is deliberate or not, 
the sample of stories and the interviews with journalists identify this as a problem in 
the mediated construction of the Koreas.  
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8.1 Thesis Overview 
 
There are three questions asked in this thesis. 
  
RQ1. What does the network for news on North Korea and South Korea look like?  
RQ2. How is North Korea and South Korea framed in news.com.au and The 
Guardian Australia? 
RQ3.  What are the factors that influence the way in which journalists report on 
North Korea and South Korea? 
The first examines the composition of the network for news on North Korea and 
South Korea.  
 
As part of a response to calls to look beyond the newsroom as the site of the 
construction of journalism narratives (Anderson, 2013; Anderson et al., 2012; Zelizer, 
2004), using a simple byline analysis, the first part investigated the networked nature 
of news (Beckett & Mansell, 2008; Van der Haak et al., 2012) on the countries. The 
approach was important because it established that newsrooms, in the case of the 
Koreas, were no longer the sites of content creation. It enabled a decision to move 
beyond the newsroom and into the field, leading to interviews with wire service 
journalists, instagrammers, pundits, craft mode providers and others feeding the 
metaphorical beast for content on the Koreas. This also led to the opportunity to 
interrogate the journalists’ (Boesman et al., 2017; Brüggemann, 2014) frame on the 
Koreas. 
 
The second question examined in this thesis pertained to the framing of the Koreas 
in The Guardian and news.com.au. In order to recognise changes in the practice of 
journalism, this analysis took an unconventional approach to framing. This was done 
to contextualise framing in a disrupted news environment, and analysed articles, in 
the sample, as a whole. While using different methods in analysing text and images 
within an article, this thesis takes the view that both elements combine in an event-
based frame.  
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The third question was aimed at making sense of the construction and framing of the 
Koreas. In seeking to bring context to the frames (Boesman et al., 2017; Reese, 
2009; Van Gorp, 2007), semi-structured interviews with the people reporting on the 
Koreas for an international audience were used as part of a wider framing 
methodology. This study differed from many others using a similar mixed methods 
approach, particularly in the questions asked of the interviewees. Rather than 
appealing to questions of frames and framing, these interviews look to broader 
questions and themes in the construction of the Koreas. Again, this was deliberate 
and done to draw out the broader issues in reporting on the Koreas. The interviews 
ranged in duration from one to two hours and revolved around questions of the style 
and nature of content and questions of practice. These interviews were then 
thematically analysed.  
 
These three questions combined to give a comprehensive analysis of the framing of 
the Koreas in a disrupted media landscape, with an emphasis on industrial and 
ideological change.  
 
8.1.1 Network  
 
Mapping and shedding light on the network for news on the Koreas led to several 
key findings. Chapter Four revealed that although the network for news on the 
Koreas was diverse, there was a heavy reliance on international wire services. This 
is in keeping with other research into the reliance on international wire services for 
international news (Lee, Maslog, & Kim, 2006). This was especially true for news on 
South Korea, despite there being a sizable foreign journalist contingent working 
under big international mastheads based in Seoul. Both The Guardian and 
news.com.au relied heavily on wire services for their news on the North, but both 
drew upon wider networks for their content on North Korea.  
 
A key point of difference between the two organisations lay in the composition of 
their respective networks. For news.com.au, the network was inward, or “intra”, 
looking and drawing content from the wider News Corporation network for their 
content on North Korea. This resulted in a tendency toward the hyperbolic and 
shallow. The Guardian does not have the benefit of drawing on the same intra-
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network as news.com.au and instead looked outward to other news organisations, 
and other news sources, in constructing a picture of North Korea beyond what the 
wire services provided. The resulting Guardian coverage of North Korea was more 
diverse.  
 
Set against the background of Picard’s (2014) industrial modes of journalism, 
revealing here is The Guardian’s use of craft mode providers in their coverage. To a 
limited extent, this conforms to Picard’s view of the role these specialist web-based 
news providers increasingly play in the news industry. Both NK News and Daily NK 
augmented The Guardian coverage of North Korea in both depth and informed 
analysis. Craft mode providers fill the gap vacated by specialist experts leaving 
newsrooms in the wake of the disruption of news.    
 
In terms of quality and quantity of coverage, The Guardian far exceeded 
news.com.au. Over and above the use of craft mode and wire services, The 
Guardian drew upon pundits, social media, freelance writers and staff writers in 
building their “The North Korea Network”.  The mere existence of this network 
acknowledges the necessity of going beyond the newsroom in assembling a diverse 
range of content on the country. Notable in its absence was a corresponding network 




Despite the diversity of sources for news on the Koreas, there was a uniformity to the 
framing of both North Korea and South Korea across both news organisations. This 
frame is labelled ‘the bizarre frame’.   
 
This study found the coverage of South Korea is largely dependent on what is 
happening in North Korea. In terms of journalistic coverage, South Korea lives in the 
shadow of North Korea. There are numerous reasons for this, but findings from 
Chapters 5 and 6 suggested that with the breakdown and disintegration of traditional 
models of journalism in the wake of the digital disruption of news, the appetite for 
stories on South Korea from those willing to pay for them had steered toward the 
bizarre (Cain, 2016).  
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Gone is the market for immersive and analytical pieces. They have been replaced by 
stories that fetishized the more bizarre aspects of South Korean culture and society. 
To this end, this study found the salience of the bizarre frame in framing both Koreas 
difficult to ignore. Within the scope of micro-frame, the sub-frames that comprise the 
bizarre frame, the only place where South Korea could be analysed to any degree of 
satisfaction was in the conflict frame (Gamson, 1992; Gamson & Modigliani, 1989) 
alongside and in contrast to North Korea. Again, it was the bizarre aspects of the 
conflict that were elevated and salient in the framing of the south. These included the 
use of loud speakers to broadcast across the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) separating 
the two Koreas. South Korea was constructed as an impotent bystander or victim 
alongside an aggressive North Korea. North Korea was framed as bizarre, too. 
Unlike South Korea, North Korea was framed as irrational and unpredictable. This 
formed a binary with the evil North and innocent South bookending the bizarre 
frame.  
 
Reinforcing these frames were the images in the stories. For North Korea, there 
were the ubiquitous images of Kim Jong-un. He was portrayed as an odd character 
smiling despite driving the rest of the world to the precipice of war and possible 
annihilation. He is usually surrounded by older fawning men taking notes. Most 
revealing is that these kinds of images of Kim are used in stories where Kim is not 
mentioned. This conflates Kim with North Korea with the converse also being true. 
They are one and the same.  
 
For South Korea, the images used are more closely related to the story. President 
Park only makes an appearance when she is part of the story. She is also depicted 
in more stately terms than her northern counterpart. Still, despite this, in keeping with 
the stories themselves, there is a bizarre quality to the images. Images of South 
Korean pop-stars and people using computers dominate the imagery across the 
South Korean stories helping to create frames that speak to a country that is 
concurrently shallow and strange.  
 
This study contextualises framing against broader changes in journalism as an 
industry. At its core, this study accepts frames are more than a newsroom construct. 
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Frames are a product of the environment in which journalism is done (Reese, 2009; 
Van Gorp, 2007). This is an environment that is shaped by endless factors driven by 
an industry in flux. In this environment the onus is on stories that titillate and 
entertain. This is the root of the bizarre frame.  
 
8.1.3 South Korea 
 
These findings were drawn from interviews with journalists supplying the Western 
market for news on the country. 
  
South Korea can be best understood as an afterthought in terms of international 
news. As a nation, South Korea suffers “middle country” syndrome (Evans, 2016). 
This happens when a nation is relatively well run and lives in the shadow of their 
neighbours. In the case of South Korea, this results in the threshold for news on the 
country being much higher than their more dysfunctional and fractious neighbour. 
When stories reach and exceed the threshold and make it into the international news 
cycle, they appear random, extreme and lack proper and appropriate background. 
This further enhances the bizarre flavour of South Korea as paradoxically 
unpredictable. 
 
Stories on the oddities of South Korean society feature in this study, too. The 
interviews informing this chapter suggested stories on the excesses of life in hyper-
capitalist South Korea are common fodder for Western news media organisations. 
These stories paint a picture of a nation struggling with the trappings of success. 
They often include stories of plastic surgery addiction, strange and unusual online 
behaviour, and a bizarre corporate culture. The staple is stories of South Korea’s 
popular culture industry. These stories present a stylised vision of South Korea that 
is at odds with the reality of the country and its people (Koo, 2017). 
 
Like any other country, foreign journalism on South Korea has been impacted by the 
digital disruption (Sa, 2016). Gone are the publications that published longer “think 
pieces”. Even publications like The New York Times are pushing their journalists to 
publish shorter more colourful articles that are more suited to digital delivery and 
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consumption. This resulted in interviewees uniformly labelling coverage of South 
Korea as a country as “shallow”. 
 
The findings also showed the coverage of South Korea is determined by the 
employment conditions of journalists covering the country. The disappearance of 
many prominent foreign mastheads maintaining correspondents and stringers in 
Seoul, falling rates of pay for remaining staff journalists and freelancers, lack of 
investment in staff development, and the casualisation of working conditions have all 
contributed to more and more of those covering South Korea unable to competently 
perform the role of a journalist covering the country. This is in keeping with Seo 
(2018) who found diminishing investment in staff development within wire services 
was resulting in less skilled staff. This translates to fewer foreign journalists being 
able to speak Korean, and fewer journalists understanding South Korean culture, 
politics and society. This also results in fewer journalists able to draw a sustainable 
income from covering South Korea. This, in turn, leads to foreign journalists relying 
on local South Korean media for stories without an appreciation of the limitations of 
that media, and a reliance on a small pool of local sources, a tendency towards 
“easy” stories and a construction of the country that is inaccurate.  
 
While the middle of the market has fallen out the market for social and political 
stories on South Korea, the market for business and investment news analysis has 
thrived. The global elite buys these kinds of articles, and, as such, this is the market 
Reuters, Associated Press and The Wall Street Journal have decided to service. 
 
News on South Korea is something that happens in the shadow of North Korea. 
Unstable employment has pushed journalists reporting on both countries to abandon 
risky stories. ‘Risky’ can be understood as stories that may not generate traffic into 
host news organisations’ websites. These included longer analytical articles, stories 
on the more sobering aspects of Korean life, and, more broadly, stories on South 
Korea as a whole. The overwhelming consensus among the interviewees was that 
covering South Korea in any serious capacity was often too resource and time 
consuming to make it profitable. For those wanting to maintain a foothold in covering 
the Koreas, the mainstay was stories on North Korea.  
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8.1.4 North Korea 
 
The story of why North Korea is presented like it is in the Western news media is 
both simple and complex. Put simply, North Korea as a country is largely 
inaccessible to outside media. This results in two key effects. First, it makes stories 
on the country difficult and sometimes impossible to verify. This study finds, rather 
than withdrawing from the topic in the interests of good journalistic practice, Western 
journalists and news organisations have flocked to even the most absurd stories on 
the country in the interests of “feeding the beast” for clicks on their stories. This 
creates a very low bar for content on North Korea while the corresponding threshold 
for news on South Korea becomes inflated. This conforms to Lankov’s (2015) 
summation of “anything goes” no matter how strange when it comes to 
misunderstanding North Korea.  
 
Second, inaccessibility to the country has spawned a range of other sources who 
have become the “go to” places for stories or support for stories on North Korea. 
These include, the South Korean news media, pundits, defectors, and other 
journalists and news organisations. A consequence of this, combined with the low 
bar of stories on the country, is the lack of understanding and recognition of the 
inherent ideological biases of many of these sources. This results in a narrow view of 
North Korea gracing the pages of the websites we get our news from. As was 
introduced at the beginning of this thesis, this view is more a caricature of the 
country (Smith, 2015). Also, more often than not, this conforms to the incumbent 
policy on North Korea emanating from Washington DC and Seoul. The low bar also 
results in an “anything goes” approach to story-telling on North Korea that translates 
into the stranger the better. Single source anonymous unverifiable stories have 
become the norm in stories on North Korea.  
 
Defectors were highlighted in the findings as a key source on North Korea. Although 
there is a swathe of literature on defectors (Green, 2017), other than this author 
(Murray, 2018), there is yet to be an authoritative study on defectors as sources for 
news on North Korea. As a contribution to the study of North Korea and journalism, 
this study found defectors form an important part of the North Korean story. Often 
defectors are the only North Korean voice informing a story. An important finding 
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was the role defectors play in promoting conservative foreign policies of isolation in 
relation to North Korea as part of a broader human rights agenda. This resulted in 
journalists like Choe Sang-hun (2016), who support deeper more sustained 
engagement with North Korea, viewing defectors as diplomatic pawns in shifting the 
dominant narrative on North Korea away from policies of engagement. The policy 
implications formed part of a broader set of concerns over the reliability of what 
defectors had to say about their former home. There was also deep cynicism around 
the rise of celebrity defectors and their motivations for representing North Korea and 
their respective North Korean experiences in the terms they did.  
 
Another interesting point of contention among the interviewees was the presence of 
Associated Press in Pyongyang. This was a finding that, again, revealed an 
ideological and political binary in how to deal with North Korea. At issue here was 
whether it is right for AP to maintain a news bureau in Pyongyang in the knowledge 
they were handing most of the editorial control of the bureau over to agents of North 
Korea. Again, this revealed a ‘hawks’ and ‘doves’ divide where those who supported 
engagement with the North tended to support AP in Pyongyang. Those who took 
issue with AP in Pyongyang did so on human rights grounds and tended towards 
more isolationist policies in dealing with North Korea.  
 
Ultimately, news and coverage of North Korea is driven by the same forces that 
govern the coverage of South Korea – the bizarre leads, for it is the bizarre that gets 
the clicks, likes and shares. This fuels a culture that rewards journalists to frame both 
countries as bizarre. For many, doing so has become a matter of survival rather than 









It has been almost a decade since McChesney and Pickard (2011) published their 
collected essays, Will the Last Reporter Please Turn Out the Lights: The Collapse of 
Journalism and What Can Be Done to Fix It. The collection presented compelling 
arguments for changes to journalism practice as a means to staying ahead of the 
impacts of digital disruption of journalism. This thesis demonstrates that this has not 
been the case. Instead, journalism as an industry has been reactive. In the case of 
those covering North Korea and South Korea, this has meant the practice of doing 
this kind of work has changed in ways that do little to further an audience 
understanding of these countries.  
 
Growing job and work instability has led journalists reporting on the Koreas to report 
on the countries in ways they sometimes see as unsavoury. The pressures of 
maintaining a foothold in journalism has resulted in journalists resorting to stories 
that in any other setting would be unethical. Colour has become more important than 
substance in this form of journalism. This leads a culture of reporting that 
emphasises the bizarre instead of reporting that emphasises accuracy, fairness, and 
balance.  
 
8.2.2 Theory and Methodology 
 
As part of a contribution to framing theory, this thesis has responded to calls from 
Reese (2007) and Van Gorp (2009) to situate and contextualise framing within a 
“web of culture”. The web of culture here refers to the context where journalism takes 
place. This context can be comprised of environmental factors, industrial factors, 
social and political factors. The best way of exploring these factors was through 
interviews with journalists reporting on North Korea and South Korea. Simply 
extracting frames from a text does not tell the full story. Moving beyond the 
newsroom and into the network that supplies the articles on North Korea and South 
Korea for consumption results in the need to map and understand the environment 
where story production and construction happens. Building on the work of   
Brüggemann (2014) and Boesman et al. (2017), the “Networked Framing” approach 
advocated in this study addressing the industrial environment and conditions 
journalism on the Koreas take place in as well as recognising the primacy of the 
journalist frame in operating in such an environment. 
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None of this is to suggest all framing studies need to use multi or mixed methods. 
Even so, this thesis argues, if there is value to understanding framing as part of a 
wider culture of journalism, and this calls for a mixed-methods approach. This study 
based in a culture of a crisis. This is a culture of instability in work and uncertainty 
about the future direction of journalism as a practice and an industry. In explaining 
this culture, this study drew on Picard (2014) in shedding light on the structural 
changes in journalism. Questions of impact of day-to-day pressures of doing 
journalistic work as well as institutional change became key determinants in why the 
Koreas were framed as far away and bizarre.  
 
8.3 Limitations and Suggestions for Future Study  
 
This study did not set out to draw conclusions about the state of journalism and the 
journalism industry as a whole. However, the changes to the way in which North 
Korea and South Korea are covered and framed as part of a post-digital disruption 
expression and the connection to reporting on the strange as the mainstay of 
journalism is worth researching in other locations.   
 
Further, investigating the role of The Guardian and news.com.au as gatekeepers will 
shed further light on the broader construction of North Korea and South Korea. The 
changing role of the mainstream newsroom from a site of production to centre of 
distribution has been studied under the guise of gatekeeping (Barzilai-Nahon, 2009; 
Barzilai-Nahon, 2008; Bruns, 2005; Singer, 2014; Singer et al., 2011). The uniformity 
of the frames found across the networks investigated as part of this study suggest 
the newsroom as a source of frames and this requires further study. A study of this 
type would also serve to further Picard’s notion of the service mode of journalism by 
adding to scholarly knowledge on the contemporary role of newsrooms.  
 
Research into better ways to accurately report on North Korea in practical terms is 
needed. Given NK News and The Daily NK are regarded by most journalists 
covering North Korea as a benchmark in reporting on the countries, a deeper study 
into why this is so would have the potential to reveal better ways of approaching not 
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only North Korea but also other despotic or difficult to access regimes. Also, these 
news services are expressions of the digital disruption of news in that they are 
internet based. Studying these organisations could well provide analysis on what it 
takes to thrive in a disrupted journalism industry. 
 
More extensive and detailed research on the extent to which the mainstream South 
Korean news media set the international agenda for news on North Korea would 
broaden understanding of the mediated construction of the North. Such a study 
involving South Korean journalists would shed light on the inner workings of South 
Korean journalism as an industry and a practice.    
 
This study was limited by the number of news organisations investigated, the 
platforms those organisations publish across, and the number of journalists 
interviewed. In enriching our knowledge of the framing of the Koreas, future studies 
could investigate the coverage of the countries from different or a mix of platforms 
including online, print and/or broadcast. This would also have the benefit of bringing 
diversity to the sample of content and journalists interviewed. It would also allow for 
a greater range of news organisations to be studied. There would also be 
advantages to going beyond the Australian context. This might mean looking at 
American and British news media, but, ideally, it would mean going beyond the 
English speaking world. This would expand understanding of how North Korea and 
South Korea are constructed, framed, and understood to a global level. This would 
expand the understanding of how ideology works in the framing of the Koreas in the 
transnational setting in a disrupted journalism industry. 
 
Finally, this study serves as a platform for investigating international reporting in 
other parts of the world. The digital disruption has transformed journalism and this 
needs to be addressed beyond the Korean context as part of how we study the 
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